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ABSTRACT 
Melting into the Margins intervenes in the academic and media debate about normality: the 
white nuclear family and white middle class men. This thesis traces the emergence of the 
contemporary discourse which suggests that the normal is being displaced into the margins, 
away from the centre, 'disproved' as a lived condition and shown to be * untrue' as an 
ideological concept and examines the implications and effects of this discourse. A new 
discourse of the normal is deemed necessary by the academic disciplines of masculinity and 
family studies because they argue that we live in a new age of tolerance, equality, meritocracy 
and plurality. The disciplines of masculinity and family studies that this thesis critiques argue 
that in this new age and new society the *old' idea of a white, middle class, gendered, 
heterosexual normality is becoming unworkable and obsolete. This thesis examines the new 
discourse itself and its archive (Foucault, 1972), in the form of contemporary representations of 
white men and the white, middle class, heterosexual nuclear family. Beginning with the idea 
that white men were traditionally and historically invisible this thesis argues that this was never 
so and that the centre of our society has always been visible. This thesis offers a critique of the 
current project from the academy and from the media that proposes to *make-the-centre-visible' 
in order to 'prove' that normality does not exist. 1 argue that this project, which exposes failure, 
doubt and abnormality beneath the surface appearance of the normal is a project set up by white 
middle class people for white middle class people. The new project, its discourse and archive 
attempt to demonstrate that no-one has any extra-ordinary power in our society because of race, 
gender or class. This thesis argues that this demonstration evidenced in the academy and the 
media takes an extreme anti-essentialist view point that eventually denies that there are any 
limits to choice or opportunity. The denial of an excluding and exclusionary normal predicated 
on concepts of difference suggests a pure meritocracy, which helps to justify the continuing 
domination of white men. The aim of Melting into the Margins is to offer a critique of the 
current discourse of normality and an examination of its archive and to offer ways forward that 
can truly fulfil the stated objectives of masculinity and family studies: the deconstruction of the 
exclusive, excluding white, middle class centre of British society - the normal. 
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Introduction 
The characteristics of the privileged group define the societal norm. [...] 
The characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are 
described as societal norms - as the way things are and as what is normal in 
society. This normalization of privilege means that members of society are judged, 
and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by those 
privileged. The privileged characteristic is the norm; those who stand outside are 
the aberrant or 'alternative'. 
Members of the privileged group gain greatly by their affiliation with the dominant 
side of the power system. This affiliation with power is not identified as such; 
often it may be transformed into and presented as individual merit. [...] 
Achievements by members of the privileged group are viewed as the result of 
individual effort, rather than privilege (Wildman and Davis, 1997: 316-7). 
This thesis intervenes in the current debate about normality: its definition, its status, its 
positioning, how it is represented and the possibility of its continuance, either as an ideal or 
as reality. Where the normal in the shape of white, middle class masculinity and the white, 
heterosexual, middle class family was seen as the ideal, privileged and powerftil centre of 
British society, this thesis argues that currently there is a cultural change; an ideological, 
rhetorical and discursive removal of normality away fi-om the centre of society and into the 
margins. The ideological and rhetorical removal both maintains and creates a discourse 
that denies the possibility of normality's existence in contemporary British society. And 
this thesis argues that this has been the general discursive movement in British society at 
least since the mid 1990s. Within the currently fashionable inclusive discourse of 
multicultural, plural, tolerant, meritocratic contemporary British society, normality is 
usually discussed as not existing 'anymore', often as never having existed in the first place, 
as being an ideal that it is not possible for anyone to (really) obtain and indeed, as being an 
undesirable ideal anyway. This thesis traces and examines this discourse in relation to 
feminism and postcolonialism, arguing that normality still exists as a material position, a 
regulatory ideal and a myth.' It argues for the recognition of a normality that is still 
associated almost exclusively with white, middle class men and the heterosexual, white 
' In this case 'myth' is defined in the Barthesian sense whereby both facts and representations which define 
the normal are given a cultural inflection which conflates the concepts of the normal making it appear namral 
and eternal (Barthes in Storey, 1998: 115-117). Within the terms of this thesis, myth is discussed as being 
able to both create and sustain reality. 
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nuclear family and which continues to be an exclusive position that confers privilege and 
benefit because of class, race, sexuality, age and gender. 
This thesis examines the archive (Foucault, 1972) of the discourse that is being created by 
the academic disciplines of masculinity studies and family studies and current media and 
fictional representations. In these academic disciplines and often in the media, there has 
been a shift whereby the white middle classes are the new objects of speculation, 
discussion, representation, unease and radical discourse. The new 'radical' discourse 
indicates a break with the past and advocates a deliberate re-positioning of the concept of 
the normal: a theoretical, rhetorical and representational removing of the normal from the 
centre into the margins of society. 1 argue that there is a new discourse about normality 
emerging with the white middle classes themselves being its authors through a 
reconstruction of the archive of the discourses of the normal. In the new discourse that 
emerges with this archive normality, as an ideal and actual position is being disavowed and 
denied and a new discourse of inclusivity, multiplicity, fluidity and therefore equality for 
all is being set up. 
In masculinity and family studies and very many media representations the consensus is 
that throughout the developed Western world, the 'old ' idea of the normal is said to be 
becoming obsolete, unworkable and untenable because of changes in society. Hence there 
has emerged a deliberate project aimed at dismantling, disproving and disavowing the 
normal. It is part of the work of this thesis to document and discuss how this is being 
done; from a discussion of why the normal is said to need displacement (chapter one), to a 
spectacularization of the nonnal that scrutinizes it and therefore displaces it (chapter two), 
to a re-reading and re-writing of the history of the nonnal and old-style masculinity which 
posits the normal as 'past' and singular (chapter three), to a discussion of the relentless 
anti-essentialism of both masculinity and family studies (chapter four). In all the 
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discussions and representations that this thesis looks at (the archive), 'traditional' positions 
of normality, white, middle class men and the heterosexual, middle class nuclear family, 
are deliberately being disassociated from any idea of the normal. This removal is said to 
benefit those who have been historically marginalized by being positioned as different to 
the normal as well as those who are said to have had to carry the 'burden' of nonnality. 
The dis-appearance of nonnality is said to be best for everybody. 
As we will see throughout this thesis, the main thrust of the cunent argument is that 
normality only ever existed as an insidious myth that created and sustained inequality and 
unfair power differentials. It is the intention of this thesis to examine the changed 
discourse that currently asserts that a denial and deconstruction of the centre and a 
destruction of any idea of the normal is the moral and correct way to enable a redistribution 
of power. In this discourse nonnality is discussed as no longer existing and those who 
were seen to be in positions that could be described as being closest to the normal are 
being shown to be just as disempovvered and marginalized as everyone else. This has the 
effect of symbolically re-positioning the centre of society in the margins and supposedly 
equalizing British society. Thus through the academy and the media we are told that there 
is no centre anymore, no longer any discrimination against minority groups, that we all 
have the same choices and opportunities and that the white middle classes are no (longer) 
more privileged than anyone else. In this discourse therefore normality no longer exists or 
exists only as one un(der)privileged position among many in the margins. Thus the benefit 
and privilege accruing to those in the position of the nomial is also being said to no longer 
exist. 
It is my contention throughout this thesis that the current denial of the nonnal and the 
project from both the media and the academy that aims to disprove and deconstruct it as a 
'reality', far from leading to liberation from the normal, actually serves to hide the fact that 
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spaces of privilege do exist that confer benefit and privilege because of race, class, 
sexuality, age and gender. The cunent denial of the spaces/places of the normal leads on 
to what is becoming a systematic denial that white men might be able to exercise power 
because they are white men (heterosexual, middle class and often the 'head' of a nuclear 
family), and not because of individual merit and talent that has been recognized and 
rewarded by an equal, just and meritocratic society. And similarly, the constant denial 
from family studies and many media representations that the nonnal, white, middle class 
family can ever be normal, denies any privileging of this family form that may arise from a 
capitalist economy as well as from society's ideologies, discourses and representations. 
This thesis works from Foucault's suggestion that: 
Power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms (Foucault, 1976: 
86). 
Assuming (as I do) that normality still exists, i f the continuing power of the position, 
reality and myth of normality cannot be seen, it cannot easily be resisted. If therefore, 
nomiality still exists as a place of power and privilege and it is in the interest of the ruling 
class that it continues to exist, then it is most effective for the ruling class itself to deny the 
existence of the normal and, by implication, suggest that we live in an equal and 
meritocratic society where nonnality is being marginalized. 
The new discourse that this thesis traces is sophisticated, complicated and very effective. 
White middle class commentators acknowledge firstly that any ideal or reality of an 
exclusive and excluding normal is immoral and needs changing. This itself is a new move 
whereby the white middle classes are involving themselves in the seeming deconstruction 
of their own privileged position. Secondly both the academy and the media seem to accept 
the idea that what cannot be seen cannot be resisted. Therefore the new move from both 
the academy and the media is explicitly to make the centre visible. This it is said will 
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displace, deconstruct and ultimately destroy the exclusive white, middle class normal. The 
culmination of the new discourse is a varied and concerted effort designed to expose 
normality and bring it to light. The idea being that visibility in and of itself will destroy 
the normal and is in the process of doing so already. The visibility of the white middle 
classes pursued by the media and the academy looks 'beneath the veneer' of normality in 
order to expose the failure, doubt, disempowerment, bewilderment and often downright 
abnormality underneath. What is supposedly exposed by this project is the non-existence 
of normality in 'actual fact'. Thus we have a double denial of the normal whereby it is 
said that what 'looks' like the normal isn't (reality), and at the same time it is said that this 
exposure itself destroys the myth of normality.^ 
This introduction sets out the main areas of concern within this thesis, including an 
explanation of the intervention the thesis makes into the academic debate about the centre 
of British society as evidenced within contemporary masculinity and family studies as well 
as in current media representations of the normal. I begin with a discussion of the 
definition of the normal and my strategy of using the words normal and normality. 1 then 
move onto a discussion of the evidence given by masculinity studies, family studies and 
postcolonial studies of the origins of our ideas about the normal and how it is defined 
against that which is placed as 'different' to it; for example the feminine and colonized 
people of colour. This leads to an examination of the rise of both masculinity and family 
studies as new disciplines arising primarily out of traditional sociology in the form of 
masculinism and studies of the family. I will look at how masculinity studies and family 
studies, in opposition to this traditional sociology claim parentage from both feminism and 
postcolonialism. From this I set out my methodology of examining the archive (Foucault, 
1972) of the normal and the re-application of feminism and postcolonialism to the 
" In the new discourse there is often a conceptual split between the ideas of reality and myth whereby myth is 
perceived to be 'untrue'. Within this split a separate and perceivable reality or 'truth' is suggested to be 
beneath the myth ignoring the material and ideological effects of any cultural myth, whilst simultaneously 
ignoring the "status of truth" (Foucault, 1984: 74). The ideological creation of 'truth' will be discussed later 
in this introduction. 
14 
discourse of the normal. Following on from this the next section of the introduction 
"Interventions from Cultural Studies" sets out the position this thesis takes within the 
academic discussion of the normal, showing how it intervenes in these debates. Taking 
two cultural theorists of the normal, Deborah Chambers from the discipline of family 
studies and Sally Robinson from the discipline of masculinity studies, I discuss how my 
work moves on from their discussions, arguing that the visibility of the centre that they cite 
as a threat is in fact a strategy from the centre which will serve to maintain the status quo. 
This leads to a discussion of the use of taking a cultural studies approach to examine the 
discourse of the normal and in particular the importance of media representations in the 
maintenance and creation of this discourse, reviewing my choice of primary texts used 
within this thesis. Discussing how enunciations and the discourse that they exist within 
create truth, this introduction ends by examining Mahmood Mamdani's definitions of 
'beneficiaries and victims' (Mamdani, 1997). This introduction lays out the main areas of 
concem for this thesis, traces where these concerns originate from and points to the way 
that I move the debate forwards. 
Definitions and uses of the word Normal 
This thesis entire is about normality; a concept of the normal is at the centre of it. In 
general parlance there are different types of normality which include: medical normality 
whereby the state of health is ascertained via an idea of a norm or standard of 'good' 
health, both physical and mental; a normal that is ascertained by a statistical average; a 
concept of everyday normality for individuals; and the type of normality this thesis is most 
concerned with, a biologically visible position (whiteness and usually maleness), 
heterosexuality, a position of economic stability and the possession of symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 2001), power and knowledge. Throughout this thesis I use the word 'nonnal' 
in this final way to depict what in this definition it is culturally, historically and 
ideologically fneant to mean, an idea of an 'ordinary', 'proper' or 'best' way of being or 
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living that is universalized. At its most basic this definition defines the normal through 
race, sexuality, age, class and gender. These characterisecs; whiteness, heterosexuality, 
middle age, middle class, maleness, historically defined as the normal, help to secure a 
politically, socially or culturally central posifion and lifestyle within a society that in and of 
itself, because of how it is structured, both conferred and still confers privilege, benefit and 
power to the group of individuals who possess these characteristics. 
Within the academy the word normal is not usually used and there is a decided preference 
for the terms 'nomiative' or 'normalization'. And where the 'normative' and 
'nomialization' indicate a process of becoming or moving towards the normal, the 
'normar is an already-there outcome. The use of the words 'normative' or 'normalization' 
point more to an activity (an averaging out, a homogenizing impulse, a moralizing pull) 
rather than to a conceptual thing or a solid and static position. The concepts of 
nomialization and the normative are more abstract and can apply to anyone, the normal is 
more concrete and can only apply to certain (white, middle class) people. From the 
discipline of masculinity studies Bob Connell says that "normative definitions" allow for 
some recognition of the differences between men, offer a standard of masculinity but 
"allow that different men approach these standards to different degrees" (Whitehead and 
Barrett, 2000: 32). Within the tenns of the normative therefore, some movement and 
interpretation is possible. Where Connell cites 'normative definitiooy', the normal would 
only have one definifion. The nonnative thus also more readily refers to a plural than the 
singularity of the nonnal. The term normative is far more fluid than the more historically 
and politically relational concept, structure and position of the nomial. 
In my use of the word nomial 1 do not take it to mean a majority, usual or average position 
although these definitions of the word will become important as we proceed. Within the 
argument of this thesis I take the word as describing a position that only a specific minority 
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can reach. However, although this thesis denies the possibility, the new discourse I am 
examining points to a process of normalization whereby everyone is in the same boat 
really, and anyone with the right attitude, despite differences in class, race or gender has 
the opportunity to choose their own position and lifestyle (meritocracy). And, even as the 
more static normal is being denied as an exclusive and exclusionary position, I will argue 
that the nonnal continues to be normalized (and therefore recreated) through its denial as 
an exclusive position and its repositioning as marginal. In our society the concept of 
'nonnalization' indicates a process towards a position that can (and should) be made into 
an average or majority posifion, one that aims to become ubiquitous. TTie ideal of a 
meritocracy involves a denial of the position of the normal as exclusionary and actually 
widens it out as a concept, making it inclusive and thus supposedly turning it into a 
position that anyone can achieve. Paradoxically the widening of the normal (supposedly 
turning it into a position that anyone can achieve), is being accomplished implicitly 
through a process that sets out to abnormalize the normal. In this process (aided and 
abetted by media and academic discussions and representations) the normal is being 
strategically marginalized — shown again and again to be just one more position among 
many in the margins and therefore a position that anyone can choose to occupy. Thus even 
as the exclusionary nonnal is being denied, the concept is being constantly recreated as an 
inclusive concept that still carries the same ideologies and moralizing pulls that it always 
did. 
The academic reluctance to use the word is perfectly understandable as it is embarrassing 
to still have a white, heterosexual, middle class, male and familial normal sfill in place. 
However in this thesis the use of the word normality is a deliberate strategy which aims to 
show that normality is (still) a concept with psychic and material consequences and 
implications, and to highlight the fact that it is a common currency colloquialism. It is 
even more important to use the words normal and nonnality because currently they are 
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politically uncomfortable to use. In fact this thesis argues that it is this very political 
discomfort that is driving the current denial of the continuing existence of normality. 
Therefore my use of the words normal and normality is an integral part of my argument 
that positions and concepts of normality and the normal still exist and the use of these 
words is part of this thesis' strategy of intervention in and disruption of the 'comfortable' 
contemporary discourse arising from the academy and the media. Although I recognize 
that the words normal and normality are awkward to use and even embarrassing, 
sidestepping the use of words that are still used will not eradicate the concept of the normal 
or its political, social and personal effects. 
The new inclusive discourse that marginalizes the normal promises the same opportunities 
for all, and in doing so de-historicizes the concept of the normal. Thus we have a peculiar 
move whereby the new discourse denies normality's existence even as it invites everyone 
' in ' . So for example the first sentence in an important and influential family studies book 
reads: "Our focus in this book is the changing nature of intimate and familial relationships 
in the context of shifting normative frameworks" (Silva and Smart, 1999: 1, my italic). A 
'shifting nonnative framework' in denying a static and exclusionary normal does not 
actually let other people into the normal but rather points to changes in the boundaries and 
the removal of certain goal posts. Thus the normal seemingly becomes permeable and, one 
would suppose, therefore dissolves. This however involves a denial that the positions of 
whiteness, a concept of ' the' family, middle classness and maleness do still and have 
historically, fonnulated the normal. That which has been defmed as the normal has always 
been specific, discrete and a minority position with closed, impenneable boundaries. Even 
as the white middle class normal defmed itself as a universalized 'average', it was an 
exclusionary 'average' that placed the majority of people as different and abnormal. 
Historically and therefore defmitionally it is noi possible for everyone to be normal: 
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normality and the normal are classed, racialized, sexualized and gendered concepts that 
inherently set up inequalities. 
The Historical Emergence of the Normal 
The discursive formation of white masculinity and the normal family is usually sourced as 
beginning to be apparent in colonial times, and in the nineteenth century in particular (see 
for example Tosh, 1999, Davidoff and Hall, 1987, Whitehead, 2002, Beynon, 2002, 
Weeks, 1981, Sinha, 1995). In the discussion of the historic construction of the normal, its 
creation in relation to an idea of abnormality is inevitable. In relation to the normal it is 
the perceived 'differences' of races, classes and genders that allow the normal to be 
defined as white, male, middle class and Western. Our current ideas o f the nonnal are 
cited as beginning with the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution necessitated a 
division of home and work and ft"om this precipitated a gender division that is still 
recognized today (Tosh, 1999). Division of another kind was necessitated by the colonial 
adventure whereby a definition of 'civi l ized' culture and people (white, western) was 
created in opposition to 'savage' and inferiorized native cultures and people (Hall, 1997a) 
and 'manly' men were defined in opposition to women as well as often in relation to the 
'effeminate' men of other cultures (Sinha, 1995). Because of the division of home and 
work, and because the colonial administrations needed men to be away from their families, 
questions of monogamy and paternity became pressing and many of our myths of perfect, 
or at least proper, family life are premised on these fears as well as more positive ideals of 
reftjge and sanctuary and peace (Tosh, 1999, Weeks 1981). These divisions of home, 
work, gender, race and many others including class and relative status and ideas of proper 
'civilization' all congealed into a (white, middle class and British) definition of the normal 
in opposition to what was seen as improper, abnormal or uncivilized. 
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The gendered division of labour; home and work, equates to a division between the public 
and the private. Chambers argues that 
By the mid-nineteenth century in Britain, the concept of the family was perceived 
as nuclear, patriarchal and hierarchical, and its members were defmed by their 
primary relationship to the conjugal couple [...]. Discrete family units headed by a 
male breadwinner, became the hallmark of both civilized society and stability 
(Chambers, 2001: 37). 
The image and trope of the nuclear family, with its male head became embedded into 
culture in colonial times and became one of the most abiding images of 'civilization'. 
Colonial tropes of both the family and masculinity rested on all kinds of definitions of 
difference and various constructed hierarchies in all of which normal, white masculinity 
sits at the top. Chambers argues that the nineteenth century idea of the family itself at the 
time upheld the idea of white male dominance: 
The family came to be a metaphor for the naturalizing of hierarchy, of race, gender, 
generation, nation. [...] Women were only treated as members of the nation-state as 
dependants of men and the family in private and public law, not directly as citizens. 
By drawing on familial metaphors, the naturally superior 'adult' races were 
perceived by the white British to be domesticating, by example, the 'children' of 
'primitive' races. The hierarchically gendered middle-class family was therefore 
centrally a symbol of white imperial nationalism, providing a sexual, gendered and 
racial justification for the white male control over colonial space (Chambers, 2001: 
39). 
The 'family' as a regulatory myth or ideal of the nonnal (white, middle class, British) 
served to justify colonial domination, the domination over others by white men and the 
universalizing of the idea of the white normal as the proper and moral standard. 
The split between the domestic and the public domains was also consolidated at this time 
partly through a very strong concept of biological determinism that occurred in the 
nineteenth century. Biology, through ideas of biological determinism, (social) Darwinism 
and eugenics not only separated the 'uncivilized' races (the non-white) and the 'civilized' 
races (white), but also separated the masculine from the feminine domestic (Weeks, 1981). 
Thus the idealized image of the nomial, which placed the white man at the head of his 
nuclear family also, in a peculiar twist, removed him from that very domestic. Masculinity 
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in colonial times was associated with a certain type of masculine culture that was set both 
beside and against an idea of femininity. John Tosh argues that in fact the acquisition of 
'proper' manhood require a renunciation of the domestic, at least for a time: 
Becoming a man involved detaching oneself from the home and its feminine 
comforts. It required a level of material success in the wider world which was so 
often represented in threatening and alienating terms. And it depended on the 
recognition of manhood by one's peers in an atmosphere which had as much to do 
with competition as camaraderie (Tosh, 1999: 110). 
This instilling of a rigid conception of 'manliness' usually started at public school which 
encouraged both an atmosphere of homosociality and competition (Tosh, 1999: 177). 
Ideas of normal or proper 'manliness', empire, competition, a delay of the domestic and 
homosociality were often consolidated in the arena of sport, which itself took boys away 
from the feminizing world of women (Weeks, 1981). 
Tosh argues that the values of British public schools were actually at odds with the 
domestic: 
The job of these schools was to instill manly self-reliance in boys who had been 
raised in comfortable conditions of domesticity [...]. The level of anxiety felt by 
Victorian fathers and schoolmasters on this score meant that the balance was often 
tilted strongly in the direction of homosociality at the expense o f domestic graces 
or home tastes. [The] emphasis now was placed on stoical endurance, group loyalty 
and team sports. [...] The late Victorian upper middle class was significantly over-
populated with men who were permanently disqualified from family life. The 
characteristic stance of mid-Victorian fathers towards domesticity had been an 
appreciation of its material comforts and moral uplift, combined with the fear that it 
would emasculate their sons (Tosh, 1999: 177). 
And although Tosh argues that "marriage was still seen to be an essential stage in the 
attainment of full manhood" (ibid), it was to be delayed and was often rejected altogether. 
The difficulty was that in order to attain an idealized form of masculinity, the feminine had 
to be rejected. Too close an attachment to home could itself lead to effeminacy and 
weakness (Davidoff and Hall, 1987: 113). Be>Tion argues that narratives of empire written 
for boys "emphasized sports, sportsmanship, team spirit and a strong manliness determined 
against the 'fragile' feminine" (Beynon, 2002: 32). The idea of 'manliness' for both 
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middle class and working class boys and men^ was innately at odds with any idea of the 
feminine which brought with it disturbing connotations of both effeminacy and therefore 
homosexuality, which was also a danger and has an underlying strain in any homosocial 
culture. Beynon as well as Tosh argues that sports were used to combat this double threat: 
The division of labour occasioned by the Industrial Revolution (that is, men into the 
factories, most women consigned to the home) and the resulting patriarchy (based 
on men's economic superiority), the idea that men were innately practical, rational 
and competitive, unlike women was 'naturalized'. Also, in both Britain and the 
United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century [...] there was a determined 
etTort to re-masculinize men through sports and outdoor activities (Beynon, 2002: 
18). 
That men 'needed' to be 're-masculinized' was the fault of the 'sof\' domestic. Hardness, 
practicality, rationality and competition were set against the threat of the feminine. These 
were the properties that white, colonial men were supposed to 'naturally' possess and 
which thus 'naturally' placed these men at odds with not only the feminine and domestic at 
home, but also the feminized colonized subject. 
Normalized masculinity constructed itself as naturally practical, rational and expressed 
itself through physical culture, or sport. Beynon (2002) as well as Easthope (1986) and 
Burstyn (1999) amongst others posit colonialism, nationalism, patriotism, sport and 
masculinity as almost indivisible. In a peculiar blurring of realities, myths, concepts and 
constructions, the biology of maleness, a conception of normality, a fierce nationalism and 
an idea of the moral properties of masculinity converged into a construction of a 'correct' 
and, at the same time, 'natural' masculine culture. Beynon says that a concept of normal 
masculinity has been historically constructed through narratives of "action, adventure, 
competition and aggression" (Beynon, 2002: 17). These are (white) colonial virtues and, 
Beynon argues, rest on an ideal of 'hard masculinity' that involves discipline and self-
sacrifice, and the 'manly' virtues of "grit, self-reliance, determination, leadership and 
^ The idea of 'manliness*, although predominantly a middle class ideal was also educated into working class 
boys and men as a means of social control (Beynon, 2002: 40). And although the expression of working 
class masculinity has historically been somewhat different to that of the middle classes, it is often cited as 
involving more extreme expressions of manliness in order to compensate for a lack of economic or familial 
power (Segal, 1990/97: 94-5, Beynon, 2002, Easthope, 1986). 
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initiative" (Beynon, 2002: 28). And, because they are colonial virtues, this construction of 
'proper' masculinity rests on the difference of women and people of colour to the normal.'* 
In relation to the colonies, these white virtues were to be educated into, and imposed upon 
the colonial subject and by this (sometimes violent) imposition were to be hardened and 
consolidated into a rigid conception of normal (white) masculinity associated with very 
specific moralities and properties. C L R James documents a childhood in the West Indies 
educated via the white, English public school code which not only espoused but morally 
imposed the ideals of "playing with the team", "keeping a stiff upper l ip" and "playing 
with a straight bat" at least on the cricket pitch where these codes were imbibed most fully 
(James, 1963: 25). James talks about these colonial codes being naturalized and therefore 
unquestioned because ''everything began from the basis that Britain was the source of all 
light and leading, and our business was to admire, wonder, imitate, learn; our criterion of 
success was to have succeeded in approaching that distant ideal" (James, 1963: 30). 
'Success' in both Britain and the colonies depended on the playing out of the normal codes 
of masculinity; "the British reticence, the British self-discipline, the stiff upper-lips, upper 
and lower" (James, 1963: 42). And all these were (and often still are) encoded within 
masculine sports. A l l these codes encapsulated the ideal of 'manliness' apparent in the 
Victorian and Edwardian eras. As Whitehead suggests: "by the end of the nineteenth 
century an idealized version of masculinity - encompassing physicality, virility, morality 
and civility - had emerged to some prominence" (Whitehead, 2002: 14). It was these 
codes, morals and ideals that were employed to limit and control both colonizer and 
colonial subject. 
"* Mrinalini Sinha discusses an interesting aspect of ihis type of 'manliness' and what it is necessarily posited 
against in her discussion of not only the *manly Englishman' in relation to colonized Indians, but also a 
concept of the 'manly' Anglo Indian posited against the 'effeminate Bengali'. In her discussion too, sport 
and physicality is an arena of difference (Sinha, 1995). 
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Varda Burstyn equates nineteenth century sport, education, recreation and military training 
together with very specific (white, Westem) ideals of masculinity (Burstyn, 1999: 47). For 
Burstyn the realms of nationalism, war and sport are always psychically mixed. Not only 
this, but she cites the rise of corporate capitalism as being the base of all these ideas in the 
nineteenth century. She says that all nineteenth century sports had something in common 
with each other and that this extends to today: 
That commonality lay in their definition of who was permitted to 'play the game' 
(men), what the participants were expected to do (aggress), and what such 
participation signified and conferred (power and privilege). [...] 
The major team and individual sports of today emerged practically, economically 
and mythically as the rites of men, marking out symbolically and literally the 
attributes and activities of an exclusively male terrain (Burstyn, 1999: 49-50). 
Sport is a (mostly) male arena and the codes, pracfices and moralities o f male sport help to 
define normal and naturalized masculinity at least partly through gender and often racial 
differentiations. Burstyn says that "sport served to regroup men as men, to reassert their 
gender privilege, to reclaim and extend their entitlement to leisure and public space, to 
celebrate aggressive physicality, and to symbolically place themselves, both in their 
experience and that of women, at the heart of community myths of prowess, valour and 
heroism (Burstyn, 1999: 60-1). In this mythological construction of masculinity, men are 
seen as men, as separate (better) and different to women. Through sport men are placing 
themselves in the symbolic centre of society: the normal. 
Sport however is not the only realm that is discussed as constructing and expressing 
nomial, white masculinity. With the rise of corporate, and later consumer capitalism other 
ideals and expressions of normal masculinity have been hardened, naturalized and come to 
identify normal masculinity. And although there is a differentiation made between 
working class and middle class expressions of masculinity, the main fonns of expression of 
nonnal masculinity itself are said to congregate around concepts of being practical and 
'handy', the valorization of 'hard' labour, banter, jokes, buddy-dom, horseplay, swearing, 
sex, alcohol and of course sport and many fonns of physical culture as well as the wider 
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and more institutionalized concepts of rafionality, sanity, law and civilization (Beynon, 
2002, Easthope, 1986). Together these properties, priorifies and ideals are said to form 
themselves into a conception of 'old' masculinity - an idea of normal masculinity that is 
now said to belong to the past, but also one which is both associated with and described as, 
a unity. The concept of normal masculinity passes itself off as unified, complete, certain 
and universal. 
Re-Reading Masculinit)' Studies and Family Studies Through Postcolonialism and 
Feminism 
In documenting and discussing the nonnal, the archive of the normal and the discursive 
formation that allows the creation of this archive, two of the main areas of concern for this 
thesis are the academic disciplines of masculinity studies and family studies because of 
their preoccupations with white masculinity and the white, middle class nuclear family. 
Both disciplines indicate a 'break' with older definitions of nonnality and forms of 
masculinity studies (masculinism) and family studies (traditional studies of the family). 
Both disciplines arise with and from the theories from the margins of feminism and 
postcolonialism and both are heavily invested in postmodern deconstructions of a singular 
definition of masculinity and any idea of the family. This thesis argues that there is, within 
the archive, a discourse has not been properly examined yet: the discourse of 
marginalization for white men and the nuclear family. It is the enunciations and the 
archive of the new discourse of the nonnal that this thesis sets out to explain, exploring the 
possibilities of enunciation, the creation of the archive and the theoretical, political, social 
and material implications of the new discourse of the nonnal. This thesis examines the 
current collection of these enunciations and thus takes as its subject the archive of the 
normal. 
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We will begin with masculinity studies, which is ideologically, politically morally and 
theoretically removed fi-om the premises of masculinism. In masculinism the 'old* type of 
masculinity documented above is normalized, universalized, naturalized and equated with 
'masculine nature*. Arthur Brittan argues that this view of masculinity is still circulating 
in the cultural debates of masculinism: 
Masculinism is the ideology that justifies and naturalizes male domination. As 
such, it is the ideology of patriarchy. Masculinism takes it for granted that there is 
a fundamental difference between men and women, it assumes that heterosexuality 
is normal, it accepts without question the sexual division of labour and it sanctions 
the political and dominant role of men in the public and private spheres. Moreover, 
the masculine ideology is not subject to the vagaries of fashion — it tends to be 
relatively resistant to change. In general, masculinism gives primacy to the belief 
that gender is not negotiable - it does not accept evidence fi-om feminist and other 
sources that the relationships between men and women are political and constructed 
nor, for that matter, does it allow for the possibility that lesbianism and 
homosexuality are not forms of deviance or abnormality (Brittan, 2001: 53-4). 
Masculinism thus takes on fully the 'old ' view of naturalized gender relations. Masculinity 
and heterosexuality are seen as natural and normal, the division of the private and public 
spaces is endorsed, and men are seen to be the natural dominators of both. Feminism is 
rejected as are its theories of social construction of gender roles, and any form of 
homosexuality is seen as abnormal. This 'old' ideology of masculinism has been called 
variously: 'the men's movement' (Whitehead, 2002) and also 'men's studies' (Collinson 
and Heam in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001). This 'old ' ideology is not however so 'old' 
after all and it has been incorporated into the late 1980s and early 1990s 'mythopoetic 
movement' of Robert Bly (Whitehead, 2002). Masculinism upholds a rigid idea of normal 
masculinity. 
As a relatively new discipline, and as instrumental in the current removal of normality into 
the margins, masculinity studies has a vested interest in discussing masculinism, and in 
describing and defining the normal it naturalizes, in order to indicate the 'break' with this 
'old' view. In the analysis of the origins of the nonnal, masculinity studies takes the same 
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starting point and the same evidence as postcolonial studies.^ Postcolonial studies 
examines oppression and the positioning and 'creation' of the oppressed by the dominant 
white colonists. It looks at the experience of people under colonial rule (Quayson, 2000), 
at the twin points of power whereby people were subjugated: power and knowledge -
especially the imperial 'knowledge' of other peoples (Ashcroft et al: 1995: 1) and the 
historical impact that this has had on oppressed and marginalized people. Taking 
colonization as an "historical fact" (Ashcrofl et al: 1995: 2) postcolonialism looks at the 
process that 'othered' and 'abnormalized' colonized people in relation to a dominant white 
ideal of the normal: a process that positioned them as 'different' (Hall, 1997a: 259). 
In contrast, masculinity studies looks at the creation of'Imperial Man' (Beynon, 2002: 26) 
and offers knowledge about the creation of this dominant and idealized persona. These are 
two different, although interrelated emphases. Put simply, postcolonialism looks at the 
processes that oppressed people and at their experiences of that oppression. Masculinity 
studies looks at the processes that made white men dominant and at the experience of that 
posifion of dominance. Because of this two different projects are fonnulated, but projects 
that link at various points. Masculinity studies takes as its raison d'etre the destruction of 
the idea of a privileged, normal masculinity. As Stephen Whitehead and Frank Barrett put 
it in the introduction to one of the definitive masculinity studies texts, The Masculinities 
Reader: "what we are fighting against is a culture that privileges men and masculinity" 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 13). Masculinity is examined as a 'myth', (and a 
destructive one at that), that needs to be de-mystified, de-essentialized, proved to be a 
social construction and dismantled.^ Thus where masculinity studies seems to involve a 
process of coming-into-non-being (the destruction of the white, privileged masculine 
nonnal), Quayson cites postcolonialism as: "a process of coming-into-being and of 
^ This point and its implications will be examined in more detail in chapter two. 
^ In this context 'myth' is seen as an umruth rather than a continuing and deep-seated social construciion that 
carries truth-elTects. 
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struggle against colonialism and its after-effects" (Quayson, 2000: 9). And where 
masculinity and family studies set out to 'disprove' the normal as a method of its 
deconstruction, postcolonialism cannot, in the same way 'disprove' oppression. Thus 
where masculinity studies advocates the deconstruction of what is largely its own position 
(white and middle class), postcolonialism is involved in a process reconstruction', of 
subjectivity, position, history and agency (Hall, 1997b, see also chapter three of this 
thesis). The deconstruction of the 'myth' of the normal inevitably (as we shall see 
throughout this thesis) involves a deconstruction of white-men-as-a-group. The 
postcolonial reconstruction project however involves forging links and acknowledging 
differences between seemingly disparate groups of people, their histories and experiences.' 
What this thesis asks is i f such a deconstruction of the normal will really help erase 
inequality; to "correct imbalances in the world" (Quayson, 2000: 11), or i f it is a 
postmodern sidestepping of the issues that will individualize social inequalities and thus 
only serve to hide them. 
Masculinity studies therefore begins with concerns shared by postcolonial studies. 
However, it is feminism that is discussed as the explicit origin of the discipline of what is 
termed "pro-feminist masculinity studies" (Whitehead, 2002, Whitehead and Barrett, 2001, 
Pease, 2000, Peterson, 1998 etc). Al l the masculinity studies texts that I consider fall into 
the category of 'profeminist' masculinity studies. The introduction to The Masculinities 
Reader emphasizes its affiliation with feminism: "[t]he point to stress, then, is that writings 
in this volume originate fi-om both women (feminists) and men (pro-feminists) and, as 
such, declare their feminist parentage and affiliation quite openly" (Whitehead and Barrett, 
2001:4). Masculinity studies comes from feminism. Jardine and Smith, (1987), Chapman 
and Rutherford (1988), Berger et al (1995), Peterson (1998), Whitehead (2002) and many 
others who practice masculinity studies make the same point. Masculinity studies therefore 
^ Questions of anti-essentialisra and strategic essentialism will be examined in chapter four as well as in the 
conclusion. 
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borrows its concerns, the evidence it uses and some of its methodologies from feminism 
and from postcolonialism. 
Both postcolonialism and feminism are theories of and ft*om the margins. They theorize 
the positioning of the groups of people they are concerned with and document the placing 
of marginal people as marginal, as 'different' and as 'abnormal'. There is a strong sense of 
historicism and an acknowledgement that things change slowly, i f at all. In contrast, the 
discipline of masculinity studies is said to have moved very quickly through various 
phases, indeed, Whitehead and Barrett cite "third wave masculinity studies" (Whitehead 
and Barrett, 2001: 17). Beginning in the 1970's with the 'men's movement' that 
(sometimes) complemented the 'women's movement', masculinity studies as such began 
to consolidate itself into an academic discipline in the early 1980's (Whitehead and 
Barrett: 2001). Beginning as a response to feminism the area of masculinity studies 
quickly moved into the consideration of "men in feminism" (Jardine and Smith, 1987), and 
"the question of male feminist criticism" (Boone and Cadden, 1990), whereby, although 
running at the same time as masculinism, in direct contradiction to it these texts examined 
i f there could be a place for men within feminist theory and critique. This discussion 
moved on and away fi-om the idea of men in feminism and, taking the methodologies of 
feminism, masculinity studies became a discrete discipline in its own right with its own set 
of basic theoretical presumptions. Academic texts such as Male Order: Unwrapping 
Masculinity (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988), and Anthony Easthope's I'Vhat a Man's 
Gotta Do (Easthope, 1986) began to look exclusively at masculinity and questions around 
fatherhood and the place (or not) of men in the family. 
A similar movement has happened in relation to family studies which is the second 
academic discipline that this thesis critiques. The family studies equivalent of masculinism 
is traditional sociological studies of the family. These studies assumed (and sometimes still 
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assume) a singular type of white, heterosexual, nuclear normal family. Although colonial 
times are discussed as bringing into being our current ideal of the family (Tosh, 1999), 
traditional sociology tends to revert back to a 1950s ideal image of a small, closed unit that 
is relatively autonomous and isolated with the husband/father being the main breadwinner 
and through this the 'old' sociological definition of the normal family is evoked. The 
usual suspect cited as having the biggest impact sociologically on the creation and 
definition of the normal family is Talcott Parsons whose main work covers the period from 
the 1940s to the 1970s. David Cheal says that "Parsons argued that the cultural standard 
for American family life was that of the urban middle-class family. It defined for practical 
purposes the 'normal American family" (Allan, 1999: 58). And although writing about 
America it is this model of nonnality that has also been taken up in Britain. Cheal 
continues: 
In its narrowest fonn, standard sociological theory conceives of the 'normal family', or 
'conventional family', as consisting of the nuclear roles of husband and wife, and their 
children. In the work of Parsons (1943, 1971) the norms regulating interactions 
between family roles require the following: 
1 Marriage between adult partners (more specifically monogamy). 
2 Superiority of the conjugal bond over other social commitments. 
3 Fulfilment of the marriage bond through the raising of legitimate children. 
4 Co-residence. 
5 The employment of one or more adult members outside the home. 
The unrestricted sharing of incomes between adult members 
(Allan, 1999: 59) 
In this way it is argued that the nonnal family could be 'classified'; measured and defined 
using empirical and statistical methodologies borrowed from science. Traditional sociology 
such as Parsons' follow the positivist approach which argues that there can be "a science of 
society" (Haralambos et al, 1995:16) which employs scientific methodologies. However 
this model of nonnality is not just a definition, it represents certain moral values and 
expectations; it is gendered, classed and raced. And as well as being a mythologized 
regulatory ideal and imperative, this model of nonnality was taken as the standard or the 
average. Thus two forms of normality are conflated whereby the ideal is seen as the 
The abiding images of 1950s normality will be discussed fully in chapter three. 
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average, the usual, and therefore is used to measure difference from this model. Deborah 
Chambers names: 
The persistent privileging of white ethnicity and the regulation o f heterosexuality 
and patriarchy through family values [and] the processes through which both 
whiteness and heterosexuality are naturalized and normalized by appropriating the 
nuclear family as a regulatory ideal that inferiorises and discredits alternative 
experiences, structures and meanings (Chambers, 2001: 3). 
Chambers argues that this version of the normal is said to be biologically natural and 
therefore universal (Chambers, 2001: 2). This error is compounded by traditional 
sociology accepting this model as the normal and itself taking it as being natural and as the 
basis for studies of the family, studies that are still being conducted today.'' 
Family studies critiques the traditional model of the normal family. Taking the studies of 
the family that are to be found in traditional sociology, family studies as a newer 
sociological discipline indicates a break with *old' sociology. The studies of the family 
that 'old-style' sociology made are critiqued because they accept and even advocate the 
singular family which is white, heterosexual, middle class and nuclear and which 
normalize this family in relation to other pathologized, abnormalized and demonized forms 
of family - extended, ethnic, working class, single parent etc (Silva and Smart, 1999, 
Jagger and Wright, 1999, Smart and Neale, 1999). Deborah Chambers charts the concerns 
and assumptions made by traditional sociological studies of the family, arguing that: 
Academic research and debates in the social sciences in the United States and 
Britain continue to prioritise the nuclearised family form as an object of study (Van 
Every, 1999), and to take the Anglo-white nuclear family as the norm against 
which to measure 'other' family forms. [...] Sociological theories of the family 
typically invent 'the family' as a relatively bounded unit that exchanges with other 
equally relatively bounded units in society. Many accounts of the family consist of 
checklists and categories of information collected to be tabulated and quantified for 
scientific analysis of ' the family' as an economic unit, residential household type, 
kinship network, and so on, and then presented as the manifestation of identified 
trends and generalities (Morgan, 1999: 14). An example of this is the 
methodological approach and summaries of the influential British government 
One such report that is compiled annually is British Social Attitudes that inter\'iews 3,500 people each year 
to find out their opinions on matters such as gender divides and roles, the family, marriage, religion, sex and 
national identity (see for example the 17* aimual report. Sage publications, 2000 2001). 
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stafisfical journal Social Trends. While theoretical accounts are increasingly 
represenfing the family in terms of'change', 'decline', or 'de-institutionalisation', 
it continues to be treated as a unit, as a coherent whole that somehow ought to be 
static and unchanging. " (Chambers, 2001: 10). 
Traditional sociology is thus a part of the creation of the idea of the nonnal family, a 
family form that places others as different and measures them against this 'normal'. In 
these studies of the family, it is seen that the family can be quantified; identified, measured 
and recognized by everyone. 
Family studies as a subject began as a (rather small) strand of mainstream sociology and 
has its origins in these studies of the family. The reason given for the emergence of family 
studies as opposed to traditional studies of the family and its consolidation into an 
important and discrete discipline and specialism is the rise of feminism which removed 
family studies from just being a small subsidiary part of sociology to having importance in 
its own right as women began to examine and critique their own positions in the home and 
in the world. To begin with, family studies remained within feminism, then itself became 
sidelined by feminism in the 1980's, only to be revitalized as a subject in its own right 
when the 'big boys' such as Anthony Giddens stepped in (Smart and Neale, 1999). 
According to Carol Smart and Bren Neale family studies did not emerge as a discipline in 
its own right unfil the mid 1990's and really took off at the end of this decade. Family 
studies, as opposed to traditional studies of the family, is a very new discipline indeed. 
Family studies on the whole takes as its starting point the popular conception of the 
nuclear, white, middle class, gendered family as having represented the British ideal but 
now as being in decline or crisis. The concept of the 'nonnal' family is invoked just to be 
challenged and in order to reinstate and revalue alternative forms of the family and what 
family studies calls 'families of choice' (Morgan, 1996). The ideal of the white nuclear 
family is de-mystified and debunked as a myth, and as a damaging, oppressive and 'untrue 
myth (Chambers, 2001). Current examples of family studies attempt to pluralize, multiply 
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and ft-agment nofions of the family in order to get away from the one ideal of the white 
nuclear family. David Morgan writes that the newer approach to looking at family 
'practices' (as opposed to studying the family) seeks "to overcome the gap between some 
of the more formal or statistical analyses of family life and everyday experiences and 
understandings" (Morgan, 1996: 15). Morgan traces the changes in emphasis and politics 
in 'family sociology' as it moves into a postmodern era and therefore into 'family 
studies'.'*^ He describes these changes as a blurring of boundaries and an overlapping of 
different aspects of sociology (labour, poverty, leisure etc) with an active interaction 
between sociology and other disciplines such as feminism, cultural studies and 
postmodernism (Morgan, 1996: 12-13). In this way, 'family studies' can be described as 
traditional studies of'the' family meets cultural studies, feminism, postcolonialism, and 
perhaps most importantly, postmodernism. As Jo Van Every says, "for better or worse, the 
post-modem family revolution is here to stay" (Jagger and Wright, 1999: 165). 
Coming from a different place (the central) to feminism or postcolonialism, masculinity 
studies and family studies theorists set themselves the relafively easy task of arguing 
against traditional sociology. Traditional sociology assumes a 'nonnal' be it statistical 
(although of course statistics themselves and the questions they ask are not static), 
political, experiential or moral. Masculinity studies and family studies critique traditional 
sociology but this sociology still provides a clear platform for them to work from. 
However, both feminism and postcolonialism were bom from contradictions, conflicting 
desires and tempting and or inevitable complicities and conflations with the white, male 
mainstream. The difference of theorizing ft-om the margin to theorizing from the centre is, 
too often not acknowledged or dealt with. 
'° 'Family studies' as a phrase has not been universally adopted by practitioners that could be described as 
working within the field. The term the 'sociology of the family' is still sometimes used, but often as in the 
case of Graham Allan and his book The Sociology of the Family, the work that is being done falls into the 
new style, questioning sociology. 
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Masculinity studies says that it has the same aim as feminism and postcolonialism in that it 
has the general aim of dismantling patriarchy and its attendant gender and race inequalities. 
As the concerns of masculinity studies and family studies originate from feminism and 
postcolonialism, these 'studies' of the centre explicitly originate from and claim to use or 
improve on the theories, methodologies, critiques and ideas of the margins. Because of 
this it is these marginal theories (feminist and postcolonial), their methodologies and 
critiques that I apply directly to my own examination of these 'new' studies" and the 
subject of normality itself i will examine the ways in which masculinity studies and 
family studies are implicated in the creation of the new discourse of normality and I 
employ feminism and postcolonialism from source as theoretical tools to deconstruct and 
examine this discourse and the claims of the 'new' studies. Relatively frequently the 
feminist or postcolonial theory or discussion that 1 use is quite old with perhaps the oldest 
being Fanon's writing from 1952. in places throughout the thesis this is a deliberate 
strategy designed to demonstrate that too often masculinity and family studies have failed 
to listen to the theory they claim to be using or to the people they claim to be 'liberating'. 
In citing Fanon or hooks, for example, there is no sense that these people speak for ' a l l ' 
black people or 'a l l ' women, but their voices and others are included to show intervention 
and disruption to dominant (white or male) assumptions and to show that such disruptions 
have been around, often unaccounted for in dominant theory, for decades. This thesis 
argues that in ignoring these voices and interventions masculinity studies and family 
studies use marginal theory selectively and in ways that ser\'e to maintain the current 
white, patriarchal hegemony. Too often the easy route is taken by these studies, 
particularly in relation to postmodernism where, unless one is extremely careftjl, people 
can be silenced and theory can become glib (Waugh, 1997: 208). Postcolonial and 
feminist theorists have struggled and continue to do so both with their own theories and in 
an effort to be heard by the centre. 
" Throughout the thesis 'new studies' refer to current masculinity and family studies. 
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In relation to both feminism and postcolonialism it has been the process of these struggles 
that has produced the most fruitful connections theories and ideas around the ideas of (self 
or imposed) identity, agency, oppression and positioning. Masculinity studies and family 
studies, perhaps because they claim to originate as disciplines from marginal theory, often 
only engage with the outcomes of these theoretical and personal struggles and theorize 
their own positions from there. Thus many masculinity and family studies texts and 
arguments stand on the theoretical achievements of the marginalized without fully 
engaging with the steps that were followed before these outcomes were 'achieved' and 
without acknowledging that theory for the marginal and those in the centre are two 
different things. Much of the strength of both feminist theory and postcolonial theory 
comes from their marginalized position. As we will see in more detail in chapter two of 
this thesis, there is strength that comes from "living in two worlds" (James, 1963: 25) and 
being able to see both inside and outside by virtue of being placed outside the normal. In 
both feminist theory and postcoloniai theory there is a thorough (although unfinished) 
discussion about complicity, resistance, standpoint, biology and even the possibility of 
either feminism or postcolonialism as discretely defined disciplines given the fact that the 
positionings of both 'woman' and 'person of colour' or 'colonized person' come from 
witlwut, and are (historically negative) reflections of difference to the white male normal 
(see for example discussion in Cook and Bemink, 1999 and Quayson and Goldberg, 2002). 
Both bodies of theories and discussion come from political and personal struggles and 
perhaps because they come from the margins, the amount of rigour involved is sometimes 
astonishing. This sense of rigour is often expressed in debates around difference within the 
(pregiven, if reclaimed) categories of gender, race and colour. Political and personal 
positionings, experiences and exigencies are never taken as read and in that sense nothing 
is taken for granted or seen as 'done' or 'finished'. 
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Within masculinity studies and family studies theorizing however, sometimes the 
'outcomes' and 'achievements' of feminist or postcolonial theory are seen as singular, 
truthful, 'universal' and 'finished' and therefore can be taken as something 'solid' for the 
theorizing of masculinity or family studies to stand on and move on from. This can be a 
grave difficulty when the new studies theorize for the white middle classes. Both 
materially and theoretically some things just don't 'fit ' . Because of this 1 retrace and 
reapply some elements of postcolonial and feminist theory and critique that have not been 
selected for use or discussion by masculinity studies or family studies, for example such 
concepts as ocularcentrism and essenUalism; often because it is seen that these discussions 
have been done. However these discussions have not 'been done' by masculinity or family 
studies themselves in relation to their own subject. Some of these discussions would, i f 
applied properly to the subjects of the new studies, disrupt their theoretical logic and 
therefore these elements are often silenced within the new discourse that is being created. 
Although the new discourse of the normal at the moment is extremely widespread, it is 
often contradictory and involves other elements. There is discussion outside of it although 
these discussions are often restricted, limited, and sometimes ignored entirely. Many of 
these (subversive and disruptive) discourses/discussions are being marginalized again, 
turned into what Foucault tenned "subjugated knowledges", or "disqualified knowledges" 
(Foucault, 1980: 81 and 83). Foucault argues that there has been/is "a whole set of 
knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task: naive knowledges 
located low down on the hierarchy" (Foucault, 1980: 82). The discourse of normality that 
1 describe in detail below, has consolidated and hardened itself into a set of specific truths, 
knowledges and speech acts, and across a range of academic disciplines and diverse media 
texts, the degree of consensus is remarkable. Masculinity studies and family studies have 
left behind their feminist and postcolonial roots (which are often implicitly, and 
occasionally explicitly dismissed as 'inadequate to the task' of explaining particularly 
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white masculinity, see Easthope, 1986) and have morphed into something other that rarely 
argues with itself Because of this 1 re-introduce both feminism and postcolonialism to the 
debate. Foucault suggests that the re-application of marginalized knowledges can be the 
most useftil: 
1 [...] believe that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, 
these unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges [...] that it is through the 
re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local, popular knowledges, these 
disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work (Foucault, 1980: 82). 
And, in this way, a re-application and re-evaluation of postcolonial and feminist theory to 
the discourse of normality can help to shed light on how the discourse is being formulated 
and the (material) effects of this fomiulation. 
Both masculinity studies and family studies are involved in a project that deconstructs the 
normal. Any idea of normality is seen as excluding, exclusive and often just purely as 
'wrong'. Thus both disciplines see it as their job to deconstruct the idea of the normal, 
often by 'disproving' it. Whilst not disagreeing that a proper destruction of the nornial is 
desirable this thesis argues that the way that this project is being approached by 
masculinity studies, family studies and the media actually serves to obscure continuing 
power relations and aids the continuation of the current status quo. This thesis argues that 
the denial that normality exists at all also inevitably entails a denial of continuing privilege 
and benefit for a small and exclusive group (the white middle classes). I argue that a 
denial that there is a concept of nonnality (mythological or otherwise) still existing and 
working at the centre of our society is more dangerous than a clear acknowledgment of 
normality's existence. 
Intcrx'cntions From Cultural Studies 
So far we have been looking at the supposed 'break' from old notions o f normality by 
masculinity studies and family studies and a denial of nomiality's continuing existence. 
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Whilst both masculinity studies and family studies are more multi-disciplinary than older 
style sociology as I have argued, there remains a tendency to base their own work on older 
style sociology. Thus the greater part of masculinity and family studies still concentrate on 
the traditional sociological concerns of 'real life' and lived reality, social policy, law, 
statistics, interviews and ethnographies, all methodologies that allow people, communities 
and societies to be classified and measured in relation to an idea of the normal even if that 
normal is cited as 'past'. And so it is that whilst indicating a relationship with the broadly 
cultural studies approaches of feminism, postcolonialism and queer studies, these 
disciplines are used within current masculinity and family studies as a means of changing 
the emphasis of sociological study from an unquestioned assumption of the normal and a 
naming of the abnormal, to an emphasis on the destabilizing of the normal and a political 
objective of deconstructing and marginalizing that normal through looking at 'real life'. 
And in this way, as we saw above, although the emphasis may have changed, some of the 
assumptions haven't and the very methodology of marginalizing the normal by 
deconstructing it, displacing it and defamiliarizing it, can itself leave the normal in place. 
Theorizing the nomial as having disappeared through statistics, ethnographies, 
consciousness raising group work and case studies will not, as it is claimed, make it 
disappear into an equalizing cloud of postmodern multiplicity, fluidity and fragmentation. 
There are however two texts, one from masculinity studies and one from family studies 
that do not accept that merely 'theorizing away' the nonnal and 'proving' it does not exist 
is an acceptable or effective strategy. These two texts, Marked Men: White Masculinity in 
Crisis by Sally Robinson (2000) and Representing the Family by Deborah Chambers 
(2001) have both been a link between this thesis and more mainstream*^ examples of 
masculinity studies and family studies. Both texts adopt a more cultural studies' approach 
'~ Within the terms of this thesis the word 'mainstream' in relation to masculinity studies and family studies 
refers to pro-feminist masculinity studies, and family studies as opposed to the now more marginalized but 
more traditional sociological studies of the family. 
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than most examples of masculinity and family studies and look at novels, films and general 
media representations as still being implicated in the creation of the normal and in self-
identity.'^ 
Deborah Chambers examines the ^reinvention' of the normal, white, middle class, 
heterosexual 'ideal' family. Her emphasis in Representing the Family is on the fact that 
the nonnal is still being constantly created as a regulatory myth. Chambers does not try to 
sidestep a concept of the normal family, and her interest is not in 'disproving' it. 
Chambers argues that 
the modem nuclear family does exist and is flourishing as an ideal: as a symbol, 
discourse and powerful myth within the collective imagination. This cultural myth 
is a regulatory force that impacts on our lives at a very personal level. It structures 
emotions, modes of official knowledge, bodies, identities and definitions of public 
and private cultural space (Chambers, 2001: 1). 
Chambers, in the very first page of the book, acknowledges the continuing importance and 
centrality of the normal, idealized family. Chambers is excellent at setting out the ideal-as-
was/is. The entire book is about stopping and looking at the continued constmction of the 
white, nuclear family as normal. Where the other family studies texts I examine take this 
'normal' as read (and past) and aim to disprove and discredit this norm without first 
examining or deconstmcting it properly. Chambers, carefully and with thought, examines 
the contemporary constmction of this norm: 
Overall, the book focuses on two key themes that have come to represent core 
arguments surrounding family values in westem Anglophone nations: namely the 
persistent privileging of white ethnicity and the regulation of heterosexual ity and 
patriarchy through family values. These themes are examined by analyzing the 
processes through which both whiteness and heterosexuality are naturalized and 
normalized by appropriating the nuclear family as a regulatory ideal that 
inferiorises and discredits altemative experiences, stmctures and meanings 
(Chambers, 2001: 3). 
This discussion and Chambers' process of examining a still existent normal is almost in 
direct contrast to that of most family studies practitioners. Thus where Silva and Smart 
' ^ Although I found these two texts to be the most progressn e and interesting examples of either family 
studies or masculinity studies texts, neither is often cited in mainstream masculinity or family studies texts. 
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claim that "the idealized nuclear family simply cannot work, either across the whole of the 
life course or on a universal basis any more (if it ever did of course)" (Silva and Smart, 
1999: 12) and Jagger and Wright claim that "there simply is [...] no such thing as the 
family" (Jaggcr and Wright, 1999: 3), Chambers' business is not to deny the idealized, 
normal family, but to look directly at it. In denying any existence to the normal family 
(now), most family studies texts and discussions unwittingly use it as a (static) basis from 
which to jump from into discussion about alternative (implicitly 'not normal') families and 
alternative ways of looking at the family. Although I have my areas of disagreement with 
Chambers, which I will look at later in this introduction, her approach is much closer to my 
own in that she recognizes that the normal is still the normal. 
Sally Robinson's usefrilness to this thesis is somewhat different. Her book. Marked Men: 
White Masculinity in Crisis fills the theoretical gap between mainstream masculinity 
studies and my own work. In line with the theoretical strategy of Deborah Chambers, 
Sally Robinson makes a point of looking directly at the centre of society stating that: "I 
seek to elaborate the etTects of a marking of white masculinity in the middlebrow or, more 
simply, the 'mainstream', because that is where the normative lives" (Robinson, 2000: 15). 
And in line with my own work Robinson also concentrates on the issue of visibility. Most 
masculinity studies practitioners see the way to deconstruct the concept and positioning of 
normal, white, middle class, heterosexual masculinity as being through making the normal 
visible and thus dispelling it. Visibility for white men is theorized as being a disadvantage 
as it is said to endanger their position. Sally Robinson disagrees with this position and 
challenges the view that visibility will , inevitably, de-centre white masculinity. She argues 
that: 
Whilst most accounts of the relationship between power and (in)visibility suggest 
that only the disenfranchised have a positive interest in promoting the visibility of 
social difference - and that the dominant can only have an interest in remaining 
unmarked and invisible - I will argue that what calls itself normative in American 
culture has vested interests in both invisibility and visibility (Robinson, 2000: 3). 
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It is the argument put forward by so many masculinity studies texts that 'only the 
disenfranchised' have an interest in making and keeping the dominant (and therefore 
inequality) visible that leads to the idea that visibility is bad for those in the dominant 
position and therefore visibility will aid equality for those who are disenfranchised. 
Robinson takes a somewhat different view, and argues that visibility for white men can be 
beneficial. She argues that the discourse of victimized and wounded white men that arose 
in the 1980s, (her work centres on America), far from making inequality visible and 
inevitably leading to change, visibility for white men actually serves to recentre these men 
in the dominant position of the normal. She sees this visibility as a deliberate, (although 
still defensive), individualizing strategy that, although originating from an imperative from 
the margins, has subsequently been used and promoted by white men themselves. 
Robinson agrees with the argument put forward by most masculinity studies texts that 
white men were forced into visibility (citing 'feminism and black power' (Robinson, 2000: 
14) but where most masculinity studies texts argue that this was a disadvantageous move 
forced onto those in the centre of society who were first passive, and then reacted 
defensively (Whitehead, 2002, Bergcr et al, 1995 etc), she sees the subsequent moves and 
positionings of white men, at least in some ways, as being controlled. Usually visibility, 
embodiment and particularization are most often seen as happening to passive white men, 
however Robinson sees this as a (representational) strategy coming from white men. 
Robinson sees the 'new' visibility of white men somewhat differently to most masculinity 
studies texts which argue that this visibility is forced onto men.'** She argues that: 
Representations of wounded men most often work to personalize the crisis of white 
masculinity and. thus, to erase its social and political causes and effects. [...] On 
the one hand, the substitution of an individually suffering white male body for a 
social class or gender and racial identity under attack betrays a desire to 
materialize, literalize the wounds to white and male privilege that come from 
puncturing the aura of'universality' and 'unmarkedness' historically claimed by 
whiteness and masculinity. On the other hand, individualizing a more properiy 
social wound is a way to evade, forget, deny the very marking that has produced 
This uill be fully discussed in Chapter One. 
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these wounds in the first place. In other words, narratives about wounded white 
men spring from, but obscure, the marking of white masculinity as a category. 
[But] such a materialization, in turn, threatens to expose the lie of disembodied 
normativity so often attached to white masculinity (Robinson, 2000: 8-9). 
Sally Robinson concentrates on media and fictional representations of white men from the 
late 1960s to the late 1980s (Robinson, 2000: 16), and during this time many of the 
dominant images and representations of white men were of white men as wounded and 
victimized. Robinson argues that these representations 'personalized' and 'individualized' 
the new, critical position of white men and that this personalization helps to sidestep the 
political. She argues that these representations actually directly signify the 'wound' white 
men felt through the questioning of their position as dominant. 
Robinson however sees this as being a risky strategy for white men as this personalizing, 
although it sidesteps the political, continues to 'expose the lie of disembodied normativity'. 
She says; "the middle is, as 1 see it, is an essentially defensive culture and political 
formation, one characterized by suspicion, even paranoia, about the passing of a now 
delegitimized cultural order" (Robinson, 2000: 14). It is here that I differ in my analysis of 
the current situation to that of Robinson. This thesis takes the social and cultural 
discourses and representations of the mid 1990s for analysis and argues that the discourse 
of wounding and victimization for white men, as well as the discourse o f crisis for both 
white men and the nuclear family is being substituted by a discourse of marginalization. 
Because of this, my argument throughout this thesis is that (controlled) visibility and 
marginalization for white men is not a risky strategy for white men, and that it is in fact, in 
the current climate the safest strategy for white men. Although Robinson sees some 
advantages for white men in a (defensive) strategy of visibility, in line with other 
masculinity studies texts and theorists, she still argues that this visibility may well lead to a 
deconstruction of the universalized normal and the privilege that it carries for a small 
number of people. Sally Robinson argues that: "the forced visibility of the white and male 
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norm, as white men experience [a] 'marking' [...] endangers their position as unmarked 
and universalizing norm" (Robinson, 2000: 55, second emphasis is mine). Robinson is 
arguing that white men cannot retain the position of'unmarked and universalizing norm' 
now that they have been forced into visibility. 
And where she cites this danger in terms of a threat to white male power that comes with 
'exposing the lie of disembodied normativity' (8-9), this thesis will argue that an exposure 
of white men, a making visible of their embodiedness and particularity actually serves as a 
safety-valve in that it can 'demonstrate' that white men are marginalized too; just the same 
as anyone else, no more 'whole' or indeed privileged than anyone else. Thus Robinson has 
been extremely useftil to this thesis in that she begins to theorize the advantages to white 
men from (enforced) visibility. This thesis goes further in that it argues absolute (and 
deliberate) advantage to white men from visibility. 
Chambers also cites the 'new' visibility of the white, heterosexual family, arguing that 
where more usually it was 'other' families that received attention, now the 'nomial' family 
"is also being scrutinized and marked out" (Chambers, 2001: 30). Chambers sees the 
visibility, exposure and scrutiny of the white, nuclear family as being a social discourse 
that is gathering force. Chambers deduces from this that a re-visited version of the normal 
family and the patriarch's position in this "white, Anglophone nuclear family" (Chambers, 
2000: 166) is in the process of being refonned. She cites gay and bisexual relationships as 
being the biggest threat to those who wish for a reformation of the rigid normal. However 
she argues that: 
This threat is no longer 'external' but comes from inside, through the desire for 
individuality and experimentation. And it is depicted as a white problem 
(Chambers, 2000: 170). 
Where Robinson sees this 'threat' as being, to some extent, utilized by those in the centre. 
Chambers depicts the main reaction to the 'threat' as a return to frindamentalism 
(Chambers, 2000: 167). Both conceptions are useful to this thesis. Mainstream 
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masculinity studies and family studies see the rise in, and increased visibility and 
legitimacy of diversity as exposing gaps and cracks in the ideal normal and therefore as 
precipitant of crisis and deconstruction. Chambers and Robinson, in different ways 
disagree with this optimistic reading of the situation. Chambers still sees the idealized 
white nuclear family as being represented as aspirational and as being.(still) universalized 
and Robinson sees the trope of wounded and victimized white men as recentring those very 
white men. Both see the centre as still being the centre, albeit that that centre is more 
vulnerable than it was. 
This thesis also argues that the centre is still the centre, but it argues that the new discourse 
that takes account of diversity, difference and indeed the supposed 'vulnerability' or 
'crisis' of the centre has in fact strengthened the position of those (white, middle class) 
people in the centre. This thesis claims that what can be seen as the 'disadvantages' of the 
rise in diversity in society and the 'threats' to the centrality of white masculinity and the 
white nuclear family that occur because of this are, in fact, the lynch pins of the new 
discourse that fonnulates a concept of marginalization-for-all. And out of this comes a 
conception of the new 'normal' (which universalizes the ab-nonnal) that comes from a 
discourse of both marginalization and equality for all. The scrutiny of the normal by the 
media and the academy and the increased visibility of multiculturalism and diversity show 
that, what was seen as the nonnal is not in fact 'normal' (usual) at all. The fact that the 
nomial was never 'usual' because it is an exclusive concept is ignored, and what is set up 
as a consequence of this oversight is a universal abnormal that shows that 'we' are all 
equal, but therefore all capable of aspiring to the same ideal. Thus this thesis argues that 
what are presented by both Chambers and Robinson (as well as very many others) as 
problems and risks are in fact an integral part of the new discourse that claims abnormality 
and marginalization for all and which leaves space for an ideal of meritocratic aspiration. 
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Fictions/Factions of the Normal 
As indicated, both Robinson and Chambers take a cultural studies approach to masculinity 
studies and family studies respectively. A cultural studies approach examines both myth 
and reality as producing and creating each other and, at the least, sees that these related 
ideas can radically affect each other and the conceptions of identity that come from both 
(Hall, 1997b). And so it is that fictional, media and popular cultural representations 
remain a critical area of study to cultural studies. This thesis is situated within the 
discipline of cultural studies where the emphasis of study is most usually on popular 
culture: television, radio, film, novels, newspapers etc: mass media, mass entertainment. 
An important part of this thesis therefore is the examination and discussion of the part of 
the archive of the nonnal that is made up of contemporary media texts. As stated at the 
beginning of this introduction, this thesis sets out to examine, explain and discuss the 
archive of the nonnal as it is being expressed through the discourses of the normal in both 
the academy and the media. 
According to Foucault discourses are made up of enunciations, articulations or statements 
and the discourses themselves are organized into and around what Foucault calls the 
archive. He argues that discursive formations are a 
complex volume, in which heterogeneous regions are differentiated or deployed, in 
accordance with specific rules and practices that cannot be superposed. [We] have 
in the density of discursive practices, systems that establish statements as events 
[...]. They are all these systems of statements [...] that I propose to call archive 
(Foucault, 1972: 128). 
Because discursive fonnations and the archive are created through specific rules and 
practices they are both, to some extent, limited and bounded. And it is through and 
because of these limits and boundaries that discursive formations and their archives make 
sense. In tenns of the subject/object of this thesis it is therefore the fact that the new 
discourse of the normal is limited and in fact only one among several, that makes it 
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possible to identify it and therefore makes it possible to study. Foucault says that the 
archive 
Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great 
confused murmur of a discourse, far from being only that which ensures that we 
exist in the midst of a preserved discourse, it is that which differentiates discourses 
in their multiple existence and specifies them in their duration (Foucault, 1972: 
129). 
The archive itself differenfiates discourses, lays them out as multiple and of limited 
duration. Thus where this thesis details and examines one discursive formation of the 
normal, there are others. The discourse of normality that I consider in detail below is not 
finished, complete or singular. There are a diversity of voices out there and there are 
always spaces outside various discourses, the 'extra-discursive' (Foucault, 1980). 
Competing, parallel and contradictory discourses are in circuladon. However, many of 
these contradicfions, or outright disagreements, are not listened to by those who still 
occupy the dominant positions in society. The discourse of normality that 1 examined in 
this thesis does not exist in isolation, but exists alongside other discourses around the 
nonnal some of which sfill assert in the 'old' way that the white, patriarchal, heterosexual, 
nuclear version is correct, 'natural' and 'best'. Although acknowledging that these 'old ' 
views and discourses exist, my intention is to examine the movement towards the more 
'radical' discourse of the normal; one that is, in the final analysis, more effective for the 
retention of the status quo. 
This thesis engages in what Richard Johnson calls "text-based" cultural studies (Storey, 
1996: 107). Al l types of text are implicated in the creation of knowledge about normality 
(Hall, 1996b), the discursive formation that fonnulates knowledge of and 'truth' about the 
nonnal, and the enunciation of this formation. Because of this, texts wil l be treated in a 
similar manner whereby 'factual' or academic texts will not be read in a radically different 
way to 'fictional' texts and documentaries, novels or films will not be read very differently 
to each other or to the academic texts either as they all contribute in their different ways to 
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the making of meaning and the creation of the archive within a discursive foirnation. They 
will be seen as enunciations of the discourse, expressive of the codes and conventions of 
that discourse. 
I have chosen to study the (dis)appearance of nonnality through media representations as 
well as theory because within my own discipline (broadly cultural studies), representation 
is seen as the site of the creation of knowledge and therefore the site of the creation of 
discourse and identity. Although this thesis could have been followed through by looking 
at other areas; law or politics for example, the stories and fictions that constitute our most 
popular and accessible media representations also present the most accessible and clear 
way of examining the new discourse and explaining its comprehensiveness. Cultural 
studies, following Stuart Hall (as we so often do) works from the premise that discourse, 
identity and 'reality' itself are formulated through representation; "how things are 
represented in a culture [...] plays a constitutive, and not merely a reflexive after-the-event 
role" (Hall, 1996b: 443). Representation creates discourse and discourse is always 
implicated in relations of power, and is therefore always implicated in inequalities of 
power in the real, material worid. As Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding put it: "cultural 
studies has always been resolutely focused on the links between culture and power, 
especially as detectable in popular culture" (Ferguson and Golding, 1997: xxv). Because 
of this, representation is also spoken about as making spaces for the creation of identity. 
Stuart Hall has this to say about representation and the fomiation of identity: 
[i]dentity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural 
practices then represent, we should think instead, of identity as a 'production', 
which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within and not 
outside representation (Hall, 1997b: 51). 
Thus all enunciations, including representations are a part of the creation of the changes 
and new identities and are implicated in the creation of spaces from which we can think 
and articulate ourselves. 
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As we have discussed, in the discourse that is recreating spaces of articulation, the normal 
is being displaced, shown not to exist and being re-placed as marginal and this is reflected 
in all the texts I examined whether academic or from various types of media. The 
contemporary media representations that look at the centre of society, white middle class 
masculinity and the white, middle class nuclear family, do not follow the more traditional 
'romanfic' formula of many of the representations of the centre that have gone before 
them. 'Reader I married him' is (more or less) how Jane Eyre (Bronte, 1847), in classic 
romantic style, ends. The films and novels that I am using for this thesis do not end here. I 
have chosen texts to examine in relation to the new discourse of marginalization for the 
normal because they begin after marriage has occurred and are about marriage, divorce and 
family life: the novels Man and Boy, (Parsons, 1999), The Best a Man Can Get, (O'Farrell, 
2000). Intimacy, (Kureishi, 1998), Larry's Party 1997), and the films ^/wer/cart 
Beauty, (1999), 77ie Truman Show, (1998). Pleasant\nlle (1998). Magnolia (1999), Fight 
Club. (1999), The Full Monty (1997). There will also be discussion of some documentaries 
that also fall within the new discursive formation of the normal. 
At the centre of all the texts looked at is a concept of the nonnal nuclear family even if this 
is breaking up, broken up or already failed. In all of them there are different kinds of crisis 
for men and for their families. And when Jane Eyre (to really end the book) places their 
firstborn in Mr Rochester's arms, in contemporary texts this is where the hard business of 
fathering begins. The point with many of these texts is that being a husband and a father 
and a worker is not given and not easy. In most new representations of (what was seen as) 
the nonnal, it is crisis and marginalizadon that is concentrated on. In the discourse of 
marginalization in popular culture, in novels, films, debates and discussions, men do battle 
with their masculinity, their lives, their fathers and their own experiences of fatherhood, 
work, the family and domesticity. And the white nuclear family itself is shown to be 
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changing and indeed falling apart. What all these representations show in their own way, 
is that nonnality, particularly in terms of the family, fatherhood and rigid gender roles is 
not only an impossibility but i f you scratch the surface of the seeming-normal you will see 
that it never existed anyway. Al l these texts in line with the stance of masculinity and 
family studies texts are anti the normal, albeit in quite specific ways. None of them 
idealize the normal in the way one might expect from mainstream texts from societies 
(Britain, America and Canada) that are materialistic, ideological, white-dominated and 
patriarchal, instead they show (and often celebrate) marginalization and disempowerment. 
Masculinity in these texts is studied in relation to three main areas: a) domesticity - which 
encompasses relationships with women, the home and fatherhood, b) work - status, 
success, authority (or not), power (or not), prestige and money making abilities and c) the 
body - which encompasses physical prowess, physique and looks, muscles (or not), and 
sexuality. The primary texts have been chosen because they look at different aspects of 
masculinity as it is spoken about and represented in contemporary culture. I have chosen 
texts that range from 1997 to the present. This is because, although some of the texts 
examined are North American, my emphasis is on British culture and attitudes. The North 
American texts are thus looked at in relation to their impact on British popular culture and 
society, and in relation to their echoing of the concerns of British culture, ideology and 
politics. The year 1997 has been chosen as a starting point for the media texts looked at 
because of the change in political climate that came about in Britain with the election of 
Tony Blair's 'New Labour' government, its emphasis on inclusion, meritocracy and the 
'Third Way' that again emphasized inclusion, choice and opportunity for all. The advent 
of 'New Labour' ideology thus both sets and reflects the tone that makes the new discourse 
both possible and desireable. I contend that the current re-positioning o f the old exclusive 
normal would not have been possible within a different political climate. And also that 
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within the current poUtical cHmate an advocation of the old, exclusive and excluding 
normal would be extremely difficult and therefore it is rarely explicitly attempted. 
Al l the texts chosen have found their way into popular, contemporary culture and the 
novels and films at least have done extremely well commercially. Most of the novels have 
sat on the bestseller lists (Larry's Party, Man and Boy, About A Boy, Intimacy, The Best a 
Man Can Get), and many have been adapted for either television or radio {Larry's Party -
radio, Man and Boy - television, About a Boy - feature film, Intimacy — feature film, The 
Best a Man Can Get - radio). The films too have been box office hits, critically acclaimed 
and popular (American Beauty won five Oscars and The Full Monty took the most money 
of any British film at the time). A l l these texts express a change in representation; from an 
idealization of the normal (usually expressed through romantic texts) to a vivid 
examination of the ins and outs of the abnormal and as we have and will see, this is 
presented as a 'break' from the old intolerant and rigid expression of masculinity and the 
family and new representations have an emphasis on inclusion and tolerance. 
This 'break' with the old and the change to the 'new' has of course got its own history. If 
we just go back to the early 1990s John Beynon argues that; "laddishness was in the air as 
a backlash against 1980s over-dressed, narcissistic new man. [...] Lads' programmes 
dominated television ratings, most notably Men Behaving Badly (Beynon, 2002: 111). 
This 'lad' was the precursor of the type of some of the (now grown up) men in the 
representations examined in this thesis. There is of course some cross-over (and indeed 
continuation),'^ however 1 will contend that the move within mainstream representations 
and theorizations is away from this type of laddishness. In Man and Boy, The Best a Man 
Can Get, and Intimacy the cross-over from lad to what Beynon calls, '"dad lad' (that is, the 
'lad' who has grow^n up and settled down)" (Beynon, 2002: 119), is quite clearly apparent. 
The first series of Men Behaving Badly was broadcast on IT\^ in 1992, but the last was not aired until 1998 
on BBC 1 (BBCi website). 
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In all these texts the protagonists' crises are precipitated by the pull of this 'old' 
laddishness and the 'new' grown-upness of being a husband and father. However in these 
texts the pull of the lad is shown to be an irresponsible and incorrect pull. This is because, 
as Beynon puts it, "the new lad [is] objectionable, selfish, loutish, inconsiderate, building 
his life around drinking, football and sex" (Beynon, 2002: 111). This is an expression of 
unreconstructed 'old' style masculinity and it is this 'old ' style masculinity that most of the 
texts I examine indicate a break from. Even in these texts where the protagonists feel a 
'puir to the old, the emphasis is not so much on 'drinking, football and sex' as on 
marriage, the family and fatherhood. The discussion is much more about Beynon's 'dad 
lad' and in the texts such as Fight Club and Magnolia where expressions of old-style 
masculinity are examined any expression of older types of masculinity is not seen as 
sustainable. 
Indeed extreme old style masculinity is portrayed as pathological, and is not sanctioned in 
the same way that Beynon argues that it was in the early 1990s. Beynon argues that at this 
time "young men were sanctioned to display the errant side of masculinity, a return to the 
unreconstructed basics like flesh, flin and unselfconsciousness" (Beynon, 2002: 112). 
Fight Club and Magnolia are neither of them much ' fun' and unselfconsciousness is not 
part of their remit. Most of the texts studied question the idea of 'how are men meant to 
behave now'? And the subtext of many of the films and dramas and documentaries and 
novels as well as the theory that I am looking at is that this laddish way of behaving is not 
how men are meant to behave now. And what is often explored is the tension that exists 
between the 'true' old masculinity (the normal), the frivolity of the lad, and the failing, but 
caring, responsible, fluid and flexible 'new' forms of masculinity. 
I have deliberately chosen a wide range of texts to discuss in this thesis in order to be as 
thorough as possible in my examination of the archive of the nonnal. Within the 
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examination of a discursive fonnation any and every way that a subject is spoken about 
(and not) is a part of the creation of that subject within discourse and therefore part of the 
creation of the discourse itself Within cultural studies representation is seen as the site of 
the creation of knowledge and therefore the site of the creation of discourse and identity, 
whilst theory is the arena where the academic discussion of knowledge, discourse and 
identity is played out and re-presented. Representation creates spaces from which we can 
speak as subjects/individuals, and this includes the academic texts, as well as the media 
texts. Stuart Hall has this to say about representation and the formation of identity: 
[i]dentity is not as transparent or unprobiematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural 
practices then represent, we should think instead, of identity as a 'production', 
which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within and not 
outside representation (Hall, 1997b: 51). 
Thus where specifically masculinity studies and family studies claim to be reflecting 
changes that are already happening in society (feminism, multiculturalism, divorce, single 
parenthood etc), they are in fact a part of the creation of the changes and new identities and 
are implicated in the creation of spaces from which we can think and articulate ourselves. 
The purpose of this thesis is to intervene in a discourse that is consolidating and 'proving' 
itself and, in the process, hardening. Already it is difficult to critique the denial of the 
normal without feeling 'mean' as the explicitly stated aims of the new discourse are 
inclusion, an end to inequality and tolerance of difference and diversity. However 1 intend 
to show that in order to even begin to reach these goals more care will be needed and 
crucial to the stated aims of masculinity and family studies is an acknowledgment of other 
people's points of view, a more thorough and careful reading of postcolonial and feminist 
theory, and a space of silence from the white middle classes in which other people can 
speak, publish and represent for themselves. 
For the moment however, we will look at Foucault's 'enunciative modalities' (Foucault, 
1972) and the idea of who, at the moment is able to enunciate the new discourse of the 
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normal. Because 'spokespersons' are created within the discourse (Hall, 1997b), creating 
identities and places from which to speak, for the new 'truth' of normality in particular, 
because of the racial, class and gender implications the term carries, it is imperative to 
trace which groups of people 'speak' it. Through an examination of both media and 
academic tests this thesis will examine which groups of people are 'allowed' to speak, 
when and what they are allowed to speak and what the 'correct' way of speaking about 
normality is at the moment. It is this limitation as to what can be said and the limits to the 
possibility of how things may be said that make up "enunciative modalities". Foucault 
says these modalites are: 
Described on the basis of the position occupied by the subject in relation to the 
domain of objects of which he is speaking. In this way, there exists a vertical 
system of dependences: not all the positions of the subject, all the types of 
coexistence between statements, all the discursive strategies are equally possible, 
but only those authorized by anterior levels [...] certain modalities of enunciation 
are excluded (Foucault, 1972: 72-3). 
In the possibility of speech there is a hierarchy and often only certain things are able to be 
said and what is able to be said may depend on the position of the subject who is speaking. 
It is in this way that the current discourse of the normal is sometimes 'allowed' to be 
articulated by black people, gay people and women and their speech is thus let into and is 
expressive of the current discourse. As Hall himself says when speaking of power (which 
is always completely implicated in discourse), power "circulates. It is never monopolized 
by one centre" (Hall, 1997a: 49). 
In the face of a discursive formation, no one person or even type of person is 'all powerful' 
in articulating that discourse. And to this extent it does not matter who authored the texts 
or representations (in the sense, for example, of whether an author intended this or that 
nuance etc). In discussing the texts from the academy and the media as contributing to the 
discourse of nomiality I do not intend to imply personal or institutional intention, in fact 
for many of the texts, discussions and representations I examine the consequences and 
effects are obviously unintentional, deviating widely from stated intentions (pro-feminism, 
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liberation, inclusion etc). This is because individual speech acts themselves can 
unintentionally originate from, and indeed have (often) been created by, the discourse itself 
and are thus enunciated through it. 
Discursive formations always imply a 'truth'. Stuart Hall says that they constitute what the 
"truth of the matter" is at a given historical moment (Hall, 1997a: 45) and at this moment, 
the discursive 'truth of the matter' of normality is that, in the forms of white masculinity 
and the white nuclear family, normality doesn't in fact exist and is an 'untrue' myth that 
needs deconstructing, dispelling, fragmenting, multiplying, and, in effect scattering to the 
wind. We are presented with a discourse that espouses the dismantling of the normal and 
the exclusive white, middle class male power bases and which speaks of the goals of 
inclusion and equality for all regardless of sex, race, class, sexual orientation or family 
type. Tliese are all very seductive goals that appear to be of benefit to the majority of the 
population. The white middle classes are expressing a desire to dismantle 'old' concepts of 
an exclusionary and exclusive 'normal', and this debate is framed and discussed in such a 
way that it makes it very difficult to argue with or to be able to see any discrepancies 
between stated aims and employed methods. The discourse of the normal at the moment is 
being so successftally 'squared' with the ' w i l l ' of (all) the people (Hall, 1982) that, as we 
have seen and will continue to see, it has created spaces that allow those who have been 
marginalized to 'speak' it in the same way that for example, white, middle class male 
academics are speaking it, most often without the slightest hint of a possible conflict of 
interest. A l l sides seem to agree and the new discourse of the nomial is being represented 
as being in the interest of all. 
The 'truth' that normality does not exist is being 'proved' again and again by both the 
academy and the media. 'New' knowledges about normality, nearly all of which 
repeatedly 'prove' that nomiality does not exist, are being unearthed almost daily and are 
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then presented as the 'truth' of the matter. However, what must not be forgotten is that any 
concept of 'truth' is always invested with power. As Stuart Hall says: "[k]nowledge linked 
to power, not only assumes the authority of the 'truth' but has the power to make itself 
true'' (Hall, 1997a: 49, his emphasis). Thus the academic disciplines and media texts that 
are claiming truth are also making that truth and any claim to knowledge of a singular, 
certain truth is itself an exercise of power. However, there will always be 
spaces/places/speech acts outside any given discourse and, as Stuart Hall says: "[i]t is not 
inevitable that all individuals in a particular period will become the subjects of a particular 
discourse" (Hall, 1997a: 56). And so it is that there is always room for dissent. 
The current discourse is neither singular nor complete in part because neither patriarchy 
nor power itself are overriding or all-encompassing. From Foucault's point of view, it is 
not possible for anyone to hold power because power is exercised rather than held 
(Foucault, 1980: 89). Therefore in this model of power it is impossible for one group in 
society or for specific individuals to possess power, but inequalities in the exercise and the 
possibility of exercising power can and do exist. This has been a difficulty for some 
feminists (see Ramazanoglu, 1993). However, this model of power fits in with the idea of 
discourse as being a formation that creates places of articulation and identities which can 
encompass different groups of people and a formation that can suppress within it 
marginalized voices and concems. 
The idea of power being exercised rather than possessed is usefriUy expanded by 
Mahmood Mamdani. Mamdani, speaking about South Africa, and specifically about the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, writes that it is far more usefril to consider the 
relationship between the beneficiaries and victims of a system than to cling to the idea of 
perpetrators and victims: 
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Perpetrators are a small group, as are those victimized by perpetrators. In contrast, 
beneficiaries are a large group, and victims defined in relation to beneficiaries are 
the vast majority in society. [...] 
Which is more difficult: to live with past perpetrators of an evil, or its present 
beneficiaries? If perpetrators and victims have a past to overcome, do not 
beneficiaries and vicfims have a present to come to terms with? If reconciliation is 
to be durable, would it not need to be aimed at society (beneficiaries and victims) 
and not simply at the fractured political elite (perpetrators and victims). [...] 
The significance of [...] history teaches us to think of evil as social rather than just 
individual (Mamdani, 1997: 25). 
Although Mamdani is speaking about a specific situation, I find his notions extremely 
useful in relation to the idea of (British) nomiality. Employing the notion of beneficiaries 
means that we can move away from the concept of intention, and therefore from the 
stifling concept of guilt, and means that we can't conceive of either in an uncomplicated 
way. Mamdani argues that power can be exercised through a set of specific social 
situations and histories, rather than just possessed by individuals who intentionally 
perpetrate inequality and injustice. This means that conceptions of power can be seen in a 
larger context. It also means that those who benefit from existing relations of power 
cannot fall back onto the idea that for example, some individual men merely expressing 
'profeminist' statements will change anything at all. However if we can show how, 
historically, benefit has come about and is sustained for certain groups o f people through a 
concept of nomiality then some change in the systems of thought, practice and creation of 
discourses may be possible. 
Consideration of the idea of beneficiaries and victims may also help to clarify who in fact 
does benefit from discourses of nonnality, old and new, and may aid in extricating other 
groups of people for whom the given discourse may in fact be harmful to their specific 
causes. Although acknowledging that patriarchy is not all-encompassing, it allows us, 
without needing to 'blame' individual men, to acknowledge that there is "deeply 
entrenched male privilege throughout social life" (Ramazanoglu, 1993: 17). Despite the 
denial, deconstruction, 'disproving' and disavowal of nonnality nothing much seems to be 
really changing. White men still reap the benefit of a patriarchal society and the nuclear 
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family is still the institutional family form of this patriarchy. This needs acknowledging 
and tackling head on before there can be any hope of real and radical change. 
57 
Chapter One: Dispelling the Invisibilit>' of the Normal: Making the Centre Visible 
This first chapter traces the arguments, as laid out by masculinity and family studies texts, 
that have led up to the discourse that they espouse of dispelling and disproving the normal 
and beginning to de-centre it. And in doing so, this chapter considers the creation of the 
new rules and conventions of the discursive formation of normal. These first arguments 
set up how the normal is being spoken about. The chapter culminates in a sustained 
examination of fictional representations of the 'crisis' of masculinity and the family. 
Masculinity studies and family studies take certain consensual starting points'^ from which 
to construct their arguments and which they then use to 'logically' move the discussion 
onto their own claims, methods and concems. This chapter follows and explains the first 
steps that the texts of new studies take in beginning to construct their arguments and looks 
at how these ideas are recreated and illustrated within current fictional representations. 
In order to examine these first theoretical steps it is necessary to take a step or two back 
from the eventual marginalization of the centre to look at how masculinity and family 
studies themselves (re)constmct and relay the various movements of the normal. The first 
steps taken by masculinity and family studies trace the origins of our current conception of 
the nonnal and seek to explain the change in how we see the normal. From their 
conclusions, and from the inevitable and inherent inequalities, the silencing of others and 
the violence and repression of others due to a white, and mostly male conception of the 
nonnal, the new studies argue that the centre must be studied in order to expose the 'true' 
workings of the concept of the nonnal. From this foundation masculinity and family 
studies texts lay out their aims, aspirations and the methodologies. In this chapter we will 
thus follow masculinity and family studies as they trace the movement of the normal from 
There is, within mascuhnity and family studies texts, a small amount of dissent which is examined later in 
this chapter. For the most part, the level of consensus across the new disciplines is remarkable. 
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invisible to visible, from backlash reactions to crisis. We end this chapter with the 
argument from masculinity and family studies that the normal, white, nuclear family and 
nonnal white, middle class men have moved from a historic position of stable invisibility 
to a new crisis of visibility. 
The discourse of crisis for those who used to be in the 'stable' position o f the normal is a 
favourite theme for a plethora of contemporary representations and fictions, which 
illustrate and are a part of the creation of the discourse as set out by masculinity and family 
studies. In popular culture representations the discourse of crisis is most apparent in 
representations of fatherhood and the family and with this in mind, this chapter examines 
four contemporary novels and two films: Man and Boy by Tony Parsons written in 1999, 
The Best A Man Can Get by John O'Farrell, (2000), Intimacy, by Hanif Kureishi, (1998), 
Larry's Party by Carol Shields, (1997), and the films The Full Monty (1997) and Fight 
Club, (1999). These popular films and novels all base their stories around themes of crisis 
for men, and they all look at the crisis in tenns of fatherhood and man's place in the 
family. A l l the texts involve a breakdown of the nuclear family and all look at the 
aftermath of the breakdown in relation to the male protagonists' lives, their sense of 
masculinity and the affect this has on their efforts to parent effectively. Fight Club 
however looks at these themes from a slightly different angle. The breakdown of the 
family and fathering is looked at in relation to the protagonist - Jack. In this text it is 
Jack's father who left and Jack has not yet become a father himself and it is he who 
precipitates his own crisis. A l l the texts have been chosen as examples par excellence of 
representations of (and therefore statements about) men in crisis in regards to any idea of 
normal masculinity and the expectations put on men by this construction of the nonnal. 
A l l the texts illustrate vividly the 'new' visibility of the normal, the personal and social 
shake up for those who could be described as having been in the position of the normal and 
the crisis for those people that this visibility is said to precipitate. In and of themselves 
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these texts contribute to the new discourse of the visibility of the nomial and therefore, in 
the tenns of masculinity and family studies they contribute to the break up of that normal 
by showing it is no longer either an inevitable position for certain people or a stable 
position for anyone. They illustrate, discuss and show that the concept of the normal is 
changing from what it used to be. These texts show this change to have both positive and 
negative elements, but for the purpose of this thesis, the most important things that these 
texts assume are that this change is new and there is a crisis. 
The discussion of these primary texts will be delayed somewhat, coming later in this 
chapter as they show crisis, and this 'crisis' is theorized by the new studies as coming after 
and occurring because of an 'enforced' visibility of the centre that I need to discuss first. 
Masculinity studies and family studies begin with the premise that things have changed 
and changed recently. The principle that masculinity and family studies work from is that 
the marginal theorists as well as changes in society have made the centre visible and that 
before this, the centre sat in the middle of society as the invisible unquestioned normal. 
They argue that white, middle class men and the white nuclear family were, within white 
Western society, positioned as the normal with everyone and everything else displaced as 
other, different and marginalized. This is said to have begun in colonial times as we saw in 
the introduction, and to have continued until very recently. Both masculinity and family 
studies begin their work on the basis that this is morally and socially wrong and needs 
changing. This premise originates from postcolonial and feminist theory and therefore 
originates from theorists working within the marginal spaces in our society. The new 
studies issue from the white middle class centre and therefore approach this initial premise 
from the centre. This is of course a fiindamentally different starting place from marginal 
theory. 
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The first ideas that arise from masculinity and family studies is that the white centre needs 
to re-position and examine itself i f any change is to be possible, that this has not happened 
before and that it was theories from the margins that drew the centre's attention to itself. 
This is a change from the initial premises of masculinism and the area of 'studies of the 
family' we looked at in the introduction whereby the normal is both accepted and 
acceptable. Masculinity and family studies begin with the premise that change is not only 
happening but that this change is necessary. I will therefore begin by looking at how these 
studies (re)constuct and re-state the conditions that they say precipitated the change they 
advocate, examining how masculinity and family studies discuss the idea that the centre 
was invisible, why these new studies say that invisibility was necessary for the retention of 
power by the white middle classes and what they say has now changed. 
1.1 The Invisibility' of Normality' - A Technique of Power 
We begin with the oft-stated argument that the centre was, or used to be, invisible. It is 
important to look at this assumption because it fonns the conceptual basis for the theories 
and claims made by masculinity and family studies and provides the stated foundation for 
their very existence as disciplines. Chapter two will argue that the stated foundational 
premises of masculinity and family studies are fijndamentally flawed and only address the 
dominant white middle classes. However, before discussing these arguments it is 
necessary to lay out the ground as masculinity studies, family studies and media 
representations present it. Therefore I begin with the discussion as evidenced in the new 
studies, of how the invisibility of the nonnal is sustained and why it should need to be. 
The main thrust of the argument is that someone needs to look at the centre. And 
'someone' needs to look at the centre because it is argued, it was invisible and this was a 
technique of power that allowed/allows the white patriarchal status quo to continue. 
Within masculinity studies and family studies (as well as some feminisms and postcolonial 
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studies), the answer to how white, bourgeois male power manages so successfully to 
continue is that it is (or at least has been) invisible. Anthony Easthope argued this position 
in 1986: "masculinity has stayed pretty well concealed. This has always been its ruse in 
order to hold on to power. [...] Masculinity tries to stay invisible by passing itself off as 
nonnal and universal" (Easthope, 1986/1992: 1). Concealment and invisibility are seen as 
a 'ruse' used by masculinity, and this 'ruse' enables the masculine hold on power. White 
men have consolidated and maintained their power because 'we' have not been able to see 
that this is what was happening. Hegemonic, white, male power has striven to remain 
invisible. In relation to the ideological state apparatus that is most important in 
constructing the white patriarchal bourgeois nonnal, the family, it is fatherhood that is 
discussed as having remained invisible. Deborah Chambers cites the "absence of 
fatherhood in anthropological and historical studies of parenting and the lack of its visual 
presence in popular representations during the 'golden era' of nuclear familialism in the 
mid-twentieth century (Chambers, 2001: 99). Indeed, the absence of fatherhood is cited 
again and again within family studies, (Chambers, 2001, Jagger and Wright, 1999, Smart 
and Neale, 1999 etc). As Chambers succinctly puts it: "fatherhood has been largely 
absent, until now" (Chambers, 2001: 174). Men, in various roles, it is argued, maintain 
their grip on power, both public and private, by remaining invisible, absent and concealed. 
Why would this work? in explaining why invisibility is so important for retaining power 
we need to refer back to the Foucauldian conception of how modem discursive power 
works quoted in the introduction: 
power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms (Foucault: 1978: 
86). 
In this model, power needs to hide in order to be effective. Power has to be acceptable or 
consent can never be won. And power will only ever be accepted i f it hides most of its 
manifestations and workings. It has to be able to hide how it works because i f power 
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cannot be seen, it cannot be resisted. If power is obscured it is less likely to be questioned 
and if people cannot see its workings it is more likely to be taken-for-granted and left in 
place. Sally Robinson argues this point: 
Masculinity and whiteness retain their power as signifiers and as social practices 
because they are opaque to analysis, the argument goes; one cannot question let 
alone dismantle, what remains hidden from view. This line of argument makes a 
good deal of sense, for it is clear that white male power has benefited enormously 
from keeping whiteness and masculinity in the dark. What is invisible escapes 
surveillance and regulation, and, perhaps less obviously, also evades the cultural 
marking that distances the subject from universalizing constructions of identity and 
narratives of experience (Robinson, 2000: 1). 
Although Robinson goes on to complicate this view as I will discuss later, here she clearly 
lays out the argument made by most masculinity studies texts. If power cannot be seen 
then it cannot be analyzed and therefore cannot be deconstructed or dismantled. In this 
argument, invisibility ensures the retention of power by the white male centre of our 
society. Invisibility means that the status quo remains unquestioned, white masculine 
power is not held under surveillance or therefore regulation. And ftirther, i f white 
masculinity cannot be seen it cannot be accurately categorized as a position, or as a 
specific and particular grouping, enabling white masculinity to universalize outwards from 
its own (particular) position without this being properly detectable. Thus it is argued, 
white men become representative of 'mankind'. It is this universalization that defines the 
normal as well as what is other than or different from the normal. Invisibility and silence 
are said to be techniques of power that enable those in power to stay in that position more 
easily. And by keeping the centre invisible and keeping the mechanisms of power opaque, 
the norms of society, rather than being seen as ideologically invested and unequally 
balanced, appear to be given, universal, historically static and inevitable. 
This absence at the centre of society has been observed by academics from many different 
disciplines; feminists, postcolonialists and those engaged in masculinity studies and family 
studies. How, they ask, is it that (within contemporary parlance), white, middle class men 
have managed to remain ^unmarked'? (Robinson, 2000, Bourdieu, 2001, Glenn, 1999: 28, 
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Chambers, 2001: 15). One of the most common explanations is that it is the 
overw helming presence of white bourgeois masculinity and its point of view that 
paradoxically keeps it hidden. Stephen Whitehead and Frank Barrett, editors of the 
Masculinities Reader concur with this view; "as feminists have long argued, the historical 
centrality of malestream writing, philosophy and political practice has served to make men 
invisible" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 4). The argument is that because white, middle 
class masculinity pervaded every part of cultural production, its ideologies and the men 
behind this hegemonic form of masculinity were obscured. White masculinity with its 
privileged view- point was so ubiquitous that it was normalized, and therefore neutralized 
and naturalized (Bourdieu, 2001: 8-9, Young, 1990, in Kemp and Squires, 1997: 196). The 
white male point of view was/is given out to be 'objective' and therefore neutral - no point 
of view at all, just the taken-for-granted, common sense position. 
Richard Dyer argues this is the most important factor for those in the centre wanting to 
retain power. Most necessary is: 
The attainment of a position of disinterest - abstraction, distance, separation, 
objectivity - which creates a public sphere that is the mark of civilization, itself the 
aim of human history. [...] It provides the philosophical underpinning of the 
conception of white people [...] as everything and nothing. It suggests the sense in 
which the viewpoint of a text (how, in its formal organization it sees its subject 
matter) may legitimately be characterized as white (as well as male and upper or 
middle class). It is a position of such notable, albeit catastrophic, success in the 
world that it is one that many people neither white, male nor middle class, may 
aspire to (Dyer, 1997: 38-9). 
Abstraction, distance, absence, objectivity, all common conceptions within Western 
culture. Each contributed to the creation and the veiling of what is conceived to be the 
normal. Dyer characterizes this as 'everything and nothing', ever\lhing in that these 
conceptions underpinning the signification of white people were all-pervading, and nothing 
in that, by being all-per\'ading, these (white) conceptions/ideologies become invisible. 
These central ideological concepts were not directly spoken about as they became the 
'common sense' or 'given' ways of looking at things and conceiving of things. The white 
64 
patriarchal viewpoint was synonymous with the normal, the taken-for-granted and white 
masculinity itself from colonial times defined and inhabited the normal which within this 
argument was both invisible and silent. As Chapman and Rutherford argued in 1988: 
"masculinity remains the great unsaid. The contestation is over the bodies of black and gay 
people and women. Masculinity remains somehow removed" (Chapman and Rutherford, 
1988: 11). White masculinity does not 'say' itself because it does not need to, it remains 
'unsaid' and disembodied, removed, absent and distant and, it is argued that it is in the 
interest of preserving the status quo for it to remain so. 
In essence, the argument is that since colonial times white, bourgeois male power has been 
so huge and all pervading that it is virtually invisible, so normalized that it cannot be seen 
clearly, i f at all. Stephen Whitehead in Men and Masculinities complicates the matter a 
little, saying about men that he is not suggesting: 
that men have previously been invisible. On the contrary, men as a gender group, 
are omnipresent across the social world. Are not men the very centre, the core, the 
drive, the universal 'mankind'? Certainly, many men have been prone to seeing 
themselves as such. But is being at the 'centre' the same as being 'visible'? No, 
for paradoxically, being at the centre can serve to hide, obftiscate, confuse, obscure 
(Whitehead, 2002: 5). 
Thus 'men as a gender group' are visible and invisible. And it is their omnipresence that 
obscures them, the fact that they are 'the centre, the core' and the universal. They are too 
present to be seen. Richard Dyer quotes David Lloyd noting the same quality in relation to 
whiteness: 
White identity is founded on compelling paradoxes: a vivid corporeal cosmology 
that most values transcendence of the body; a notion of being at once a sort of race 
and the human race, an individual and a universal subject; a commitment to 
heterosexuality that, for whiteness to be affirmed, entails men fighting against 
sexual desires and women having none; a stress on the display of spirit while 
maintaining a position of invisibility; in short, a need always to be everything and 
nothing, literally overwhelmingly present and yet apparently absent (Dyer, 1997: 
39). 
As white masculine power universalizes, so it obscures. It is the overwhelming presence 
of white, heterosexual, male power that makes it absent. The materiality of the body is 
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transcended, the particularity of the white male position is universalized, normalized and 
obscured. This it is argued is one of the major ways in which white male power remains 
invisible. White masculinity is defined as normality. The normal in these discourses is 
spoken of as being the human condition. Other definitions, ways of living, or positions are 
defined as different from this one central position. It is this concept of a single position 
being the normal that is and has been strongly critiqued largely because this means that 
everyone else is seen as abnormal, different or other. This singular concept of the normal 
also relates to the white heterosexual nuclear family. Deborah Chambers cites widespread 
social processes "through which both whiteness and heterosexuality are naturalized and 
normalized by appropriating the nuclear family as a regulatory ideal that inferiorises and 
discredits alternative experiences" (Chambers, 2001:3). Having the nuclear family as an 
ideal means regulation in that the very definition of the normal displaces others as inferior 
to it. Any concept of the normal cannot exist without a concept of otherness. 
In the discussion of the creation and sustenance of the normal as white, heterosexual and 
patriarchal, the question of otherness becomes extremely important. If as Richard Dyer 
puts it white masculinity "both defines normality and ftilly inhabits it" (Dyer, 1997:9), 
what happens to those who are not white or male? White, hegemonic, patriarchal Western 
culture works conceptually and ideologically within systems of hierarchical binaries. One 
of these binaries is that of mind over body and, within masculinity studies in particular, 
one of the techniques discussed as enabling the retention of invisibility for white men is to 
remain in the mind (spirit) half of the Cartesian division of mind and body. Removal from 
the body itself enables white men to universalize outwards thus, it is argued, keeping 
others within particularized embodiment. Men are related to the spirit, the mind, and 
therefore remain disembodied and thus invisible (Dyer, 1997, Peterson, 1998, Chapman 
and Rutherford, 1992 etc), whilst traditionally in Western society it has been women and 
people of colour who have been related to the body, (see Ortner, 1974, Betterton, 1996 and 
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Fanon, 1967, among many other discussions). As the bodies of those deemed different to 
the normal are visible, so the marginalized are visible and the spirit/mind/white male is not. 
Masculinity studies argues that this strategic disembodiment of white men is also a part of 
the invisibility of white men and a part of their consolidation of the power base. Stephen 
Whitehead claims that even within academic disciplines this is often so: "within the 
sociology of masculinity, the male body is omnipresent yet relatively absent" (Whitehead, 
2002: 181). Thus it is the same omnipresent/absent argument that we saw above, largely in 
relation to cultural production, that is used when examining the (non) positioning of the 
white male body. 
As the 'unmarked' norm against which other's bodies are marked, the overwhelmingly 
present white male body remains invisible at least as a direct object of study or overt topic 
of discussion. As Richard Dyer argues in relation to race: 
Biology [...] has traditionally been based upon a model of scientific knowledge as 
separate from that which it investigates. It is thus not surprising that the biology of 
race should sometimes seem to have written whites out of the account, for whites 
are those who have such knowledge, but are themselves less readily the object of it 
(Dyer, 1997: 20). 
Since at least the nineteenth century biology and science in general have the white ideals of 
abstraction and objectivity that help to define the normal mostly by looking at bodies that 
are deemed abnonnal - people of colour and women. Therefore i f it is white men who are 
defining what biology is, constructing and perfomiing the experiments, then the very fact 
that white men are doing the defining removes them from objectification. White people 
hold the knowledge and thus at the same time escape knowledge's sur\'eillance. In this 
argument the privileged point of view of the knowledge makers remains unseen and it is 
others who are the objects of knowledge and therefore seen. 
This is an important aspect of the strategic invisibility of white men; the visibility of others 
keeps those in the central positions obscured. If the bodies of white men are to remain 
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invisible the bodies of others must be forced into visibility. Judith Butler explains this 
phenomenon in relation to the idea of the (neutral) white gaze that looks outwards, 
describing: "the masculine privilege of the disembodied gaze, the gaze that has the power 
to produce bodies, but which is itself no body" (Butler, 1993: 136). Butler invokes the idea 
of the objective, white (scientific) gaze associated with the strategic disembodiment of 
white men expressed from a feminist point of view, however masculinity studies itself 
concurs with this view and Richard Dyer relates it to whiteness: 
The claim to racial superiority resides in that which cannot be seen, the spirit, 
manifest only in its control over the body. [...] 
Moreover, the ultimate position of power in a society that controls people in part 
through their visibility is that of invisibility, the watcher. [...] 
Whites must be seen to be white, yet whiteness as a race resides in invisible 
properties and whiteness as power is maintained by being unseen (Dyer, 1997: 44-
5). 
Dyer is arguing that the white power base can see but it cannot be seen. The surveillance 
of others' (bodies) is a vital part of this, allowing white, bourgeois masculinity to remain in 
the centre of society and to occupy the position of the normal. 
If we return to Foucault for a moment we will see how he believes the disembodiment and 
invisibility of those in power and the visibility and embodiment of those without power to 
be an historical (and relatively new) phenomenon: 
Traditionally power was what was seen, what was shown. ... Discursive power, on 
the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on 
those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the 
subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assumes the hold of the power that is 
exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to 
be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his [sic] subjection (Foucault, 
1984/1991). 
Foucault is arguing that not so long ago power itself was invested in visibility. In this 
form, power wanted to be seen and power was exercised by being seen. However, what he 
terms 'disciplinary power' has vested interests in not being seen - it is those who are 
disempowered that are seen and this compulsory visibility is a part of the process of 
disempowemient. Discursive power is itself invisible and the disciplining and powerftil 
68 
gaze is turned outward, illuminating the marginalized, whilst itself remaining in the 
shadows. Attention is diverted away from the centre. Whereas, historically Foucault 
argues, feudal power drew attention to the body of the King, and power was invested in 
what was shown, (Foucault, 1975: 187, also see Silverman, 1992: 152-153) now, newer 
fonns of discursive power rely on obscurity - on not being seen. Homi Bhabha links the 
discourse of language with the discourse of vision when discussing these points: 
'He' , that ubiquitous male member, is the masculinist signature writ large - the 
pronoun of the invisible man; the subject of the surveillant, sexual order; the object 
of humanity personified (Bhabha, 1995: 57). 
Therefore we have the ubiquity of white masculinity, the surveying properties of this 
privileged position, the invisibility of this position, and the singularity o f it. Within the 
discussions of masculinity and family studies white bourgeois masculinity was it seems, in 
the perfect (objective, removed, ubiquitous, disembodied, invisible) place of the normal. 
These arguments and discussions are of course not unfamiliar. However, the claim from 
masculinity studies, and family studies is that a critique of this invisibility of the centre by 
the centre is new. The new studies espouse change and as we shall see advocate change 
from the invisibility of the centre to a new visibility. However, i f the white patriarchal 
centre as exemplified in the ideal of normality vv^ t^  invisible, how has this 'new' critique 
become possible? How for example can we possibly have the discussion in the 
introduction to this thesis that traced the creation of the ideals of the normal 'manly' man 
and the nuclear family? What is it that is said to have shed light onto the 'invisible' space 
of the nomial making it invisible no longer? 
1.2 The 'Enforced' Visibility' of Normality' 
The idea that the white patriarchal spaces of the normal were invisible, forms the first stage 
of the arguments of masculinity studies and family studies. The idea and discussion of this 
invisibility comprises the initial link in the chain of the theoretical logic that these studies, 
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with very few excepfions, follow. The second stage of the argument is that the white 
patriarchal centre began to be made visible by feminism, postcolonialism and queer theory; 
by the physical presence of an increased diaspora, through globalization including de-
industrialization, economic, communication and technological changes and by the 
marginalized mobilizing politically. In the discussions of masculinity and family studies 
the phenomena of change that receive most attention are the marginal theories that are in 
fact, said to have 'mothered' the new studies themselves as disciplines. The argument runs 
thus: feminist and postcolonial theorists began their work by looking at their own marginal 
positions trying to gauge how they had been placed in the margins of society and what the 
implications of these positionings might be. By examining their own marginal positions 
they began to question the central hegemonic position of white bourgeois heterosexual men 
and the ideology of the normal and this questioning began to throw light onto the white 
centres. However as we saw with the centre-was-invisible argument documented above, 
what is said to have been found was not a presence but an absence, (Braidotti, 1991, 
Butler, 1990, Betterton, 1996, Dyer, 1997, Easthope, 1986/1992, Chapman and Rutherford, 
1992, Chambers, 2001 etc). Within this argument what feminist and postcolonial critics 
and theorists seemed to discover was that white, heterosexual, middle class masculinity 
was absent in representation, theory and audible hegemonic discourse. The conclusion 
drawn was that white men have been sitting invisible, silent and disembodied at the centre 
of the family and society. These two stages; the invisibility of the centre and the beginning 
of enforced visibility by the margins, fonn the founding arguments for most new studies 
texts. It is on these foundational arguments that the logic of the new studies is based and 
therefore these arguments are of vital importance not only to masculinity studies and 
family studies but also to my own examination of the logic of the new studies texts and the 
theoretical and ultimately material implications of their theories. 
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Within masculinity studies and family studies the phenomenon that is most often cited as 
bringing masculinity and the *true' nature of the nuclear family to light is feminism. More 
recently postcolonialism is cited as the theory that first brought whiteness into the critical 
spotlight (Dyer, 1997), and in relation to the construction of ^compulsory heterosexuality' 
(Rich, 1980), queer theory is implicated. Thus the theories of the marginal are said to have 
brought normality itself into visibility. The visibility of the centre is discussed as being an 
almost inadvertent move brought about by the marginalized examining their own 
positionings and the inequality inherent in being placed away from the centres of society. 
These investigations are said to have begun to disrupt the unquestioned hegemony of white 
men. The early (as well as the later) movements of these disciplines examined binaries and 
stereotypes. Binaries are, as is suggested by the name, hierarchical systems of duality 
which include what is seen as the privileged and normalized as well as the inferior and 
abnormalized, as we saw above with the binary of mind/body. This means that even when 
marginal theorists concentrate on examining the way that the iesser' half of a binary 
opposition works, the 'normalized', 'higher' part of the binary is implicitly evoked, 
recognized and acknowledged. Similarly, still working with binaries, the deconstruction of 
stereotypes necessarily involves an examination of the normal. As Stuart Hall puts it: 
Stereotyping [...] is part of the maintenance of the social and symbolic order. It 
sets up a symbolic frontier between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', the 'normal' and 
the 'pathological', the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what 
does not or is 'Other', between 'insider' and 'outsider'. Us and Them' (Hall, 1997a: 
258). 
In deconstructing hierarchical binaries and the stereotypes of those placed as 'other', the 
central hegemonic 'normal' is uncovered and its techniques and mechanisms of retaining 
power by fixing and marginalizing others by defining them as 'abnormal', 'pathological', 
'deviant', 'unacceptable' and 'outside', are laid bare. Through examining one half of the 
binary that defines the 'abnormal' the definitions of what consfitutes the 'normal' 
immediately become apparent. In this way it is argued that the centre was made visible, 
although absolutely not through its own volition. 
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Whitehead and Barrett argue this position when they speak about this unasked for and 
enforced visibility: 
One of the direct consequences of feminist thinking and action has been to expose 
and highlight the power, privilege, position and practices of men. In so doing, 
feminism has explicated the continuing inequality between women and men as they 
exist across ethnic groups and cultural and social borders. Feminism is political 
inasmuch as it is about seeking change [...]. In pursuit of this aim, feminism puts 
men and masculinities in a critical spotlight, in the process centring on the practices 
of men in ways many men would prefer it not to, not least because there may well 
be costs to them as a result. Certainly in terms of sustaining unequal material 
advantage, opportunity, status and privilege, men have much to lose with the rise of 
feminist thinking (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 3, my emphases). 
From Whitehead and Barrett's point of view this exposure of men is the most important 
consequence of feminism. As women began to systematically examine their positioning as 
women, this could only be done i f they looked at their positioning in relation to men. By 
its very nature feminism called masculinity into question. According to Whitehead and 
Barrett the critique of masculinity and men is central to feminism and this critique is 
discussed most often in terms of bringing men and masculinity into visibility. Men have 
been highlighted, exposed and thrust into the spotlight by feminism and from this point of 
view it became impossible for white, bourgeois, heterosexual masculinity to continue to 
occupy the normal unnoticed. In this argument the margins marked the centre. Sally 
Robinson argues that in post 1960's America (and this relates to discussions in Britain 
too), ''the so-called average American - straight, white, male, middle class - also 
experiences a mark imposed on him by others" (Robinson, 2000: 16). In Robinson's 
argument 'others' have always been 'marked' by the centre but now with the rise of the 
marginal theorists and the social movements that often accompanied them she argues that 
the normalized white male became a 'marked" man. 
Within masculinity studies it is stressed again and again that, at the beginning, the margins 
forced visibility (Easthope, 1986/1992, Peterson, 1998), embodiment, (Robinson, 2000), 
race (Dyer, 1997), and even gender (Boone and Cadden, 1990) on to men. This seemingly 
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unstoppable movement is sometimes linked with the rise of postmodernism and the 
consequential and inevitable break up of the master or grand narratives. Truth is no longer 
'truth' and the singularities (nonnality, humanity) assumed by dominant discourse in the 
past shatter into multiplicities and fragments (Whitehead, 2002: 222-3). The shattering of 
the invisibility of white men is said to have ricocheted onto the ideal of the normal, white, 
middle class, heterosexual nuclear family as well. Discussing the realm of representafions 
of the nuclear family, Deborah Chambers argues: 
Representations have become a critical battleground in the conflicts over family 
and family values, leading to the spectacidarisation of the family as the platform on 
which society's profound debates about sexual and personal morality are struggled 
over. As such, family values are being argued over at the level of representations, 
leading to a spectacularisafion of 'the family' as a monolithic unit, to be defended 
or dismantled (Chambers, 2001:176, my emphasis). 
Chambers argues that for the nuclear family, as it inhabited the place of the normal, this 
'spectacularisation' was new. And, as Whitehead and Barrett argue that now white men 
can be seen, so Chambers argues that the nuclear family can also now be seen. 
Thus we begin the logical progression of the new studies. For masculinity and family 
studies, having argued that invisibility was necessary in order to maintain the current white 
patriarchal status quo and in order for it to be unquesfioned as the definition of the normal, 
logically, this 'new' visibility of the normal must shake this definition of the normal and 
therefore the status quo itself If invisibility allowed (particulariy) white men to stay in 
power, then it is understandably argued that visibility will undennine this power base. 
Following this argument, the new visibility of the nonnal leaves it open to question and 
therefore resistance. Within the invisibility argument it was the invisibility of normality 
that prevented questioning - with the argument that what cannot be seen cannot be 
resisted. Therefore, i f one allows for this 'new' visibility of the normal that 'safe place' of 
power has now gone along with invisibility. Abigail Soloman-Godeau in Constructing 
Masculinity takes up this point in relation to men: 
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The recent visibility of masculinity itself as, variously, a disciplinary object of 
knowledge, a subject of artistic or literary investigation, and a political, ethical and 
sexual problematic - a diagnostic primarily derived from and in fact inseparable 
from feminism and the women's movement - attests, i f nothing else, to a 
destabilization of the notion of masculinity such that it forfeits its previous 
transparency, its taken-for-grantedness (Soloman-Godeau, 1995: 75). 
Soloman-Godeau argues that as feminism and the women's movement have made 
masculinity visible so begins the destabilization of masculinity itself And with 
masculinity, whiteness and 'the' family now visible, what was seen as normality is opened 
up as an object of enquiry itself and opened up again to criticism and resistance. 
1.3 Backlash 
We now turn to the reactions that are/were the first response to this 'new' exposure and 
critique of the normal. The texts of both masculinity studies and family studies always 
document what they describe as the first reacfionary responses to the 'new' visibility of the 
centre and the newly perceived threat of the destabilization of the nonnal: the backlash 
responses. Within the context of this thesis, the documenting of these reactions and the 
reactions themselves represent an important stage in the changing place of the normal 
within current discourse. In this section 1 examine the discussion of these first reactions 
only in relation to how current theory represents them rather than documenting these 
reactions myself This is because 1 am examining these first 'backlash' reactions as a stage 
within the progression of the new studies' own arguments about themselves and their own 
political positioning and as an important step on the road to the 'crisis' o f the nonnal that 
we will look at soon. 
The backlash arguments are presented as being in complete contrast to the new discussions 
and agendas of masculinity studies and family studies. The backlash responses seem to be 
documented in order to demonstrate that their opinion and politics differ completely from 
the right wing reaction. Those espousing the backlash arguments want the re-centring of 
the nonnal whereas both masculinity studies and family studies ostensibly and explicitly 
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require the de-centring of the normal. The backlash arguments differ ft*om the discussions 
of masculinism and traditional studies of the family in that these disciplines both assume 
and accept the normal as the normal. The backlash argument recognizes that society has 
changed and that the normal has been deposed and displaced and sees this as wrong and as 
needing rectifying and moving back to 'how things were'. Between those espousing a 
change 'back' and the more radical position of masculinity and family studies there are 
however some similarities in the discussions around how and why the normal has been 
made visible. Although after this initial 'agreement' about the foundations of the changes 
in the way that normality is being perceived, those who say they want normality reinstated 
as normality and those who say they don't, radically separate in their discussions and their 
theorizations. 
The first points of agreement between the reactionary right-wing attitudes that they 
document and masculinity and family studies themselves is the idea that nonnality has 
become visible, it is under threat and attitudes to it are changing. The second point of 
agreement is that these changes have come about through the 'intervention' of minority 
groups; by minority theorizations, by minority political movements, by the assertion of 
minority rights, and by the very presence and visibility of minorities. However, where 
masculinity and family studies see this as a positive change for the better, in their own 
texts they document the reactions of others who do not. In many of the early responses to 
feminism and postcolonialism that are documented, there is a palpable sense of threat that 
informs the discourse around the normal. The nonnal is seen as being under attack, the 
status quo endangered and the very existence of the privileged nomial threatened. 
Masculinity and family studies texts and the conservative rhetoric they quote agree that 
there is a threat to the nonnal and that there really are not many places left for the white 
patriarchal centre to go. As Stephen Whitehead says; "men have nowhere to hide now. 
There are no overarching ideologies or dominant discourses into which men can retreat" 
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(Whitehead, 2002: 5-6). Whitehead is arguing that the universalizing ideologies and 
discourses that came from the white male centres have fallen apart or more likely been 
blown into a thousand fragments. White men as the epitome of the normal have been 
caught in the light; cornered. And the first reaction that is discussed by the new studies to 
this 'cornering' is this (very visible) violent and dogmatic backlash, which is discussed as 
peaking in the 1980s. 
In the introduction to the 1988 book Male Order Rowena Chapman and Jonathan 
Rutherford document this first response to feminism, gay and black political movements: 
Queer, poofter, sick, deviant: all those words weighed down with the baggage of 
ignorance and violence have been resurrected from the heterosexual psyche, to 
defend its claim to normality. In the Tory right-wing think-tanks, church debate 
and the 'quality press' the prose may be more muted, but the sentiments have been 
similar. 
This moral panic, and the strength of feeling that has been aroused, indicates the 
centrality of sexual politics in the production and reproduction of power relations. 
Far from being peripheral, the meanings, definitions and representation of different 
sexualities are a central arena of political contestation. The right has been 
attempting to counter and defeat the politics of feminism, gay affirmation and black 
identity. It has been seeking to construct these politics as the cause, rather than the 
consequence, of a fractured society (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988: 9-10). 
Chapman and Rutherford describe the sentiments of a movement that they say is defending 
normality against those who supposedly intend to dismantle the normal; feminists and gay 
and black activists. In the language of this backlash, rather than white patriarchal society's 
inevitable inequalities being blamed for the fracturing and destabilization of society, those 
who have historically experienced this inequality are blamed: 'them' rather than 'us'. 
Various 'enemies' are said to be evoked and created by the backlash movement and these 
enemies are viewed as agents of chaos intent on destabilizing society and pulling down the 
traditional order. Chapman and Rutherford continue: "when the litany o f threats is read out 
- the recurring list of blacks, gays, lesbians and feminists - it speaks to the threatened 
power and privilege of a white masculinity that has been the symbol of patriarchal order" 
(Chapman and Rutherford, 1988: 11). In light of this, it is not surprising that when the 
marginal force a hearing for themselves, it is the marginal who within conservative rhetoric 
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were/are blamed for the subsequent destabilization of the central normal. Pro-feminist 
masculinity studies (of which Chapman and Rutherford are a part) also believes that white 
masculinity's power and privilege is being threatened and, interestingly, is being 
'threatened' by the very same people/political movements; blacks, gays, lesbians and 
feminists, that are invoked by the right-wing backlash rhetoric, albeit that in this case it is 
seen as positive. 
The composition of British society is changing. Marginal political movements highlight 
inequalities and make the presence of minorifies such as gays and blacks inescapable. As 
David Theo Goldberg proclaims: 
In the late twentieth century [...] the regulative force of colonialism has broken 
down and the unsettling capacity of hybridity can no longer be kept (colonially) 
marginal by modem fonns of control. Indeed, the heterogenous and hybrid have 
come to occupy and challenge modernity's centers. Under these altered condifions, 
hybridity's unsettling capacity has been celebrated and embraced, but also fiercely 
resisted (Goldberg, 2000: 83). 
In this (postcolonial) view of the change in our society it is the presence of the 'other' that 
challenges the centre. And as Goldberg notes there are two reactions to this - there are 
those who celebrate and embrace this change and there are those who resist it. Those who 
are said to resist the 'threat', in order to resist this chaotic, disruptive 'other' are discussed 
as re-invoking a singular, stable normality which they then present as the moderate 
'common sense' middle way of the normal. 
Masculinity studies and family studies argue that as the white patriarchal centres of society 
are being threatened an attempt is being made to re-cover the unities, stability and 
ideological structuring of those centres: white hegemonic masculinity, and the white 
nuclear family as the ideal normal. Deborah Chambers documents this 'backward 
looking' movement: 
A revisionist model of the nuclear family is being recuperated through a rising 
moral fundamentalism in western Anglophone nations, spearheaded by the Moral 
Right, ethical socialists and certain religious groups to regulate meanings and 
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practices of family and halt the processes of increasing individualization. A 
growing sense of agency among formerly subordinated and inferiorised groups, 
including women, gay men and people who are treated as ethnic 'minorities', 
threatens modem family values. Modem family values have been the very site in 
which those social and cultural inequalities have been reproduced. Their demise 
would erode those key mechanisms of regulation. The privileging of nuclear 
family values is therefore being sharply defended, policed and fought over. [...] 
Fundamentalism is, then, a reaction against the demands for diversity and 
difference (Chambers, 2001: 167). 
Chambers speaks of a 're-vision' of the nuclear family that seeks to see it 'again' as the 
singular normal form of the family and which will then impart certain right-wing and 
religious moral attitudes to both its members and to society as a whole. What Chambers 
describes are reactive senfiments expressed in the language of the backlash; a sense of 
'shoring up' the centre against the assault that is flowing fi-om the margins. This bigoted 
and rigid type of reaction to uncertainty, doubt and a sense of threat has been closely 
examined in relation to nationalism. People's sense of (national) identity becomes more 
divisive and rigid if people feel under threat (Woodward, 1997), and it is this type of 
defensive reaction that is discussed as being apparent in relation to the threat to the normal. 
The defense that the new studies document but disagree with is a re-creation of the idea of 
a single, stable normal as a counterpoise to the frightening and chaotic and 'bad' 'other' 
that is demanding a voice and that is bringing both itself and the normal, privileged centre 
of society to light. 
1.4 C risis 
The notion of crisis is said to have come after the initial backlash reactions to change. 
As we have seen both those who are vociferous in their reaction against the destabilization 
of the normal, and the proponents and participants of the new studies sec the visibility of 
the normal as a threat to the status quo, to the 'old ' patriarchal order. From seemingly 
diametrically opposed positions both sides of the argument, whether for the preservation of 
the normal as it was/is, or those who advocate the deconstmction of this normal, discuss 
this visibility of the normal a) as new, b) as being forced upon the positions and places at 
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the centre of society and c) as a serious threat to this centre. For both camps, this enforced 
visibility leads to ideas of the destabilization of the old order and beginning the notions of 
'crisis' (Whitehead, 2002). The notion of 'cr is is ' is said to follow on from and, at least to 
begin with, to be a part of the violent and dogmatic backlash against the marginal voices 
that forced a hearing for themselves and 'forced' visibility onto white masculinity and the 
white nuclear family. 
The notion of crisis comes with the notion of 'blame' although the discussion of crisis 
differs from that of backlash. However the same elements and circumstances are said to 
have precipitated the crisis as the backlash. Most often it has been women in general and 
feminism in particular that have been implicated in both the perceived crisis in masculinity 
and in the white nuclear family. Deborah Chambers says starkly; "it is female 
emancipation that is blamed for the breakdown of modem family values" (Chambers, 
2001: 129). Along with feminism or the "genderquake" as he calls it, Richard Collier cites 
"the increased 'visibility' (and thus it is assumed legitimacy) of gay, lesbian and bi-sexual 
practices and cultures" (Collier, 1999: 42). He argues that the increased visibility of 
minority groups helps to construct an idea of both the family and masculinity 'in crisis'. 
The visibility and subsequent 'acceptance' of the 'abnormal' are said to have precipitated 
the crisis. 
Alongside the rise of feminism and the visibility of diverse sexualities and practices, the 
rise in the amount of people who can be seen to belong to 'ethnic minorities' is also cited 
as precipitating a crisis in the white centres. Our society is increasingly multicultural. 
There is no doubt that things have changed apace. This is how Bhikhu Parekh discusses 
multiculturalism: 
Multicultural societies are integrally bound up with the immensely complex process 
of economic and cultural globalization. Technology and goods travel freely, and 
they are not culturally neutral. Multinationals introduce new industries and systems 
of management and require the receiving societies to create the necessary cultural 
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preconditions. [...] People travel for employment and as tourists, and both export 
and import new ideas and influences. Thanks to all this, no society can remain 
culturally self-contained and isolated. Indeed, the extemal influences are often so 
subtle and deep that the receiving societies are not even aware of their presence and 
impact. [...] [T]he project of cultural unification on which many past societies and 
all modem states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no longer viable 
today. Contemporary cultural diversity thus has an air of inexorability and 
unpredictability about it and confronts us all as a shared universal predicament 
(Parekh, 2000: 8). 
Parekh is arguing that multiculturalism and globalization will themselves undermine any 
attempt at 'cultural unification', stability or cohesion. Global capitalism itself means that 
national isolation and static populations are no longer a reality. Cross-cultural influences 
pervade most parts of the globe and the first world is as affected as everywhere else. 
Societies have changed and the viewpoints of backlash, crisis and celebration all recognize 
this. From slavery to Windmsh, from asylum seekers to the new economic migrants, the 
diaspora is growing and will continue to do so. Multiculturalism and diversity within the 
discourse of the new studies are seen as an important part of the breakdown of the 
traditional, while, nuclear family as being representative of the normal and are seen as 
pointing the way to the meltdown of the white male hegemony. 
Masculinity and family studies argue that in both the backlash and the crisis rhetoric it is 
these 'minorities' that are blamed for the changes in society over and above all other 
factors. Changes in economic conditions (de-industrialization), technology (especially 
reproductive), and globalization are also all cited but (largely) as subordinate factors to the 
changes 'enforced' on the white patriarchal centres by minority groups; the increasing 
diversity in society and (because of feminism) the rise of divorce, cohabitation and single 
parenthood (Segal, 1997, Chambers, 2001, Allan, 1999, Whitehead and Barrett, 2001, 
Jagger and Wright, 1999, Smart and Neale, 1999 etc). With the growing diversity of our 
society other related changes have followed. On the point of immigration, Graham Allan 
in The Sociology of the Family writes: 
The migration of individuals and families from the Caribbean, South Asia, East 
Africa and other parts of the Commonwealth in the second half of the Twentieth 
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Century has resulted in much more variation in the organization of family and 
kinship relations than existed previously (Allan, 1999: 5). 
Forms of the family that deviate from the white nuclear family are it is argued, on the 
increase and therefore the traditional 'ideal' of the nuclear family is in danger of 
crumbling. In the arguments of masculinity studies and family studies reality is said to be 
interfering with the 'myth' - whereby actual family forms do not (any longer) conform to 
the mythic white, nuclear ideal. And again there is concurrence between differently 
mofivated arguments. This self-same argument about multiculturalism and variations of 
family forms 'threatening' the centrality of the nuclear family fomi as the ideal in Westem 
societies is also used by those who bemoan the fate of the nuclear family; it can be 
employed to 'prove' crisis in the family, but it can also be and is used to point out and 
celebrate change and point the way to new possibilifies. In the rhetoric of both 
movements, anti-change and pro-change, it is argued that variation, diversity and muUiple 
family fomis are becoming increasingly visible. And again in both viewpoints in relation 
to diversity, immigration and globalization are both cited (as interrelated phenomena) as 
playing a large part in the (relatively recent) changes in our society'^. 
In the political (ideological) book The Global Third Way Debate, Helen Wilkinson writes: 
Many families today experience huge strain. Relafionships are breaking down at a 
rapid rate; more and more children are growing up in dismpted [sic] families; 
birthrates are in decline; and there is a serious tension for many between the 
demands placed on them to be good parents and spouses and to be high achievers in 
an increasingly competitive workplace. Our [sic] very notion of the family itself 
appears to be threatened. The long-term trends suggest that we are not only living 
in a 'post-divorce' society, we are rapidly moving to a 'post-marriage' one where 
marriage itself is increasingly redundant. (The first time marriage rate is at its 
lowest possible level since 1889 and cohabitation is a cultural nomi) (Wilkinson, 
2001: 224). 
Wilkinson argues that everything that 'we' know is being broken up and 'our' norms being 
dismantled as the reality and the myth come head to head. As Deborah Chambers writes, 
Also ciied are the histories of the slave trade and the enforced movement of people; the enforced, as well as 
the more recent chosen, diaspora (see Behdad in Schwarz and Ray, 2000: 396+, and Hail in Woodward, 
1997: 51+, among many other discussions). 
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"western anglophone nations [...] struggle to cope with the huge disjunction between the 
mediated ideal nuclear family and real complex, hybrid families and relationships" 
(Chambers, 2001: 108). This is where there is another split between the advocates of the 
ideal-as-reality (some right-wing and religious groups that argue that the ideal is a reality 
that can be reinstated) and those who see that the ideal has become a myth (or in this 
reading an 'untruth'). This latter, is the view that family studies, on the whole, takes. 
Family studies argues that the white, heterosexual, nuclear family is no longer either the 
ideal or the majority family form. From both sides of the argument though it is seen that 
other forms of the family are becoming so common that the ideal of the white nuclear 
family as normal is being left wide open to question and thus is being portrayed as being in 
crisis. 
In masculinity and family studies the discussion of the discourse of crisis is an important 
step in their own theoretical paths. The discourse of crisis in masculinity and the family, 
although slightly different to the rhetoric of backlash is not unconnected. Within the 
discussions of masculinity and family studies the backlash reaction to change is not spoken 
about as being static and the reaction itself is said to change: from backlash to crisis. In the 
first place it is argued that the visibility that the margins forced on to the centre meant that 
men-as-a-group could be identified and claims to neutral, unmarked individuality were 
shattered (Robinson, 2000). This as we have seen led to the backlash reaction but the 
backlash reaction itself inevitably involves the centre acting and identifying itself a5 centre 
against the margins. In this way the visibility of the centre is inadvertently consolidated 
and (so it is argued) the centre itself fiarther destabilized. As well as this, the language and 
arguments of the backlash movement are easy to argue against to show bigotry and 
intolerance and can themselves be used to show that the white centre does perpetuate 
inequality based on identity. Thus although the backlash sentiments are still sometimes 
reiterated in various quarters its influence seems to be waning and one can cite the massive 
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rise of pro-feminist masculinity studies as one demonstration of this. Another ^proof of 
the waning of the influence of the reactionary language/ ideas of backlash is the rise in the 
rhetoric of crisis. This rhetoric is not, as I have argued, entirely separate from that of 
backlash - indeed it comes from it, but it does represent a change in tack. 
Within masculinity studies texts such as Stephen Whitehead's (2002) and family studies 
texts such as Deborah Chambers' (2001) the rhetoric of crisis is discussed as an inevitable 
and subsequent reaction that follows on from the first violent and dogmatic backlash. The 
rhetoric of crisis is said to be the next stage of a movement that, so far, is said to have 
involved; a) the invisibility of normality, b) the subsequent enforced visibility of normality 
by the margins and c) the violent and dogmatic response to this enforced visibility by the 
reactionary right-wing. Notions of crisis are said to be the next link in this chain. Deborah 
Chambers says that: 
Since the golden era of the modem family of the 1950's, during which the nuclear 
version became an icon of morality, the family has been represented as both stable 
and deeply vulnerable. It continues to be conveyed as biologically and psychically 
natural, and, at the same time, as crisis-ridden and under siege (Chambers, 2001: 
92). 
For Chambers the notion of threat and crisis is a part of the creation of an ideal of the white 
nuclear family. The very fact that a unified, biologically determined ideal is invoked 
means that it will inevitably be under siege and in crisis. Any invocation of a singular 
stable normal inevitably carries a corresponding idea of the unstable, multiple, ahnonniil. 
Normality is placed in direct opposition to the 'abnormaP and its threatening and chaotic 
forces and with the inexorable logic of binaries, the abnormal is created in line with the 
normal. Order cannot exist without chaos (Foucault, 1976: 44-9). The invocation of the 
normal will always carry in its wake the shadow of the dark and dangerous abnonnal. 
Thus, a visible but unified version of normality will always be perceived as being under 
threat. Stephen Whitehead concurs with this view in relation to masculinity: 
Many writings on the crisis of masculinity assume that men and their masculinity 
are homogenous and biologically indivisible, sustained by a natural order that has 
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been severely threatened by women's 'misguided' attempts to transform the gender 
'balance'. Importantly, and what is of concern, feminism is seen by many to be the 
guilty party in all this (Whitehead, 2002: 56). 
By viewing masculinity and men themselves to be biologically detennined and singular, 
Whitehead is arguing that, inevitably, this will place 'women' in opposition to men and 
thus as a threat. Here, as with the rhetoric of backlash, men-as-a-group have been 
identified, however the crucial difference is that the language and representations of crisis 
begin to use this identification to claim feminization and victimization for white-men-as-a-
group. 
Sally Robinson, who writes extensively about notions of crisis and the move into notions 
of victimization and feminization explains the 'new' use of a collective identity for white 
men: 
Identity politics is only mobilized after the perception of victimization or injury; 
[...] the appeal of collectivity appears to depend on a felt experience of 
disempowerment. This is evident in the language in which calls for groups rights 
are couched; that language draws heavily on the moral and symbolic power of pain, 
victimization, and crisis, whether articulated fi"om economic and social centers or 
their margins. [...] [W]hite men do not willingly fold their individual identities into 
a group identity except around perceived losses of power, articulated as 
impingements of rights (Robinson, 2000: 7). 
In Robinson's articulation of the rhetoric of crisis, collective identity for white men is 
absolutely necessary. White men cannot be in crisis or victims unless they can identify 
themselves as white men. The discourse of men-in-crisis subsumes differences between 
men into the discourse of victimization. Differences such as class and even race are 
subsumed because this discourse can only exist i f there is an identified collective identity 
for men and as we know, any type of strategic essentialism subsumes differences. The 
collective identity of'men' in discussions and representations of crisis and victimization is 
more important than racial or class identities. In the discourse of crisis the identified men-
as-a-group position of the backlash is mobilized into a strategic essentialism for men that 
shows (or makes visible) the victimization of men. It is in this way that the notion of crisis 
follows on from the backlash concepts. Both movements see that the centre is under threat 
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and white men are being disempowered. However, instead of the rage of the backlash, 
'pain, victimization and crisis' are being articulated and enforced visibility is being 
changed into 'look at (poor) me'. 
There is disagreement within the disciplines of masculinity studies and family studies 
about whether or not there actually is a crisis for either men or the family or indeed what 
fonn this crisis might take and what it might mean. However the notion of crisis is always 
discussed and the phenomenon of men-in-crisis is one of the most common ways that 
white men are portrayed in media representations at the moment, as we will see. 
Masculinity studies and family studies tend to discuss the rhetoric of crisis as one that is 
common in the current climate but not one that they themselves ascribe to as a 'reality'. 
Thus, in concurrence with the view of many current masculinity studies discussions, this is 
how Stephen Whitehead puts it: "[d]espite its reductionistic underpinnings, the notion of a 
homogenous body of men 'in crisis' is now commonplace in many contemporary studies 
of men" (Whitehead, 2002: 54). Whitehead cites some more popular works which do 
espouse the rhetoric of crisis even as he disagrees with this view point as do many 
masculine studies practitioners. In Masculinities and Culture John Beynon asks among 
other questions: "who says there is a crisis-in-masculinity?"; "Are we talking about men-
in-crisis or masculinity-in-crisis or both?" and "What is meant by 'crisis'?" (Beynon, 
2002: 76). And in relation to the family-in-crisis family studies discusses the changes in 
society that are said (by others) to have lead to the crisis. The point that I want to make is 
that the new studies use and describe the rhetoric of crisis but it is not a part of their own 
argument. That there has been change in British and Western society is undisputed, but the 
slant that should be put on these changes is disputed, as are the possible implications of 
these changes. 
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1.5 Representations of Crisis, Feminization and Victimization 
The concept of crisis for white, middle class men has gained huge popularity in newer 
fictional texts about men and the family. These texts often indulge in sustained 
representations of family breakdown, failing fathers and victimized and feminized men. 
The crisis of men is represented as being apparent in many areas of men's lives; the home, 
fatherhood, through consumption, work, their bodies and their relations with other men. In 
these representations and also sometimes in the theory, two sites of crisis are often 
conflated whereby the crisis in the family is a part of and has a direct correlation with the 
crisis in masculinity. In a chapter called "Men, heterosexuality and the changing family" 
Richard Collier argues that "a particular correlation has been made between a crisis of 
fatherhood and a crisis of the family' (Jagger and Wright, 1999: 39). Crisis is characterized 
by a breakdown in the white nuclear family, by fathers being 'pushed out' of the family, 
and by a feminization and victimization of white masculinity. 
Representations of men in crisis have been around throughout the 1990s, but I would argue 
that they have changed somewhat over the decade leading to my period of concern - the 
late 90s until now. The film that is perhaps most often discussed in relation to the theme of 
a white man in crisis; in crisis with his sense of masculine, his related identity as a worker 
and a father is the 1993 film Falling Down. Richard Dyer discusses this film at some 
length in relation to a crisis in whiteness and reproduction, arguing finally that it shows 
white masculinity to be "under threat, decentred, angry" (Dyer, 1997: 222). Because of the 
violence and anger inherent in the film and in the protagonist Dfens, and because of the 
sense of everything falling apart and the feeling Dfens has that he needs to defend himself 
and his family from the chaos, I would argue that this film is a film in the backlash 
tradition. And although there is anger in films such as Magnolia and Fight Club that 1 will 
discuss later, for the most part mainstream representations of masculinity in crisis in the 
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late 1990s do not display such anger or such an obvious backlash response but tend to 
concentrate on the feminization and victimization of their male protagonists. 
Robinson's Marked Men: White Masculinity in Crisis argues forcibly throughout the book 
that "[t]he white male victim - personally and individually targeted - is the emblem of the 
current crisis in white masculinity" (Robinson, 2000: 5). And it is this discourse, rather 
than reacting agairist the visibility forced on the white family and on white men, that 
begins to use this visibility in order to show what a hard time white men have really been 
having (Robinson, 2000). In many of the fictional, media representations that build stories 
around white, middle class men in the late 1990s there is a palpable feeling of 
emasculation, an almost welcomed loss of privilege and status and the feeling that 
something is slipping away from these men. This 'crisis' for men is most often examined 
through issues of feminization. Men in these fictions are feminized partly because 'proper' 
masculinity is represented as not being possible anymore. Representations of crisis 
however, do not concur with the earlier backlash reactions which attempted through 
discussion or representation to recoup some solid sense of masculinity. There is more a 
sense of the bottom having been taken out of any idea of masculinity (usually by women 
and 'women's lib') and thus a sense of men floundering. In contemporary films and novels 
men's disempowennent is represented through various fornis of feminization to the point 
that men's position is shown to be almost the same as women's traditional, oppressed 
position. 
The consensus is that men are being feminized and victimized and fathers marginalized 
whether they are working class or middle class, white, black or Asian, American or British. 
Deborah Chambers writes: "[t]he white middle class male is no longer being signified as 
neutral. White male protagonists are now taking on more marginalized identities. [...] 
Powerful white males have also been portrayed as crisis-ridden" (Chambers, 2001: 110). 
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The crisis is said to cover all men: working class, {The Full Monty, Fight Club), middle 
class, {The Best a Man Can Get. Man and Boy, American Beauty, Larry's Party), or black 
or Asian, {Babyfather, Intimacy). Discourses of class and race become subsumed by the 
discourse of masculine crisis. The back cover of Intimacy (Kureishi, 1998) has a quote 
from the Independent on Sunday which says: ''Intimacy speaks to, and for, a lost 
generafion of men: those shaped by the Sixties, disoriented by the Eighties and bereft of a 
personal and political map in the Nineties". This is the rhetoric of crisis. Men don't know 
what the rules are anymore, they have no map, no way of knowing how to go forward or 
what is expected of them. Men, whether they are white, black, Asian, working class or 
middle class, are in crisis, and, because men are in crisis, so is the family. 
It is in relation to this sense of crisis, to the feelings of pain and victimization and the 
emotive crisis in fatherhood that the primary texts, the novels and films come into play. As 
we will see later in this thesis,'^ current representations of any idea of the right wing 
backlash to the changes for men and the family show these reactions as aberrations, as 
undesireable and ultimately useless. Much more common are the types of representation I 
will look at now, which indulge in the emotions of the crisis. A l l the texts looked at in the 
section; Man and Boy (Parsons, 1999), The Best A Man Can Get (O'Farrell, 2000), Fight 
Club {\999), The Full Monty {\991), Intimacy {Kure'ishi, 1998) and Larry's Party 
(Shields, 1997), whether novel or film, deal with the breakdown of the nuclear family, and 
a new type offather-absence. This new type of father-absence differs from the older type, 
which as part of the general invisibility of white men in social discourse, meant that the 
patriarch was absent within the family as a part of his power (Jagger and Wright, 1999: 49, 
Chambers, 2001: 99). Now men are represented as being either absent in the family 
through being disempowered and deemed useless, or they are shown to be absent because 
Babyfaiher is a drama on BBC 2 dealing with issues of black masculiniiy and fatherhood thai aired its 
second series in November 2002. The initial catchphrase on the Baby/other website for the BBC is "Once 
men were men and women were glad of it". 
See in particular chapter three's section on homophobia 
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they are being pushed out of the family, most often by disaffected wives, but also 
sometimes by the very babies that they have fathered. 
Most of the fictional texts are comedic, or at the least ironic and all proved very popular on 
release or publication. The issues these texts deal with, although often dealt with lightly, 
carry remarkable similarities both to each other but also to the wider discourse of the 
family and white masculinity in crisis. These fictional texts illustrate (and create) the 
phenomenon of crisis. They are part of the archive of crisis. Supposedly half a step behind 
the theory, which tends to deny actual crisis, current media texts demonstrate crisis and 
weave its narrative into their own with a vast array of wounded, feminized, victimized 
male protagonists many of whom are also ejected from the families they have fathered. In 
these texts fatherhood is discussed and made present. In this way the novels and films, 
despite their different tones and concerns are a part of the change in society that is making 
the normal, in tenns of white men and the family, visible, de-naturalizing it and examining 
the way it works (or doesn't). Fatherhood and family life are no longer seen as either easy 
or natural for men: there is a crisis of both fatherhood and the family. 
We will start our discussion on fatherhood by looking at men being 'pushed out' of the 
family. In The Best a Man can Get. the protagonist, Michael Adams is an absent father in 
order, he argues, that he might manage to be present some of the time. Michael pretends to 
his wife and two small children that he is working when in fact he is renting a room in a 
house with three other (young) men in order to get a break from family life. Although the 
narrative both tells us and demonstrates to us that he is not behaving well, it also gives us 
the reasons for his (chosen) absence. It all begins when he and his wife Catherine have 
their first baby. Michael tells us, "1 felt redundant almost from the outset. Normally when 
there had been something that Catherine had really wanted, 1 had been the one who got it 
out of the box and wired up the speakers. But when we took this baby home, I was the 
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useless one who had no idea what to do" (O'Farrell, 2000: 47). Michael does not feel 
needed. He feels both redundant and useless - "I was offering to be hands-on, but in 
reality my hands were just hanging down by my sides" (O'Farrell, 2000: 54). Michael 
feels more than just useless, in fact he feels pushed out. Catherine actually does push him 
out of the marital bed; "so now she didn't sleep with her husband any more, she slept with 
her new love. The Baby. [...] She was besotted, spellbound, obsessed. It was like when 
she first fell in love with me. Except this time it wasn't with me. Mil l ie had pushed me 
out. She had taken my place" (O'Farrell, 2000: 50). For Michael, both his wife and his 
daughter have pushed him out, emotionally, and physically, and so he 'goes with the flow' 
and removes himself completely. 
In The Full Monty, the white male, and this time working class 'hero' Gaz, also feels 
pushed out of the family, and nearly pushed out of fatherhood itself And although dealing 
with issues of class, unemployment and poverty, issues that The Best a Man Can Get 
doesn't really address, the main thrust of the story revolves around many of the same ideas 
of fatherhood and masculinity. The film demonstrates very clearly that the traditional 
'male' occupations in Sheffield's steel industry have been erased almost completely, 
leaving men unsure of their masculine roles. Factories have been closed and 
unemployment among men who were the breadwinners has become rife. Because of the 
collapse of heavy industry Gaz is unemployed and on benefit and therefore cannot afford 
the maintenance his ex-wife is demanding for his son Nathan. The entire film is premised 
around this, as Gaz would not have organized the 'full monty' strip if it were not for 
needing the money that would enable him to be a 'proper' father. The f i lm follows Gaz's 
efforts to remain as Nathan's father, and follows his growing relationship with his son. He 
has to contend with Nathan's new 'nuclear' family, as his ex-wife has married again, and is 
now living in relative luxury in a wann and tidy semi-detached house in the suburbs. The 
fact that Gaz is such a disgrace as a conventional father provides much of the comedy as 
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well as the pathos of the film. It is his ex-wife who has the power over his relationship 
with his son (and this is true too in The Best a Man Can Get, and Man and Boy). She has 
the power to stop Gaz seeing Nathan, and for most of the film it is her version of what a 
'proper' father is that counts. Gaz as a father has been completely disempowered 
(although, luckily, his position as a father is recuperated at the end of the film with a 
triumphant exposure of his penis to a crowd of screaming women!). 
Man and Boy, a best-selling novel by Tony Parsons adopts a slightly different stance in 
relation to fatherhood. After the white, male, middle class protagonist, Harry Silver, 
commits adultery, his wife Gina leaves him alone with his four year old son Pat for four 
months while she tries to recoup the career she gave up for the sake of their family. The 
novel follows Harry's failures and eventual triumphs as he attempts to be a 'real parent' 
and overcome his own personal crisis around fatherhood. In this text too it is Gina who 
really holds the power. Harry, when Gina demands to have Pat back tells her; "I'm all for 
men taking responsibility for their children. I'm all for men doing their bit in bringing up 
their kids. But you can't have it both ways. You can't expect us to take part in the 
parenting and then just step aside when you want us to, as i f we were just like our dads, as 
if it were all really women's work" (Parsons, 1999: 308). Harry's complaint is that Gina is 
reverting to and using, 'old' gender stereotypes in order to get her own way. He notes that 
Gina wanted him to be a 'hands-on' dad when it suited her to go away to work, but that 
now she wants him to absent himself as the 'older' type of father did and to allow her to 
resume her gendered role as mother. Harry's own priorities have changed from being 
career oriented and concentrating on the television show he produces to being family 
oriented. He muses; "I had changed over the last six months, my months of bringing up 
Pat alone. The show with Eamon was just a way to pay the mortgage, not the way to prove 
my worth to myself and everyone else. Work was no longer the centre of my universe. 
The centre of my universe was my boy" (Parsons, 1999: 324). Harry has learnt to be a 
'real parent', and 'proper' father, partly by denouncing the masculine priority of work, 
career or breadwinning. Even so he is still 'forced' to allow Gina to have custody in the 
name of the nuclear family. Harry tells his irate lawyer that he is dropping the custody 
battle with Gina because: "I just think that a child needs two parents. Even a kid whose 
parents are divorced. Especially a kid whose parents are divorced" (Parsons, 1999: 328-9). 
Harry decides to bow to convention - the child will , finally, go with the mother and in a 
decision that is seen as correct and moral within the narrative, Pat will live in a nuclear 
family. 
This discourse of disempowered/displaced fatherhood is a repeated media concern at the 
moment. The Radio 4 programme on fatherhood in the 'Men in Crisis' (2001) series 
included a sustained discussion about how men are being edged out of the family; "air-
brushed out". A panel of both women and men talked about the threat to fatherhood ft-om 
the growing movement of women choosing to be single mothers, and further, by 
reproductive technology itself (Dr Anthony Clare noted with irony that this technology 
was being created by men themselves). Deborah Chambers writes that within current 
media discourse there is a; 
Fear that fatherhood is being marginalized and should become a more central 
concept to encourage enduring commitment from men in relationships. Arguments 
about the crisis of commitment seem then, to be centring on the ways in which 
men's role in the family has been problematised, as fatherhood is identified as a 
central cause of a crisis of masculinity. It is linked to the problems of male 
unemployment and the crisis around representations of men as fathers and 
husbands in post-divorce families (Chambers, 2001: 131). 
There is a general feeling that without proper father-figures, with fathers either leaving the 
family or being pushed out of it, whole generations of boys and men are being both 
victimized (boys need fathers) and feminized. This discussion is covered in various types 
of texts - fi"om radio, to TV, to novels to films. Thus Tyler Durden in the film Fight Club 
proclaims bitterly; "we're a generation of men raised by women", whilst in The Best a Man 
Can Get, Michael Adams ponders all the baby manuals that he has read, finally deciding; 
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"[a]ll these concepts and suggestions left me feeling that I was supposed to try and make 
myself more maternal. That's what they wanted me to be: a back-up mother" (O'Farrell, 
2000: 59). Men, in Western society are being feminized and, as we have seen, this 
discourse is not confined by class or racial considerations, nor by the Atlantic, nor by 
textual or media type. 
In concurrence with the discussion and representations of disempowered and feminized 
fatherhood whereby what it seems that is really wanted (by women) is a 'back-up mother', 
there is an extension of this that posits man-as-vvife and which furthers the discussion of 
men's disempowerment within the family. In many representations of men as family men, 
they are in their feminization, positioned in the role that was traditionally represented as 
being the wife's. These men are often oppressed within the family in the way that wives 
have said to have been (Segal, 1990, Delphy and Leonard, 1992) - exploited, taken for 
granted, patronized and ignored. And even when not exactly placed as wife, contemporary 
man is shown to have the malaise that was previously seen as the province of the 
housewife, the suburban woman - the 'problem that has no name' (Friedan, 1963: 1). Men 
are being placed in the traditional feminine position - the position that feminism mobilized 
against in the first place. And thus through the rhetoric of crisis we can begin to see the 
first moves through the representations and discussions of men as feminized and 
victimized towards the discussion (and positioning) of men as marginal. 
Intimacy by Hanif Kureishi is perhaps the most serious text that examined in this section. 
The story centres on one night, the night before Jay, the protagonist, is going to leave his 
wife Susan and two young sons for good. The entire book is saturated with sadness and 
regret, but Jay as protagonist and narrator presents us with the breakdown of his family as 
being an inevitability even as he blames himself He can't play his allotted roles as family 
man with conviction or sincerity anymore and he doesn't want to. Jay wi l l leave his family 
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because it is suffocating him and within the book his knowledge of his own imminent 
departure gives him back some of the power he has lost. Jay, although not excusing 
himself, has become invisible within his own home. He feels a stranger in his own house, 
claustrophobic and constrained. On this, his last night. Jay helps bath his boys, puts them 
into their pyjamas and brings them back downstairs: 
where they lie on cushions, nonchalantly sucking their dummies, watching The 
Wizard of Oz with their eyes half open. They look like a couple of swells smoking 
cigars in a field on a hot day. They demand ginger biscuits, as i f I am a butler. I 
fetch them from the kitchen without Susan noticing me. The boys extend their 
greedy fingers but don't look away from the T V (Kureishi, 1998: 10). 
In Jay's house his children have more power than he does. They are the *couple of swells' 
and he is the ^butler' who performs his duties without his wife noticing and without the 
children even bothering to look at him as he serves them. Jay has been feminized into role 
of servant and wife. And in the context of the novel this is dangerous. If Jay keeps getting 
treated in this demeaning manner he will leave. He has no visibility in his house; no-one 
even looks at him. This keeps happening throughout the book; a sense o f *if only . . . ' but 
things have gone too far and Jay is taken for granted too often: 
But I have been pushed and shoved because I haven't known my own mind, 
because 1 have become accustomed to going along with things, and tomorrow 
morning we will kiss and part. 
Actually, forget the kiss (Kureishi, 1998: 32). 
Jay's position in his family has become untenable and intolerable. He is not allowed to be 
properiy man, husband, father or even individual and he will not take his enforced 
feminization any more. Jay has been pushed too far and he can't go along with things any 
more - he will absent himself 
Jay's position as man, as husband and as father in his household is almost the direct 
reverse of the ^traditional' role for men in a nonnal nuclear family. Jay quite often works 
from home, cooks, fetches, carries and takes on many of the parental responsibilities. He 
is not positioned as 'husband' but as 'wife' and, in line with this positioning Jay has the 
housewife's special mentioned earlier; *'the problem that has no name" (Friedan, 1963). 
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Jay is not the only male character to suffer this 'problem' in the texts that I am examining. 
In Larry's Party Larry spends almost the entirety of his first marriage grappling with this 
'problem that has no name'. Larry does not have Jay's anger and although he shares Jay's 
sense of claustrophobia, Larry's anxiety manifests itself as panic. Whilst Larry is still 
quite newly married to his first wife Dorrie, we enter his home for the first time in the 
book: 
And what's the word for this spasm of panic that strikes Larry as he unlocks his 
back door on a winter night? [...] In the tiny linoleum-floored vestibule he stamps 
the snow off his boots and stoops to remove them, feeling as he leans forward that 
the air has dangerously thinned and that he could easily topple over dead on the 
spot. 
He hums Michael Jackson's 'B i l ly Jean' to scatter the silence, an aerosol spray. 
The silence contributes to his plummeting faith in his own arrangements. Still air, 
empty rooms. It was as though he and Dorrie had never embarked on a life of 
house and children, but had been brought to this spiritless edge by force. The 
walls, the kitchen floor, the tight circle of second-hand appliances, the tiny comer 
table with its chairs pushed neatly in - these objects refuse to acknowledge him, 
though he's the one - isn't he? - who brought this scene into being, and who is now 
trapped in the bubble of his own dread. He ought to rejoice in the settledness of 
this room, but he doesn't. He should see it as a sequestered cave hidden away in 
the tall immensity of winter. What is the word for the slow, airless unrelieved 
absence he feels? It's coming to him, this word, winging its way as though guided 
by radar, but it hasn't quite arrived (Shields, 1997: 94). 
Larry's situation fills him with panic. He feels stifled, claustrophobic, trapped; a stranger 
in his own house and life. Larry feels that this situation has occurred without his volition 
and that he has been brought here by force - the force of convention. He fears that this 
'spiritless' life of 'house and children' might kill him. He is aware of an 'airless, 
unrelieved absence'; a void. And when the word does come to him ('desperation'?), he 
leaves his family, as does Jay. 
As we have seen these two novels explain men's crisis and particulariy their crisis within 
the family in terms that are remarkably similar to Betty Friedan's eariy 60s examination of 
the 'housewife's malaise'. In chapter one of The Feminine Mystique Friedan describes 'the 
problem': "it was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning" (Friedan, 1963: 
1). And she says this stirring and yeaming culminates in a single question: "Is this all?" 
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(Friedan, 1963: 1). In the terms set out by many of the current fictional texts about men, 
this crisis, yearning and this final question itself are precipitated by a re-enactment of 
masculinity; the expectations that society has put on men, the roles that are prescribed for 
them and by a conventional enactment of the normal. These texts express the same crisis 
for men that women arc supposed to have 'gone through' already. 
In Larry's Party Larry, successfril, married, solvent takes a sideways look at the 'problem': 
Temperamentally he seems to have settled for a convivial melancholy, the rather 
lumpy psychic matter of perplexity: the problem is, he doesn 7 know how to be this 
person he's become, but this could change tomorrow. For the moment, there he sits 
behind his own face. He's dressed, he's on time. What a surprise. What a bad 
surprise too. The parts of life that used to offer comfort more and more seem an 
illusion or a deep difficulty. This is what his friend Eric Eisner calls the paradox of 
plenitude. It seems that once there's enough money, enough recognition, enough 
love, [...] then there's nothing to look forward to except the next minute (Shields, 
1997: 269, my emphases). 
Larry has too much. Larry seems to feel defined by his role and (good) position in society 
and he does not feel that this is the 'real' him. Larry feels he does not fit. He hardly 
knows the 'person he's become' and feels that he exists behind the image he projects 
outwardly to the world. What used to be a comfort is now an 'illusion'. He has enough of 
everything, but this in itself is not enough. Position, money and consumption lead to a 
feeling of emptiness. Shields' description of Larry's 'problem' echoes almost exactly the 
articulation of a female interviewee in Friedan's The Feminine Mystique who says that 
after college, falling in love, having a child, moving to a new house all that happens is that 
"you wake up one morning and there's nothing to look forward to" (Friedan, 1963: 4). 
This Larry's 'paradox of plenitude', once one is in the position one has strived to achieve, 
the emptiness of that position becomes apparent. Thus the domesticization and therefore 
feminization of men is represented as consfituting their crisis. 
In Friedan's early feminist text consumption is a part of 'the problem' as it is shown to be 
in Lany's Party, and also in the films Fight Club and American Beauty. This is the point 
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that Fight Club begins with. Jack has been attempting to fill the void he can feel in his life 
with things. In one of the first scenes of the film we see Jack wandering through his 
apartment where each consumer item is labeled by brand names. Jack wants his 
possessions to define him. He says he even wondered "what kind of dining set defined me 
as a person". Matt Jordan speaks about the book Fight Club (Palahniuk, 1997), but the 
issues are the same in the film. He writes of Jack; 
His sense of monotonous isolation is reinforced by the consumer items he buys, 
which seem to standardize rather than individualize him. 'We all have the same,' 
he repeats, with respect to items from Ikea, before remarking that the culmination 
of this process of appropriation is that 'you're trapped in your lovely nest, and the 
things you used to own, now they own you' (p.44). Or, as another character puts it 
later in the novel, 'Our culture has made us all the same. No one is truly white or 
black or rich anymore. We all want the same. Individually, we are nothing'. 
(Jordan, 2002: 373). 
Jordan argues that Jack has allowed himself to be defined by the things that he buys and in 
doing so he becomes like everyone else: homogenized, standardized. Consumption in this 
way is said to cut across race and class, 'no one is truly white or black or rich anymore'. 
Everyone is the same and everyone can choose and afford the same things. In this context 
equalization leads away from individuality. What Jack used to own now owns him. 
Consumption in Fight Club is spoken about as emasculating, as a trap, a void and unreal -
numbing, part of the crisis. Jack has no feeling, which is why he splits into Tyler who wil l 
fight to regain his feelings and his body because the more you consume the less you are, or 
you are (only) what you consume. 
For Larry, for Jay and for Jack, consumption means that they are in danger of losing 
themselves. Fall into the trap of trying to attain it all and the void in the centre will 
swallow you up. There is a sense that people have been tricked into trying to attain the 
normal and then trapped within an approximation of it. At the begimiing of American 
Beauty Lester in his suburban life of seeming comfort, security and affluence tell us "in a 
way I'm dead already". His life of 'ideal' masculinity; breadwinner, husband, father, 
consumer, lived out in suburbia is killing him, killing his sense of self, his creativity and 
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individuality. Lester continues in a voice over; "I have lost something. I'm not exactly 
sure what it is, but 1 know I didn't always feel this ... sedated". Lester feels asleep. He 
has lost himself in the * American Dream'. Lester as a man has lost his sense of self in the 
void of conventional normality and expresses it again in a very similar way to Friedan's 
suburban interviewees. Friedan reports women as saying feel as i f 1 don't exist" and "I 
just don't feel alive" (Friedan, 1963: 3-4). Lester as a man in the late 1990s feels a 
hollowness at the centre of his Mdeal' life, he is sedated by it and by the roles he is 
expected to play within it. Lester is not sure what he has lost, and his problem has no 
name. 
Larry too has lost himself in the ideal. Here he ponders on being forty: 
T m a forty-year-old man', Larry says to himself at least once every day [...] and 
the thought - forty years old - hangs around and around, and forms part of the 
atmosphere. He understands at last the rather hard dullness of being an adult, and 
perhaps for that reason he's become a man too easily consoled by games and 
surfaces. And now, suddenly, having celebrated four decades of life, he is a sad 
man but without the sad history to back it up. What he needs is a good slap on the 
ear, but at the same time it seems to him that one wrong step would throw him off-
course, and that what he would lose would be not money or friendship or intention, 
but his own sense of self (Shields, 1997: 163-4). 
Larry is bored. And he is so bored that he could lose himself. Living a life of convention 
(surface) has almost swallowed him up. His life consists of surfaces and games with no 
'real' core. The implication of these representations is that a life of normality is in itself not 
a healthy place to be, it is a space of crisis. In and of itself this position and the acceptance 
of all the roles and conventions attached to a life of normality is all-encompassing; 
encompassing the individual who drowns in convention, falls asleep by living a life of 
prescription, and loses his/her (although usually 'his') sense of self in the process. 
In Intimacy, in order to save himself Jay has to leave his nuclear family, re-find himself 
and release himself from the trap that the ideal has lured him into. He tells us; "1 am not 
leaving this unhappy Eden only because 1 dislike it, but because 1 want to become someone 
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else. The dream or nightmare of the happy family, haunts us all; it is one of the few 
Utopian ideas we have these days" (Kureishi, 1998: 101). Jay cannot be the person he is 
within his family anymore, it has turned from aspirational, Utopian dream into constricting 
and constraining nightmare and the only escape for Jay is to smash it and smash through it. 
As he puts it: "[a] breakdown is a breakthrough is a breakout. That is something" 
(Kureishi, 1998: 49). If Jay stays there is nothing, i f he breaks it up there will be 
something, to break it up will be a creative act. Jay will create a critical point, he will 
create a crisis in order to be able to live. Jay's crisis has been precipitated by his family, 
but he will push it flirther - into disaster. And in Fight Club Jack too has to break out and 
smash up his ideal life of convention and consumption to the extent that he blows up his 
MdeaF life quite literally when he blows up his apartment and all it contains. 
There is a sense that i f men do not create a climax of crisis that will force change then the 
possibilities of their exploitation and disempowerment are unlimited. Men are represented 
in both fictional texts and within masculinity theory as not only sometimes being 
disempowered in relation to women, but also in relation to other men. In this version of the 
crisis there is a frirther removal from the backlash reactions where the marginalized were 
seen as the enemy, here it is 'other', (powerful, hegemonic) men^*' who are posited as both 
different and as threatening to men themselves. Within the discourse of (marginalized) 
masculinity this is an important point. There are some men who are in power and very 
many others who are not. There comes with this a double victimization; from the 
hegemonic, powerfril men, but also from all white men being associated with such men. 
As John Maclnnes points out; "[m]any powerful men are obnoxious, homophobic and 
misogynist" (Maclnnes, 2001: 322). A part of the new discourse bemoans the fact that all 
men have been associated with this type of masculinity; a collective identity forced on to 
See Whitehead and Barreii, 2001:73+ for discussion around 'hegemonic masculinity' and the idea that 
some men (in this case, Naval officers) ''attempt to secure a masculine identity in comparison and contrast to 
a series of'Others': those deemed weaker, less able, feminine or less masculine" (73). This discussion 
focuses around the fact that some men are 'othered' by a group of more powerfiil men. 
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men that is not of their choosing. Anthony Easthope argues that although feminist and gay 
accounts of masculinity have been useful, they have linked together all men into one 
(unpleasant) homogenous lump. He says that these accounts: "written from a position 
outside and against masculinity, [...] too often treat masculinity as a source of 
oppression." (Easthope, 1986/1992:2). There is a sense that everyone has tumed against 
men. Maclnnes argues that i f we go too far down this road, it "becomes difficult to 
prevent masculinity becoming a general term for anything we don't like" (Maclnnes, 2001: 
324). The contradictory forces of collectivism come into play and where there is 
complaint about the identification of men-as-a-bad-group the defense seems to only have 
recourse to the identification of men-as-a-v/c//>w/zei/-group. 
Harry Silver, in Man and Boy demonstrates the two contending forces when he feels 
victimized by being associated with men-as-a-bad-group. As he drops o f f and picks his 
son up from school he feels ostracized by the mothers: 
The women in Alice bands had more in common with the women in ankle bracelets 
than they did with me. The women who were single parents had more in common 
with the women who had partners that they did with me. At least that's how they 
all acted. [...] 
Those mothers seemed to look upon me as a reminder of the thousand things that 
could go wrong with men. 
Standing at those gates i felt as though I was an ambassador for all the defective 
males in the woHd. The men who were never there. The men who had pissed of f 
The men who couldn't be trusted around children. 
Well, fuck the lot of them. 1 was sick of being treated like the enemy. It wasn't 
that 1 minded being considered an oddball. 1 expected that. After all 1 knew I was 
an oddball. But 1 was tired of carrying the can for every faulty man in the world 
(Parsons, 2000: 200). 
Harry is being treated as the representative for all (bad) men. He is being punished and 
victimized for every crime (other) men have ever committed. His male body is being made 
to carry gendered meaning that here, is both villainous and 'other'. In fact what is 
happening is that Harry is being naturalized as masculine - the construct of masculinity (as 
bad) being seamlessly associated with Harry as an individual man and with his body. He is 
being stereotyped, and Hall makes the point that '"stereotyping tends to occur where there 
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are gross inequalities of power" (Hall, 1997a: 258), and this time it is the women who 
have the power. Again, the position that Harry is being placed in is a feminized one where 
his body is made to carry certain meanings and where he is representative of all men, a 
position that (until the victimization discourse arose around white men) was far more 
usually associated with the bodies of black people or women. 
Sally Robinson writes that there has been a "savage embodiment" of men by women, 
(Robinson, 2000: 89). Men are being re-tied to their bodies by women. This re-
embodiment can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, as a (male) acknowledgment that the 
diseinbodied nonnativity of white men is not/was not such a good thing, and a re-
embodiment is overdue. Secondly, there is a reversal, as we saw above with Harry Silver, 
whereby white men are being forced back into biologically determined masculinity by 
women even as these women attempt to disengage themselves from such biological 
detemiinism. In Larry's Party, Larry's second wife Beth, (a "third-wave" feminist), at 
one point tells Larry: "Penis owners are more violent, their will more concentrated - that 
much is indisputable. (At this Larry blinks, but Beth hurries on.) Men are, in this respect, 
as much slaves to their biology as women, and cannot, therefore, be held to blame" 
(Shields, 1997: 122). Beth, by re-tying Larry to his (male) biology, is actually placing him 
in a feminine position. Larry is a man being equated with nature. Beth's 'feminism' 
emasculates Larry (although within the narrative Larry is allowed the moral high ground as 
what Beth is doing is 'wrong'). By proclaiming on his biology, tying him to it, not letting 
him speak, and at the same time taking away any responsibility from Larry, he is being 
placed in a traditionally feminine position: silenced, passive, not allowed agency or 
volition, having his bodily urges placed over and above his reason. Larry is suffering the 
oppression (long endured by other groups) of having an essentialized nature imposed upon 
his (individual) body from without. Larry, in the same way as Harry is being forced into 
an association with men-as-an-essentialized-group and therefore in the terms of this 
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discourse being inevitably and simultaneously feminized. Thus we have an almost total 
reversal of the gender binary. 
It is argued as we have seen, that one of the most common identifications of men-as-a-
group is to see all men as 'bad'. And i f masculinity is tending to be associated with the 
oppressive, reversing the binary and re-associating masculinity with powerlessness and 
feminization might be a better option. Back in 1988, in one of the first masculine studies 
books, Rowena Chapman wrote the following: 
There is much deploring of feminist essentialism nowadays, but this is to forget that 
patriarchy is founded on essentialism, on the assertion of biological difference and 
the unequal apportioning of values. It is hardly surprising that in opposing 
patriarchy, feminism tended towards a position of counterposed essentialism. But 
as a result of this, male supremacist arguments have been reinforced by a distortion 
of certain feminist tenets. Essentialist radical feminist arguments erected a 
moralistic equation around gender: femininity equalled good, masculinity equalled 
bad. This meant that, in order to lay claim to a stance of moral superiority men 
were forced to disavow their masculinity, and to take up a feminine subject 
position. [...] If what we define as feminine qualities will be highly valued in our 
[...] future, then to maintain hegemony it is in men's interest to co-opt femininity 
(Chapman and Rutherford, 1988: 247-8). 
Chapman argues that a reversal of the binaries of masculinity and femininity whether 
through reversing the values (good/bad) that are associated with each, or by a reversal of 
the definition of each (men as feminine) actually solves nothing. She argues further that an 
association of men with the feminine will in fact help to maintain the status quo. She 
argues that currently, in keeping with the binaries of patriarchy, it is better for men to be 
seen as being in a feminine position. 
Sally Robinson argues that white middle class men in the 1970s felt as i f they had been 
cast into the shadows, made invisible by the (new) visibility of minority groups, and 
redefined as the 'enemy' and that this precipitated a move by white men to make 
themselves visible through displays of feminization, victimization and wounding. In an 
argument that differs from the one that posits white masculinity as being forced into 
visibility by others, she asserts: 
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[m]y claim [is] that the current crisis, as it is played out in the halls of academe, is 
instigated by a marking of white masculinity as a specific and embodied (racial and 
gendered) identity - and that the mere enunciation of crisis does the cultural work 
of recentering white masculinity in a remapped academic context. [...] These 
announcements of crisis do not, [...] function to alleviate that crisis, and to 
recuperate and 'unmark' white masculinity once more; on the contrary, in enacting 
and, in fact producing that crisis, these texts work towards a recentering of white 
masculinity [...] precisely as endangered, victimized, wounded (Robinson, 2000: 
55, her emphasis). 
Robinson's argument relates to the academy, but it is relevant for the fictional 
representations we have been examining. She argues that the tropes of victimization re-
centre white masculinity and that this of course carries benefits for white masculinity, 
Robinson sees the visibility of victimized white masculinity as a strategy of white 
masculinity, that in the first place, didn't want to be Meft out' of identity politics and that 
white men, both "resist and welcome" embodiment. Robinson's argument is that the 
visibility of white men implies several things to and for white men. In the first place, the 
visibility of victimization, as we saw above, can be used as a strategy for re-centring white 
masculinity. Further, it is desire for white men, a "masochistic pleasure". It is therefore an 
active response to the pressures being placed on normative white masculinity by minority 
groups, the marginalized, and by more general changes in society. If white men are to be 
made visible, it may as well be in a way that is useful to them. The backlash response was 
a passive re-action to changes in society. Robinson argues that the crisis and victimization 
trope is a far more active response, and one that can usefrilly re-centre white men as 
'victims' of the current social trends. 
A change in discourse is certainly needed from both the hegemonic and the non-hegemonic 
point of view in relation to both white masculinity, and the white nuclear family. Stephen 
Whitehead documents the fact that the 'traditional' notions of white masculinity; 
"biologically given: unassailable, singular, discrete [...] are at the end of the Twentieth 
Century' [...] increasingly untenable" (Whitehead, 2002: 17). And as it is unacceptable for 
men to articulate these notions, the fact that in Man and Boy and Larty's Parry it is women 
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who are continuing to essentialize men immediately places them in the wrong. In these 
texts it is men who are being positioned as the more politically correct and clear sighted. 
Society has changed, and it is suggested, notions of essentialism and gender also need to 
change. 
Conclusion 
in this discourse our society has become more fluid and diverse and therefore any idea of 
what was seen as normal gender identities and the family needs to change. This is 
recognized by both masculinity and family studies. In relation to the white nuclear family, 
Deborah Chambers writes: "the white nuclear ideal is increasingly irreconcilable with the 
observable evidence of diversity" (Chambers, 2001: 115). There is a rise in observable 
material differences among family forms and these observable differences are also evident 
in relation to gender relations. More importantly, there are changes in relation to ideas and 
attitudes both to diversity and difference, and to the idea/1 of a white middle class normal. 
The idea of the white, middle class normal entire is being shaken up. The very concepts 
and ideas that have upheld the idea of the nonnal are being seen as untenable and indeed 
'untrue'. Silva and Smart may have identified the crux of the 'problem' when they say; "it 
may be changes in attitudes [...] that are seen as so alarming and destabilizing" (Silva and 
Smart, 1999: 4). Societal attitudes to difference are themselves changing things rather than 
the actual material differences that are becoming so visible. People's attitudes to diversity 
and difference as well as to the 'nonnal' are changing and, we are being told, shoidd 
change. 
It is because of this that we see the various hegemonic twists and turns documented above. 
If we go back to the first backlash reaction to these changes and the evocation of a stable, 
singular normal, and remember the binary that necessarily comes with it, the abnormal, we 
can see that re-evoking the idea of a stable nonnal as an ideal and an aspirational reality is 
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an unsafe reaction, relying as it does on the rigid binaries; normal/abnormal, order/chaos, 
with each side relying on the other for identification. Not only is it an unsafe and unstable 
reaction, it is far too visible. If the hegemony of the white nuclear family and white 
masculinity is really under threat then this is quite a crude and very visible and identifiable 
attempt to maintain power. Lynne Segal voices the opinions of many theorists when she 
writes of masculinity: 
Fhe closer we come to uncovering some form of exemplary masculinity, a 
masculinity which is solid and sure of itself, the clearer it becomes that masculinity 
is structured through contradiction: the more it asserts itself, the more it calls itself 
into question. [...] If we look more closely at some contemporary models of 
exemplary masculinity, [...] we uncover once again the instabilities of 
^masculinity': dependent as it is upon the steady confirmation of power from what 
can prove unstable social institutions and practices, dependent also upon its 
hierarchically understood difference from what can prove insubordinate 'others' 
(Segal, 1997: 123). 
Fhc louder masculinity (or the family) says itself, the more it brings itself and its methods 
of construction and maintenance to light, and therefore, the more it 'calls itself into 
question'. If in order to maintain itself power needs to hide, then this type of bigoted and 
reactionary response is no place to hide in. It is too loud, it is too visible, and it too 
obviously relies on ignorance, intolerance, prejudice, injustice and bigotry in what is 
increasingly a multi-racial and multi-cultural society. 
In 1988 Jonathan Rutherford voiced a complaint about the more generalized silence in 
response to the exposure of masculine privilege, arguing against the violent, bigoted 
backlash that again puts the onus onto the marginalized other whilst remaining silent about 
the centre. He says that in the face of feminism and queer theory critiquing and exposing 
masculine privilege: 
Heterosexual men have remained remarkably silent in the face o f this unmasking 
and criticism. It's as i f the growing demand from women for something more from 
men has pushed them into a defensive huddle shored up with their institutional 
power, without a language in which to answer. Exposed to a growing questioning 
men have used their silence as the best form of retaining the status quo, in the hope 
that the ideological formations that once sustained the myth of masculine 
infallibility will resurrect themselves from the fragments and produce a new 
mythology to hide us [sic] in (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988: 25). 
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As we have seen, the old mythology of the centre and the normal, and the backlash that 
attempted to resurrect this mythology have not been/are not working. And thus, i f it is in 
the interest of white middle class men to preserve the status quo, a new mythology is 
needed, and a 'new language in which to answer' the growing criticisms of the elite centre 
needs to be formulated. Rutherford is explaining the white, masculine centre as passive, 
sitting tight, doing little (apart from attacking the usual suspects), and hoping the entire 
situation will go away. This is a defensive culture that is closing its eyes to its own new 
visibility and also to the rapid changes in the configuration of society and the changing 
perceptions and attitudes of many people. 
Sally Robinson's book marks a shift in the discussion of both the theory and the 
representation of white masculinity and documents a change in the way that the 
manifestations of the idea of the crisis are both being spoken about within the academy and 
how they are being represented by various media fomis. She describes a more active 
response to the centre's new visibility: namely the re-centring of white masculinity through 
the discourse of victimization, feminization, wounding and crisis; the discourse that is 
being represented in the novels and books we have looked at. In her argument, the centre 
(largely through representation) is using visibility as an hegemonic strategy rather than 
completely resisting it. However, as discussed in the introduction, she sees this as a 
dangerous strategy. From the point of view of the white male hegemony she writes: 
The desire to confess anxiety is fraught with the ambivalence which necessarily 
attends any move that requires even a temporary or provisional (or even rhetorical) 
surrender of power. Will the payoff be worth the risk, or will some unexpected 
social or discursive maneuver render white male dominance as truly obsolete as 
some would claim it already is? Can the representational system misfire? 
(Robinson, 2000: 51). 
Robinson sees a danger in white men confessing anxiety and using the discourse of 
victimization and crisis. From her point of view the (temporary, rhetorical, 
representational) surrender of power may backfire on white men and power may really be 
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lost to them. Robinson views it as a risky strategy and, even as she sees the tropes of 
victimization and feminization for white men as being an active strategy, she sees it as a 
defensive one that resists the changes in society and the concurrent displacement of white 
men from the centre: "the middle, [of society] as 1 see it, is an essentially defensive culture 
and political formation, one characterized by suspicion, even paranoia, about the passing of 
a now delegitimized cultural order: (Robinson, 2000: 14). Her reading o f the 'crisis' 
documents a change in hegemonic discourse, but she discusses it as a change that follows 
the received idea of the pattern of white hegemonic reaction to the 'delegitimization' of the 
cultural order: a defensive reaction. If the backlash reaction discussed above was too 
visible, this reaction (the discussion of victimization and feminization) is, at least, more 
active and subtler. 
For those in privileged positions, i f they want to retain those privileges, passivity in the 
face of diversity and a changing society is no longer an option. The defensive and reactive 
culture adopted by the white centres of our society has to change. As we have seen, for a 
variety of reasons, the white, patriarchal centres of society have become more and more 
visible, to the point where displacement from power is becoming a very real possibility. 
As we discussed in the introduction western forms of power are hegemonic, and 
hegemonic systems rely on the consent of the majority of the population. As power, in 
order for it to be sustainable, has to win consent, reactions to difference and diversity that 
are as reactive and divisive as those outlined above in relation to the first backlash are not 
conducive to long tenn maintenance of consent. And this is partly because those included 
in the description of the nomial, in particular white, straight, middle class men, are being 
perceived to be a smaller and smaller group. Thus the public voicing of bigotry and the 
claim to nomiality only for white straight groups in society are coming from a group that is 
becoming more and more easy to identify and this identification in itself makes the 
positions of power and privilege unstable. As this is realized we see the change from pure 
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backlash responses to a more in depth discussion of the issues of crisis, the debates about 
feminization and victimization that are prevalent within representation. However despite 
the popular and numerous representations of crisis for white men in the media, in films and 
in novels, most masculinity studies texts keep the discussion of crisis as a small part of 
their larger discussions and then move on. This may well be because claims to 
victimization from a group in society that still visibly holds most of the power in society 
(straight, white, middle class men), cannot be sustained for very long. 
Chapter two will begin to look at how the power of straight, white, middle class men might 
be consolidated and sustained in the current climate. The purpose of this chapter has been 
to lay out the current arguments and developments in the field that this thesis intervenes in. 
It has begun to examine the new archive of the normal, laying out where the silences in 
society and theory are said to have existed, why these absences are said to have arisen and 
the process of exposure of the centre. It has charted the rise of the 'subversive' disciplines 
of masculinity and family studies and relayed the discussions and representations of crisis. 
In this chapter we have moved from the idea of the invisibility and silence of the normal as 
well as through the 'enforced' visibility of the normal that came about through marginal 
theory, representation and actual changes in the demographics of society. We have 
examined the discussion of the first 'backlash' reactions to this visibility and these changes 
and moved onto a discussion of the crisis that is said to follow on from this. We ended 
with a discussion of current representations that place men as victimized and feminized. 
We have also examined criticisms of this crisis and the effect that it can have of recentring 
men. However, the point I want to stress here is that, like the backlash reactions the 
discourse of crisis is not sustainable. No-one can be in crisis for ever, and the idea of white 
men as victims itself cannot last. Vast inequalities in our society are still self evident and 
thus it has to be in the interests of those who benefit from these inequalities to find another 
way round the visibility of this inequality. This chapter has demonstrated that the backlash 
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reactions don't work and argues that claims to victimization are not sustainable. Chapter 
two therefore begins to look at new hegemonic moves, moves that will achieve majority 
consent, sustain the status quo and retain privilege for the small group in society that have 
always been positioned as normal. Thus chapter two, in response to the failure of the 
backlash responses to change and the failing rhetoric of crisis begins to answer George 
Yudice's question (albeit with a somewhat different emphasis): "What's a Straight White 
Man to Do?" (Yudice, 1995: 267). 
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Chapter Two: The Dis-Appearance of Normality - The Re-Application of the White 
Male Gaze 
This chapter begins to look at the creation of new discourse proper and engages in a further 
examination of its archive. In the first chapter we looked at the theoretical positions that 
were said to lead to the formation of the new discourse; the movement from the invisibility 
of the normal, which is said to have begun in colonial times, to the more contemporary 
enforced visibility instigated from the margins. We examined the phenomenon of the 
backlash to this visibility, which instigated a (certain) embracing of it through the notions 
of men and the family in crisis and the subsequent move into victimization and 
feminization for men both inside and outside the family. This chapter looks at how these 
and even newer conceptions of normality are being formulated into a discourse and how 
this will ensure that consent is won for the current white middle class male status quo. 
Following the lead taken from the new studies texts we will examine the movement that 
claims to make the nomial visible in order to dispel it, look at some of the implications of 
this by re-applying particularly postcolonial theory to this claim, and finally trace the dis-
appearance of the normal within the new discourse. In this chapter the fact that in the new 
studies the centre is examining the centre will become increasingly important to my 
argument as will the claim by all new studies texts that they theorize from and as a 
response to feminism and postcolonialism. This chapter traces the concept and effects of 
nomiality as it melts into the margins. 
Chapter one ended on the point that, in order for any group in society to retain power 
(whether intentionally or not), consent from the majority of the populace needs to be won. 
Both those who are pro and anti change accept that change is happening and that the 
balance of cultural power is shifting: 
no 
Cultural hegemony is never about pure victory or pure domination (that's not what 
the term means); it is never a zero-sum game; it is always about shifting the balance 
of power in the relations of culture; always about changing the configurations of 
cultural power, not about getting out of it (Hall, 1996b: 448). 
From Hall's point of view no-one will 'win ' through pure domination. Winning consent 
for a particular hegemonic configuration of power means that strategic shifts in the 
balances of power are necessary: subtlety rather than force. One carmot actually absent 
oneself from the forces of cultural power but one can have a hand in shifting the perceived 
parameters of that power. And for the maintenance of the current status quo the balance of 
power needs to be shifted again because of the changes in the cultural and political make 
up of our society and the fact of multiculturalism and diversity. As Lynne Segal puts it: 
The dominant idea of a fixed and pure heterosexual masculinity, to which women 
and children are inescapably subordinated, once so securely grounded in the 
nuclear family, is i f not in crisis (as is often glibly claimed), at least a little less 
hegemonic than it has ever been before (Segal, 1990/1997: 100). 
So, even as masculinity and family studies do not fiilly accept the crisis thesis, the fact of 
change and a change in the balance of power is accepted. 
Over the past fifty years or more there have been massive changes to our society, and this 
means that there must be changes to the way that consent is won from our changing 
population with their changing attitudes. Tony Bennett says, i f hegemony 
refers to the process through which the ruling class seeks to negotiate opposing 
class cultures onto a cultural and ideological terrain which wins for it a position of 
leadership, it is also true that what is thereby consented to is a negotiated version of 
ruling class culture and ideology (Bennett, 1994/1998: 221). 
If we turn this around for a moment, and posit a negotiated version of subordinated class 
culture and ideology we get closer to the new pro-active hegemonic movement that it is 
the purpose of this thesis to discuss. The passive/ defensive reactions detailed in chapter 
one, as examined by the new studies texts are, by these theoretical disciplines, being 
changed into active and o^ensive action, representation and discourse through their own 
work. As denial of the threats besieging the centre did not work, either through denying 
the 'other', (backlash), or through a strategic burying-the-head-in-the-sand and claims to 
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victimization are unsustainable and still defensive, the best way forward for the white, 
patriarchal centre must be to ftilly embrace the threat and tum it to advantage through the 
strategy of absolute visibility. 
The strategy of overt and absolute visibility is apparent in both the theory coming from 
masculinity and family studies and also in media representations. Over the past few years 
representations of the white nuclear family and of white masculinity have become 
explicitly scrutinizing; looking beneath what looks like the nonnal, to see the 
contradictions, doubts, conflicts and secrets underneath.^' We have examined some of the 
representaUons looked at in this chapter in relation to the idea of crisis, but the 
representative work of these texts goes deeper than that, involving something other than 
just crisis - and that is scrutiny. 
On all the posters for the 1999 5-Oscar winning ^ \\m American Beauty there is, written in 
large type, the injunction to 'Look Closer' and this injunction is at the crux of 
contemporary representations of the nuclear family and white men. Many new 
representations appear to be participating in the new project of visibility and particularity 
for white men and the white nuclear family, and this extends to (re)embodiment for white 
men (Robinson, 2000). There is an explosion of novels and films as well as documentaries 
and discussions on both radio and television that explicitly scrutinize white men's lives and 
the white nuclear family, particularly the roles of fathers within the family. For the 
purposes of this chapter the novels Larry's Party (Shields, 1997), Man and Boy (Parsons, 
2000), The Best a Man Can Get (O'Farrell, 2000), and the films, American Beauty (1999), 
Fight Club, (1999) and The Truman Show {\99Z) will be examined in relation to the new 
explicit scrutiny, with reference also to two television documentaries; Married Love 
(Channel 4, February 2002), and The Secret Life of the Family ( B B C l , July 2000). These 
'^ This phenomenon has been growing during the 1990's, but has really exploded from the late 1990's to 
now. 
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very different forms of representation from different parts of the white Western world 
(America, Canada, Britain) all contribute to a comprehensive archive of the new discourse 
of the normal. And it is here that we begin to see the interests of the white patriarchal 
centre and the interests and work of the new studies theorists (albeit inadvertently) begin to 
coincide, form an archive and permeate out into the wider cultural and social world 
through representations and media discussions in the first instance tuming visibility from 
threat to advantage. 
2.1 The Agendas of Masculinity Studies and Family Studies: Answering the iNlargins 
The advent of masculinity studies and family studies marks a dramatic shift in the 
technique/attitude of the centre as shown by these studies themselves. The responses from 
these disciplines are not the first denial, backlash or 'poor me' responses to feminism and 
postcolonialism that they document. Indeed as we have seen most do not agree that there 
really is a crisis either for the family or for white masculinity (Chambers, 2001, 
Whitehead, 2002, Beynon, 2002). Within these disciplines there is a unified and general 
consensus that the normal does have to go, a consensus that the privileged position of the 
normal is untenable and a consensus that this position is fracturing anyway. The new 
rhetoric from these disciplines that come from and examine the centre is that 'we' too want 
to bring normality to light and dispel it and the attendant privileges that accrue around race 
(whiteness), class (the middle class), sexuality (heterosexuality), and gender (masculinity). 
Following on from the above discussion of the new studies disciplines that argued that 
historically white, middle class men have been sitting silent, disembodied, universalized 
and invisible in the central position of normality, the new argument from masculinity and 
family studies is that the best way to dispel the power and privilege inherent in being white 
male and/or middle class is to continue the movement that has been making the centre 
visible and to force visibility, particularization, embodiment and multiplicity on to white 
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masculinity and the white nuclear family, make them confess themselves and their 
imperfections. The visibil i ty o f victimization and crisis is not enough. 
A l l the new studies talk about their work entailing a direct use of the methods and 
techniques of the marginal (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001, Smart and Neale, 1999 etc). 
This involves a re-turn o f the gaze on to the white centres. Homi Bhabha writes that there 
has been a "feminist and gay revision o f masculinity - the turning back, the re-turning of 
the male gaze" (Berger et al, 1995: 58). Feminists and gay theorists have themselves 
employed the white male gaze to examine masculinity. It was, in part, this re-tuming o f 
the gaze onto themselves and onto those in power that led to marginalized theorists 
'exposing' white middle class men in the first place. Thus theorists from the white centres 
claim that they are employing the techniques, theories and methods of the margins as a 
pro-active (and more morally acceptable) change o f tack. The rhetoric o f victimization, and 
notions o f crisis although (as we have seen) a part o f current representations o f white men, 
are beginning to move aside, making way for a new extreme form o f visibi l i ty for white 
men (and the white nuclear family), which is manifested in a deliberate, close and 
sustained scrutiny o f the centre. 
Both the theory and the new representations o f the nonnal examined later in this chapter 
are currently engaged in detailed enquiry into the central positions o f society; scrutinizing 
and picking them apart. Notions o f crisis are being de-bunked, most often because the 
rhetoric o f crisis is viewed as merely being another white hegemonic strategy for re-
centring the centre (Robinson, 2000), albeit through a (different) kind o f visibi l i ty for the 
white centres. New masculine and family theories do not use the notion of crisis as their 
own strategy as we saw in chapter one. Instead they explicitly engage in a close scrutiny 
o f the white centres ostensibly in order to dissipate the power that the positions o f the 
nonnal in our society have traditionally held. What is being promised is liberation from 
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the white patriarchal centre by the white patriarchal centre. Within these disciplines there 
is an adoption of the techniques and theories used by the 'mother' disciplines, feminism 
and postcolonialism, and a paradigm shift whereby the work of marginal theorists is being 
used by theorists from the centre as an answer to the (documented) requests made to 
(specifically) white men by others. Richard Dyer quotes Hazel Carby prescribing a 
method for ending hegemonic white rule. She says we should consider whiteness as well 
as blackness " in order to make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the 
normative state of existence: the (white) point in space from which we tend to identify 
difference" (Dyer, 1997: 3). Carby is suggesting that whiteness itself should become an 
object o f discussion and examination in order that it can become truly visible. This is a 
different idea to the one we discussed above, where the examination of whiteness, 
masculinity or more generally normality was almost a by-product o f the examination of the 
margins. This is a far more direct approach which (here) looks directly at whiteness. 
This is by no means the only call for a direct examination o f the centre. In relation to 
masculinity, Lynne Segal writes: "men w i l l only stop displacing their fears about 
themselves into contempt for women, and antipathy and loathing for excluded or 
subordinated groups of men, once they are able to recognize and accept their own multiple 
and conflicted identities, able constantly to question and complicate the notions o f 
masculinity" (Segal, 1997: xxxi) . Segal is asking men themselves to question masculinity 
and to complicate it: asking men to look at masculinity. Rosi Braidotti asks men to dispel 
with the ideal o f disembodied white masculinity: "men need to get embodied, to get real, to 
suffer through the pain o f re-embodiment" (Kemp and Squires, 1997: 529). A n d , it is 
suggested, the idea of universalized mankind can be done away with completely. 
Elsewhere Braidotti wrote that "the proper task o f men who intend to deconstruct the 
phallic premises should be to speak as individual men, not as representatives of Mankind , 
and to develop a new way of thinking about masculinity" (Braidotti, 1991, my emphasis). 
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Men are being asked to re-embody themselves, to complicate notions of masculinity, to do 
away with the singular universal, to individualize and particularize masculinity, to make it 
multiple in the name o f positive and pro-active change. Further, the requests made to 
white hegemonic masculinity from marginal theorists involve using the methodologies o f 
the marginal in order to examine and begin to dismantle the centre using the methodologies 
of making visible, particularizing, embodying and multiplying and applying these to white 
masculinity. A n d it is these requests that new studies theorists both document and claim to 
answer with their own work. 
2.2 Making the Centre Visible - A Technique of Abnormalization 
As we saw in chapter one, one of the main complaints o f family studies and masculinity 
studies was of the invisibility o f normality as manifested in hegemonic white masculinity 
and the nuclear family. Thus it makes sense that the main project o f masculinity studies 
and family studies is said to be the making visible o f the normal. Where the normal was 
once invisible it is the stated aim o f most o f the new theoretical texts to make it visible, and 
make normality visible as a response to the requests from the margins that ask that the 
centre not remain invisible and hidden. In taking up the 'requests o f the margins' Anthony 
Easthope sounds the rallying cry for making masculinity visible when he proclaims: 
"masculinity has to be unmasked" (Easthope, 1986/1992: 2). Masculinity was masked, it 
was invisible and it is now the stated project o f masculinity studies to bring it into the light. 
A lan Peterson's entire book is titled Unmasking the Masculine (1998), Chapman and 
Rutherford's book is entitled Male Order: Unwrapping Masculinity (1988) and the covers 
of both books explicitly illustrate the idea of uncovering masculinity. The cover o f A l a n 
Peterson's book Unmasking the Masculine has a picture o f a slim, muscular, white, male 
(headless) body. Cracks are appearing on this body, and the man's hands are ripping his 
own chest apart to reveal a large jagged hole stretching from collar bone to navel, exposing 
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a white void; a white empty space where there is no substance.^^ What this image, 
anchored by the title suggests, is that there is no substance to the myth o f masculinity and a 
forcible and even violent ripping open o f the myth is necessary to show the emptiness 
beneath. The cover o f Chapman and Rutherford's book Male Order: Unwrapping 
Masculinity shows another headless male body, as the man in the photograph pulls o f f his 
shirt to expose his naked torso - making his body visible, and thus 'unwrapping' his 
masculinity.^^ 
The idea that masculinity was masked, wrapped up and hidden is explicit and is discussed 
in most masculinity studies texts and has been for years. Stephen Whitehead decides that 
"[t]he turn of the millennium appears to be a particularly appropriate moment to cast a 
critical eye on men" (Whitehead, 2002: 5). M e n need to be seen. In relation to whiteness 
Richard Dyer lays out the 'new' central project as well as prescribing how it may be 
brought about; "[w]e may be on our way to genuine hybridity, multiplicity without (white) 
hegemony, and it may be where we want to get to, but we aren't there yet, and we won't 
get there until we see whiteness, see its power, its particularity and limitedness, put it in its 
place and end its rule'' (Dyer, 1997: 4, my emphases). Seeing whiteness or masculinity 
wi l l (apparently) shatter the power and privilege o f these positions. Mul t ip l ic i ty and 
hybridity w i l l not be possible unless 'we ' can see whiteness and see its particularity. 
Jonathan Rutherford, a strong proponent o f making and keeping masculinity visible lays 
out the logic o f this project; "[tjoday, the masculine m>'th is being sufficiently questioned 
to drag it into view. Like the Invisible Man o f H G Wells , whose death is signified by his 
return to visibility, the weakening of particular masculine identities has pushed them into 
the spotlight o f greater public scrutiny" (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988: 22-23). 
This cover illustration is by Michael MacR-u, 1998 and entitled "Gellage No.90", see illustraiion 2, 
pge 118. 
This cover illustration is photographed by Frances Angela, see iilusiraiion 3, page 119 
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I l lus t ra t ion 2 
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lUustrarion 3 
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Vis ib i l i ty w i l l mean death. And as masculinity becomes visible, so Rutherford argues, 
it wi l l die. This idea o f making masculinity visible is continued through new 
representations o f white middle class men (and the white nuclear family) , which are part o f 
the archive that shows the 'weakening o f particular masculine identities'. What is 
enunciated by both theory and representation consolidates the idea that i f one can make 
white masculinity visible it, as a myth, and the power that the myth holds over people, w i l l 
disappear. One has to wonder where it wi l l disappear to, but Easthope, Dyer, Peterson, 
Chapman and Rutherford, Whitehead and very many others are arguing that visibil i ty, 
particularization and embodiment are enough to dispel white masculine power. There has 
been a massive hegemonic shift from bemoaning the visibil i ty o f the nonnal to that which 
extols 'exposure' for white middle class men and the white nuclear family. To paraphrase 
Rutherford, visibili ty w i l l signify death, so all one has to do is to continue the work of the 
marginal theorists and work to bring masculinity to light, make it a presence, the object o f 
discourse and the subject o f representation and masculine power wi l l disappear. 
This is a huge change from the ' invisibi l i ty ' o f the centre discussed in chapter one. There 
is also a change from the victimization trope that Robinson discusses. W e have a 
movement that has shifted from Robinson's discussion of white men beginning to see the 
advantages, benefits and pleasures that come with (limited) visibil i ty and from the 
discourse that claimed victimization, or white men 'bemoaning their fate', to a v iv id 
spectacularization and celebration o f ' c r i s i s ' and abnonnality within both theory and 
representations. Although the rhetoric o f victimization and feminization for men has not 
disappeared as we saw above, there is another aspect to both the theory and the new 
representations, the newer strategy of fu l l visibility. Starting with the representations, the 
novels and the films explicitly scrutinize the lives o f their white, middle class male 
protagonists, looking beneath the surface appearance o f nomiality in order to explore the 
doubts, fears, desires and failures that lie underneath. White middle class men and the 
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white nuclear family are being made visible; the 'truth' about the normal exposed. 
Deborah Chambers writes: "[a] spectacularization o f postmodern family values and 
practices is taking place and being projected globally" (Chambers, 2000: 116). The normal 
is being represented as disintegrating, and the fragmentation and disintegration o f the 
nomial is being made into spectacle. 
Within all the representations that examined, even where there is a surface appearance o f 
normality, i f you look closer you wi l l fmd it fragmented, shattered and not really existing 
at all . Within the representations this is most often dealt with in relation to the white male 
protagonists' ' l ived ' experience: no-one feels normal. This is Larry Weller, 'hero* o f 
Larry's Party, for whom insecurity, doubt and disempowerment lurk just below the surface 
appearance o f privilege and normality: 
At the age of forty-two Larry Weller, a landscape designer with an office in 
suburban Chicago, gives the appearance o f having found tranquility and ease in his 
life. He's not interested in breaking through the power firmament. He's already, in 
fact, come further along in the wodd than he ever expected to. Everything about 
him announces a man in a state o f reasonable good fortune. He is, at forty-two -
another surprise! - more or less solvent. He's getting along in the world, he and 
Beth. But perpetually - every minute of every day in fact - he prepares himself for 
exposure and ruin: he has no university degree to fall back on or boast about, he has 
never read Charles Dickens or Ralph Waldo Emerson [...]. So how is it he projects 
such an air o f confidence when, at the same time, l iv ing a fraction of an inch f rom 
public humiliation: Do other people exist this close to the flame o f extinction? 
(Shields, 1997: 208, my emphases). 
The surface appearance of Lany ' s life belies the trauma, doubt and confusion that exist just 
below that surface. Lany is middle aged, solvent, settled but this is not how he feels. He 
feels under-educated and inadequate, not middle class enough to be secure in the normality 
that he projects. He feels he is on the edge o f a precipice. Larry is hanging on by his 
finger-nails. He may project settled middle-classness, but look closer - penetrate the 
surface and you wi l l see that the surface of nomiality is just that: surface. Scratch that 
surface of normality and see the chaos, doubt, fear and failure spill out. 
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In Fight Club the veneer of normality is very thin indeed. Only this time beware; i f you do 
scratch the surface, you wi l l get something more than just fear and doubt. As Jack says of 
his boss's world vision: "under and behind and inside everything this man took for granted, 
something horrible had been growing". It is his boss's view o f normality that is the fallacy. 
In Fight Club, the violent, destructive but creative abnormal is fighting to come out. The 
men in their fight club fight to make manifest the abnormality lurking beneath the surface. 
Throughout the film it is suggested that the abnormal upholds the normal. Within Fight 
Club, although Jack is white and middle class, there is a definite and different kind o f class 
consciousness and a feeling that the middle class normal is being upheld by angry, 
feminized, victimized men, who may, at any moment, decide to smash the whole thing up 
(or blow it up, as they finally do). As Tyler tells the head of the crime prevention 
conference who is trying to destroy fight club: "the people you are after are the people you 
depend on; we cook your meals, we haul your trash, we connect your calls, we drive your 
ambulances, we guard you while you sleep. Do not fuck with us". Beneath the nomial 
lurks the dark and dangerous abnormal. The normal is not only a fallacy, it is a dangerous 
dream to have, one that involves w i l l f u l blindness to that which is pushing its way to 
visibility. As Jack tells us: "it was right there in everyone's face. Tyler and 1 just made it 
visible". 
2.3 Failure is Inevitable, Normalit>' is Impossible 
In the other less extreme representations those who attempt to create normality, although 
not represented as being in danger of extreme violence, are represented as courting 
inevitable failure. This idea is one of the main themes o f all the fictional representations 
that I am looking at. Any attempt to create nonnality w i l l fai l and indeed the more one 
tries for the normal the more disastrous that failure w i l l be. In Larry's Party, Larry, despite 
starting out with a good job, a wife, a son and a suburban 'starter' home, manages two 
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divorces, a near-breakdown, and alienation from his son. Harry Silver i n Man and Boy 
manages to smash his perfect nuclear family, as does Michael Adams, protagonist o f The 
Best a Man Can Get (although he manages to recoup it later). K r i s t o f f s creation o f perfect 
normality for Truman in The Truman Show eventually tears open along with the painted 
sky. A n d Lester in American Beauty'? Here is what the blurb of the screenplay says: "[i]n 
a typical suburban town, there is an ordinary family l iv ing the American dream. But look 
closer. Lester Bumham's wife, Carolyn, regards him with contempt; his daughter, Jane, 
thinks he's a loser; and his boss is positioning h im for the axe" (Bal l , 1999). Lester's 
^failure' is quite spectacular, even whilst he is in what looks like perfect normality. Take a 
closer look and the edifice crumbles. Privilege is shown not to really be privilege, as we 
are all as insecure and doubting and fail ing as each other. In fact, the closer you get to 
what seems like perfect nonnality, the more l ikely it seems that you wi l l fai l . 
Harry Silver in Man and Boy also fails at his attempt to make a perfect nuclear family, 
finally realizing: 
I saw that 1 had let everybody down. Gina . M y mother and father. [...] I hadn't 
been strong enough, 1 hadn't loved them enough, I hadn't been the man they 
wanted me to be, or the man that I wanted myself to be (Parsons, 2000: 
83-4). 
To expect the ideal normal to be (re)created by just one person is asking too much. It does 
not and cannot work, even where it appears that it is. Within most o f the texts there is a 
kind of 'double consciousness''"* whereby normality is desired even as it is recognized as 
an impossibility and a fallacy. In The Best A Man Can Get. Michael Adams puts it this 
way: 
In all the adverts that I'd arranged the music for, the families always had such fun; 
they always looked so comfortable with each other. Even though 1 worked in the 
industry 1 still hadn't seen through the lies. [...] 
The adverts told us we could have it a l l , we could be great dads and still go o f f 
snow-boarding and earn lots o f money and pop out o f a business meeting to tell our 
children a bedtime story on the mobile phone. But it can 7 be done. Work, family 
and self; it's an impossible Rubik 's Cube. Y o u can't be a hands-on sensitive father 
'* See T. J. Jackson I.ears (1985) for discussion of Gramsci*s original concept. 
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and a tough, high-earning businessman and a pillar o f your local community and a 
handy do-it-yourself M r Fixit and a romantic attentive husband - something has to 
give. In my case, everything (O'Farrell , 1998: 88, my emphasis). 
Michael Adams feels that he can't achieve any o f it. The ideal is a lie. It is impossible to 
achieve and i f the ideal is a lie, then failure must be the 'truth'; the 'truth behind the 
fa(;;ade'. In all the fictions an atmosphere and appearance of the normal is being set up 
only to be 'disproved'. White middle class men are being made visible; shown not to 
occupy the unified, powerful position of the nonual, but in fact to be as disempowered, 
doubting and fail ing as everyone else. In nearly all contemporary representations, those 
who were perceived to be in the position of the normal; white middle class affluent men, 
and those in white middle class nuclear families (as well as those at the very top) are being 
portrayed as actually being nowhere near the ideal. Look closer at the lives o f the men in 
the novels and films of the white Western world: Larry's Party, Man and Boy, The Best a 
Man Can Get, American Beauty, Fight Club and The Truman Show and you wi l l not see 
the nonnal. These men may appear to be privileged and exist (at certain times) within the 
ideal nonnal, but a closer look wi l l show how (most i f not all the time), they are just as 
disempowered as others, and their seemingly normal lives are anything but. The surface 
appearance does not equate with what is 'really' going on underneath. 
The current myth/representation/'truth' that is being enunciated by these texts is that the 
ideological idea/lived reality of normality does not exist any more for anyone. It does not 
matter what posifion in society one occupies, an ideal o f the nornial that is exclusive, 
unified and centralized is being represented as impossible and, fo l lowing on from this, any 
sort o f extraordinary power due to that position even for the white middle classes is also 
being represented as being impossible. The idea o f any sort o f ideal normality being 
impossible is one that is a recurring theme in current novels and films. This is Harry 
Silver, protagonist o f Man and Boy, on turning thirty: 
A l l my images o f this particular birthday seemed to be derived from some glossy 
American sitcom. WTien I thought o f turning thirty, I thought o f attractive thirty-
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nothing marrieds snogging like teens in heat while in the background a gurgling 
baby crawls across some polished parquet floor [...]. That was m y problem, when 
I thought o f turning thirty, I thought o f somebody else's l i f e" (Parsons, 1999: 6). 
What is being suggested in texts throughout the archive is that this 'glossy' ideal can only 
ever be 'somebody else's l i fe ' . The ideal images that have been built up around white 
middle class normality are fictions themselves. A n d i f no-one can get close to the ideal 
nomial it must mean per se that the normal does not exist. It is around this premise that the 
entirety of the film The Truman Show has been constructed. Truman's ' ideal normality' is 
everything but that. It is pure surface, pure simulation, and it couldn't be anything other. 
In relation to the white nuclear family, Deborah Chambers writes; "[t]he nuclear family 
exists in the public imagination [...] this virtual family, is, l ike a computer animation, more 
pure, more perfect and more real than the real thing" (Chambers, 2000: 172). A n d it is this 
fantasy that has been created for Truman. Truman has a 'perfect' wife (no children yet, but 
that is in the plan), a perfect home, a perfect suburban neighborhood - clean, with white 
picket fences everywhere, everyone is friendly and one would assume that the crime rate 
would be zero. However, the whole point o f the film is that this is an artificial , created 
fantasy, set up purely for voyeuristic purposes. The gaze o f the entire worid (and the 
cinema audience) is focused on Truman, white, middle class and male and because o f this 
the entire fantasy of normality begins to become quite sinister, exploitative and 
threatening. The film also implies that this is the only way that anyone can 'enjoy' 
nomiality. ICristoff, the producer/director/ creator/Father o f Truman's world, when 
someone quesfions the morality o f the show, tells her, "I have given Truman the chance to 
lead a nonnal life. The world vow live in is the sick place. Seahaven is the way the world 
should be". However, from the viewer's perspective (assuming we are on Truman's side), 
ICristoff is wrong and in trying to create a version o f normality for Truman he is 
committing an immoral act. 
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When an attempted creation of the ideal normal is discussed as ' immoral ' then the way that 
the discourse is being enunciated and the discourse itself has indeed changed. And , as we 
have seen, the discourse around the visibility (or not) o f normality or those in the posifion 
of the normal has also changed. Hegemonic discourse has moved (very quickly) from a 
documentation and enunciation o f absolute invisibi l i ty o f normality, tlirough the vis ibi l i ty 
of victimization, to absolute visibility which eventually shows abnormality. Discussing 
the nineteenth century, Foucault says that at the time there was: 
a centrifugal movement with respect to heterosexual monogamy. O f course, the 
array of pracfices and pleasures continued to be referred to as their internal 
standard; but it was spoken of less and less, or in any case with a growing 
moderation. Efforts to find out its secrets were abandoned; nothing ftarther was 
demanded of it than to define itself from day to day. The legifimate couple, with its 
regular sexuality, had a right to more discretion. It tended to function as a norm, 
one that was stricter perhaps, but quieter (Foucault, 1978: 38, my emphases). 
Wel l , the silence has now been broken and the 'secrets' o f the centre are being excavated 
with great gusto and discussed at great length. A n d what is being found is that the closer 
one looks, the more that is uncovered, the less the 'normal ' is found to be the normal. A s 
the secrets o f the normal are unearthed the main revelation appears to be the presence o f 
the abnomal within the nonnal, or as Trinh Minh-ha puts it: "[t]he center itself is marginal 
. . . [H]ow possible is it to undertake a process o f decentralization without being made 
aware of the margins within the center and the centers within the margin?" (Minh-ha, 
1995: 216). In the new representations it is the margins within the centre that are being 
highlighted. In effect this is the same point already discussed in chapter one in relation to 
the backlash evocation o f the stable normal inevitably containing the unstable abnormal, 
although this fime the hierarchy has been reversed. Foucault maintained that the nonnal 
creates and contains the abnormal (Foucault, 1978: 44-9). M y contention is that the new 
hegemonic move from the centre now involves the abnormal creating and containing the 
normal: a shift from Foucault's "nonnalizing technique" (1978: 89 and 144) to an 
abnormalizing technique. The 'normal' is no longer represented or discussed as the 
nonnal. 
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If we view this as a strategy there is, within both theory and representation, another strand 
whereby the abnormal is represented as being the normal. In July, 2000 a B B C I 
documentary called "The Secret L i f e o f the Family" turned a 'normal ' , middle class, white, 
heterosexual, nuclear family into a voyeuristic spectacle. The 'scientif ic ' white gaze was 
turned on to a white middle class nuclear family. Cameras were placed all around the 
house - in the toilet, down the sink, in the beds, in the carpet, in their hairbrushes - in 
order to examine the microscopic germ l i fe that lurks beneath the facade o f clean, white, 
normality. What is suggested is that what we 'see', the surface appearance o f normality, 
doesn't begin to tell even half the story. The germs, bugs and filth that were found (and 
they were pretty disgusting) were said to apply to every family: as the voice-over at the 
begimiing o f the programme told us, the aim was to "reveal a hidden vvorid we all share". 
The white, affluent, middle class, nuclear family is being held up as the universal o f what 
is perceived to be the not-normal. The clean white fa9ade is shown to be a fallacy, but a 
fallacy that we all share. The ideal image o f the white nuclear family does not convey the 
'truth' and in this case the image hides dirt, filth and decay.'^^ 
The 'strategy' o f abnormalizing the normal goes all the way up to the top of our society. 
Deborah Chambers writing about the British Royal Family says: "the Royal Family has 
transfonned from one that stands for all families as moral guardian, into one that is dogged 
by the dysfunctionality of infidelity, divorce and media attenfion" (Chambers, 2000: 98). 
Chambers is arguing that because o f their dysftjntionality the Royal Family can no longer 
be held up as the ideal. Within most academic work, particulariy on the white nuclear 
family, dysfunction is discussed as a 'threat' to the hegemonic, exclusive white centres 
(Chambers, 2000, Jagger and Wright, 1999, Smart and Neale, 1999 etc), and in all cited 
cases they see this as a positive thing which wi l l lead to the eventual fall o f these white 
This move can also be seen in the ver>' popular Channel 4 comedy documentary How Clean Is Your 
House? showing in 2003. 
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centres. However it is still argued that dysfuntionality w i l l lead to the demise o f the white 
nuclear ideal as a hegemonic structure. Later Chambers continues; "the real threat to pro-
family campaigners, [...] is instability: that is sexual relationships regarded as transient, 
il l icit , transgressive. [...] This threat is no longer 'external' but comes from inside, 
through the desire for individuality and experimentation. A n d it is depicted as a white 
problem" (Chambers, 2000: 170). However, i f the white centre is beginning to embrace 
the perceived threats to itself and to engage with them, then this depiction o f internal 
destabilization wi l l not be unwelcome. So it is that i f we view the representation o f the 
Royal Family as not being disengaged from the wider world o f representation, then within 
contemporary discourse, the very fact that the Royal Family are dysfunctional, adulterous 
and in no way live up to the white nuclear ideal w i l l allow them to 'stand for all families ' , 
to be universalized in their abnormality. 
If those at the very top of our society can claim universal individuality it is much harder for 
anyone else to engage with the white centre in tenns o f group privilege and historically 
accumulated patriarchal power. Much better than to continue to attempt universality, 
invisibility, disembodiment and silence is to move to allowed and controlled visibil i ty, 
embodiment, confession and particularization/ individualization. Sally Robinson discussed 
the tensions for white men in the 60's between individualism and collective identity (based 
around vicitimization), (Robinson, 2000: 31-2) and although this tension still exists, it is 
being resolved through white men and those in white families being depicted as 
representative o f everyone's unique individuality or as representative o f everyone's 
universal individuality. 
2.4 Re-embodying Whi t e Men 
A s we saw in chapter one, masculinity studies cites a re-embodiment for men; a ''savage 
re-embodiment" (Robinson, 2000), whereby while men are forced back into their bodies 
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through being made visible and also by the tropes o f vicfimization and wounding. 
However now, in line within the new discourse that is emanating from the centre, this re-
embodiment itself is being embraced and the white male body itself is represented as 
symbolic o f everyone's unique (and imperfect) body. There is (beginning to be) a strategic 
re-embodiment o f white men which has become a part o f the new discourse that seeks to 
de-centre or marginalize the centre. This involves a logic o f ' lowering' those in central 
positions 'down' into the margins —into the morass of failure, doubt and imperfection (a 
version of subordinated culture), rather than holding up the centre as the aspirafional, 
perfect ideal. In Larry's Party, there is a whole chapter entitled 'Larry ' s L i v i n g Tissues' 
much o f which is a discussion (from Larry's point o f view) o f his body. We are taken on 
an infimate tour which probes and invesfigates Larry 's body. This tour covers very many 
pages o f which this is just an extract: 
At forty-five years o f age Larry Weller has lost a number o f his excretory 'units ' , or 
nephrons - despite the fact that he has never been a heavy drinker. His liver, like 
most people's livers, has been shrinking since the age of forty. 
[...] 
The thickness, color, and sheen of Larry's hair is at risk. He knows that about f i f t y 
percent of men of European descent suffer some balding, which ought to be a 
comfort but isn't. [...] 
Lairy ' s testosterone, if he follows the normal pattern for North American males, 
has probably been in decline since his thirties - this worries h im, but it doesn't 
worry him every minute o f the day; he prefers to think his occasional episodes o f 
sexual failure are psychological, and that a total reverse is possible. How many 
times has he felt the skin o f his scrotum tighten? - a mil l ion? - and isn't it 
reasonable that this involuntary mechanism wearies eventually? [...] 
Like everyone else, Larry's skin started to lose its elasticity during his teens. His 
life range of expressions can be found on his face, etched there. A small brown 
spot sits in the middle of his upper left cheek, and another on the side of his neck. 
Are these caused by exposure to the sun, or could they be liver spots? [...] If the 
medical statistics tell the truth, Larry's brain weighs less than it did when he was 
thirty. He can no longer balance a number o f thoughts in his head at the same time. 
[...] 
His lung cells have stiffened - which is absolutely normal at forty-six - so that his 
fonner capacity is now deflated by about twenty percent (Shields, 1997: 265-8, my 
emphases). 
Larry's body is being made visible in extraordinary detail. His worries, fears and minor 
vanities are laid bare and we see beneath his skin - emotionally and physically. His ' l i v i n g 
tissues' are opened up, exposed for all to see, along with his private anxieties, doubts and 
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fears. Larry himself is being 'unmasked' and being shown as vulnerable, subject to 
scrutiny and a disembodied gaze. Larry is being held up, in his vulnerability, decay and 
doubt, to be everyman. Larry, as white, middle aged, middle class man, is being given out 
as an example of the normal - a yardstick which others can use to establish their own 
position and selves (again). This normal however, is measured through its abnormahty. In 
his slow decay and imperfection, Larry is described as 'perfectly normal', to be Mike most 
people' and one who falls into the 'average' bracket of'medical statistics'. This discussion 
of the white male as 'everyman' continues throughout fictional representations and is still 
apparent in some of the theory. Whitehead and Barrett in the introduction to the 
Masculinities Reader proclaim that "[i]n coming to an understanding of masculinity, we 
are, in fact, coming to some understanding of the human condition" (Whitehead and 
Barrett, 2001: 14). Thus masculinity is still equated with the (singular) human condition. 
Larry, although being portrayed as 'ordinary' is ordinary through his imperfection, 
vulnerability and unique individuality. In the late 1990's the normal condition for white 
men is being represented through what would, traditionally, have been seen as the ab-
nonnal, particularly in relation to the 'ideal' white male body. Thus what is being shown 
is that the (new) 'normal' state of white men today is that of the abnormal. Portraying the 
prevalence of abnonnality within normality itself allows for freedom of movement and 
choice in subjectivities. It means that white men can choose normality or abnormality, or 
indeed, both. This is a freedom that is still not granted to others either in 'real' life, or in 
representations. 
American Beauty, and Fight Club both deal with the recuperation of the white male body 
in relation to recuperated masculinity. In American Beauty, Lester recovers his self respect 
as he recovers his body, moving from unfit to fit. As his lust for the young girl Angela 
grows, he begins jogging - demonstrating how unfit he is when he starts, sweating and 
breathing heavily - but moving onto a regular (and effective) exercise regime, which 
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builds up his self esteem at the same time as his muscles and allows him, finally, to be able 
to do the 'morar thing, and reject Angela's amorous advances. In Fight Club too the 
recuperation of fitness and 'hardness' is associated with increased self-confidence, control 
(controlled violence), and a recovery of the participant's sense of their masculinity. Indeed 
this is a major theme of the film. Jack, the narrator, tells us that when the men first join 
fight club they are "cookie dough" but after a few visits they are "carved out of wood". 
These bodies however are very different and carry very different connotations to the 
1980's hard male body. Josh Stenger argues that the late 1990's hard body has been 
'queered' and the hard bodies recuperated in Fight Club and American Beauty "are not 
characterized by self-reliance, productive physical labor, and unqualified heterosexual 
desire, as they might have been twenty years ago. Rather, they embody the oftentimes 
queer, relentlessly merchandised male beauty that retains its cultural purchase not in spite 
of, but because it is sexually ambiguous, spectacular and fetishised" (Stenger, 2001). 
These bodies are visible but objectified as commodity, even sexual commodity, in a way 
that was alien to the 1980's depictions of the 'perfect' male body, in which whilst inviting 
the homoerotic gaze, this association was hidden. The bodies in Fight Club and American 
Beauty are openly available for the male gaze and the male bodies in both films and the 
men they belong to, are marginalized because of this. 
This (strategic) marginalization is a part of the close scrutiny and exposure of the white 
male body, and men's re-embodiment entire. At a recent conference entitled 'The Black 
Gaze' Suzanne Schneider discussed the changing Western view of the black male body, 
which during colonial times was subject to what she termed a 'penetrating scrutiny'. The 
gaze, in colonial times and beyond, was tumed on to the other, taking a 'scientific', 
'objective' stance that, Schneider argues, was in fact pornographic, and therefore 
intimately bound up with those who were in the position of power and could look, as 
opposed to those who were disempowered and were looked at (Schneider, 2001). The men 
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in the representations cited above are being looked at. Their bodies are being viewed with 
a 'penetrating scrutiny' and thus, are being placed in the position of the marginal and away 
from the normal. 
The type of gaze being employed by new masculine theory and current representations of 
white men immediately marginalizes white, middle class men; places them in a marginal 
position. The reason for this is that the white male gaze (the t3qDe that is being re-turned 
onto white men), is the gaze that has always rendered the other v i s i b l e . T h i s visibility, 
and the embodiment that it carries, has always been a vital part of the process of 
marginalization and systematic disempowering of others by the white centre - the process 
of the abnonnalization of the other. The type of gaze that is being deployed in the making-
visible project that is emanating from the centre is not, itself, being scrutinized. What is 
forgotten when injunctions to 'look closer' are given and theorists cite the need to 
systematically make the white centre visible, is the long tradition of feminist and 
postcolonial critiques of the gaze, of white Western forms of looking and of the idea of 
vision itself The type of vision that we talk about and deploy is a modem construction. 
2.5 The White, Male Gaze 
Many theorists working from the margins argue that there has been an historical 
privileging of sight itself ocularcentrism (Crary, 1998), where there is a complicity of the 
privileging of sight with white, Western, masculine power. The main criticisms are of the 
objectifying, objective, scientific, medical gaze, which predominates in Western culture 
from the Enlightenment onwards. Rogoff says that many critics have noted: "the gaze as 
an apparatus of investigation, verification, sur\'eillance and cognition that has served to 
sustain the traditions of Westem post-enlightenment scientificity and early modem 
technologies" (Rogoff, 1996: 189). The argument is that during the Enlightenment, with 
26 This is not to ignore the simultaneous invisibility of the marginalized which will fonn a part of the 
discussion. 
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the decline in religion, with the rise of the 'rational' sciences and the changing views of 
nature as something to be conquered and the body (of others, mostly) as something to be 
probed and investigated, there came a change in the way that people saw things. Vision 
became the predominant sense, but a certain kind of scientific, classifying, objective 
vision. Vision, visibility and sight have a history themselves. If this is ignored, then a 
universalized, singular 'objective' vision is the mode of vision that the white centre will 
(because of the history) deploy. 
John Rajchman, discussing Foucault writes: 
Foucault's hypothesis was that there exists a sort of'posifive unconscious' of 
vision which determines not what is seen, but what can be seen. His idea is that not 
all ways of visualizing or rendering visible are possible at once. A period only lets 
some things be seen and not others. It 'illuminates' some things and so casts others 
in the shade (Rajchman, 1993: 391). 
This idea that only certain things can be seen at one time leads to an anomaly in the 
theoretical discussions of vision that emanate fi-om both the centre and the margins. In the 
discussion that cites white men and the white centres as invisible, this invisibility is 
predicated on the visibility of others. In most discussions it is the bodies of the others that 
are rendered visible by the white patriarchal gaze and it is this visibility that plays such a 
large part in the marginalization and systematic disempowerment of the other. This 
phenomenon has long been a concern of feminisms and postcolonia! theory. This is Frantz 
Fanon writing in 1952: 
1 am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the 
'idea' that others have of me but of my own appearance. I move slowly in the 
world, accustomed now to seek no longer for upheaval, I progress by crawling. 
And already I am being dissected by white eyes, the only real eyes. 1 am fixed. 
Having adjusted their microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. I 
am laid bare. [...] Why, it's a Negro! (Fanon, 1952/1967: 116). 
Fanon's visibility and overdetemiination originate from outside himself, from 'without'. 
Fanon's self and his reality are sliced away from him - in this (white) discourse they are 
not important. He is laid bare; stripped and dissected until the part of him that is deemed 
important is irrevocably visible - he is down to only his skin. The white eye, the one that 
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commits this act, is the only 'real' eye, because it is the one that holds the power. Fanon's 
own eye and way of seeing carry no hegemonic power, and therefore Fanon as an 
autonomous human being need not even be acknowledged by the white hegemony. It is 
only Fanon's body that is visible and that matters. 
In Fanon's case, the white power to see equates with the white power that controls the 
oppressed. However, within this equation there is another aspect to the visibility of the 
dominated, and that is the (seemingly anomalous), often cited, invisibility of the oppressed. 
Where Fanon cites the compulsory visibility of black people, he himself also 
acknowledges their simultaneous invisibility and bel hooks maintains that "one mark of 
oppression was that black folks were compelled to assume the mantle of invisibility" 
(hooks, 1992: 168). A closer look at this anomaly though, means that it is resolved quite 
easily. Whilst Fanon's body is compelled into visibility, he is not allowed to look He is 
denied the gaze himself, merely becoming the object of the white gaze. And bel hooks 
claims that it is this denial of the gaze that itself leads to invisibility for those who are 
othered: "to be fully an object then was to lack the capacity to see or recognize reality. 
Those looking relations were reinforced as whites cultivated the practice of denying the 
subjectivity of blacks (the better to dehumanize and oppress), of relegating them to the 
realm of the invisible" (hooks, 1992: 168). Thus compulsory visibility for othered people 
slips quite easily into compelled invisibility. What is not seen is the humanity and agency 
of the other, partly through the very visibility and objectification of their bodies. If only 
certain things can be seen at once, in this case it is the bodies of the oppressed that is seen, 
whilst their individuality and agency is not. 
Foucault writes that we should be aware of and concemed about "the 'body politic', as a 
set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication 
routes, and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and 
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subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge" (Foucault, 1984: 175-6). In a 
peculiar usurpation of a (one would think undesirable) position, the white male body itself 
is being tumed into 'an object of knowledge' and thus being shown to be marginal to its 
own objectifying gaze. The patriarchal white gaze is being tumed on to white men and the 
effect of this will be to de-centre white men. Being envisioned by this gaze (even as it 
originates ft-om themselves - white men looking at white men) will marginalize white 
middle class men as it is the nature of this gaze to marginalize whatever it turns its 
attention on. However, white male power and privilege will never be displaced by merely 
employing an objective, distanced and unified gaze to dissect white men. Texts like 
Fanon's show the shameful nature of what has happened to those deemed other by our 
society and because of changes in our society this is no longer deemed acceptable. 
Something has had to give and something has to change. Ostensibly it is the focus of 
attention that has changed. Denouncing their own invisibility, disembodiment and silence 
the white gaze of power is being tumed by white men onto white men. However, the gaze 
that was used to fix Fanon is not being used to fix white men into one position. David 
Theo Goldberg commenting on Fanon notes that: "[cjonstitutive or reflective of strategic 
relations, visibility and invisibility each can serve contextually as weapons, as a defensive 
or offensive strategy, as a mode of self-determination or denial of it" (Goldberg, 1996: 
181). In this context white men are using the concept of visibility as an offensive strategy 
that can aid self-determination. The white gaze itself has been chosen and it is being used 
to demonstrate abnormality within normality, to show universalized individualism, 
denounce essentialism and display marginalization and multiplicity. From Lester wanking 
in the shower ("Look at me, jerking off in the shower"), to the men in Fight Club fighting 
to regain their bodies and their self respect, to Larry's living tissues, white men are being 
re-embodied, subjected to the objectifying and distanced white gaze and, therefore, 
strategically (and supposedly) marginalized. 
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The argument from masculinity and family studies is, as we have seen, that this new 
scmtiny of the centre originated from the margins (Robinson, 2000, Whitehead, 2002 etc), 
and therefore this new scrutiny of the centre by the centre is being heralded as a technique 
of the margins. People who have historically been marginalized have employed the 
scmtinizing gaze that positioned them to look at their own positions, the position of the 
centre and the process by which they got to be disempowered and displaced.^' 
Marginalized people at various times have used the dissecting, distanced white gaze to 
examine how they came to be positioned where they are, how they came to be fixed in the 
marginal spaces of society, who positioned them there.and for what reason. However, this 
gaze belongs to and originates from the dominant and therefore in the new making-the-
centre-visible project white middle class people just end up using their own technique 
again. This time however, the white gaze is not being used (as it is by the marginal) to 
demonstrate the power held by the white patriarchal centre and exercised as oppression, 
rather it is designed to display the limits in power from inside the white power base. 
Whereas marginalized groups and peoples appropriating the dominant gaze to expose the 
injustices and inequalities of their position is subversive, white men, using the patriarchal 
white gaze to examine and multiply themselves, is not. Taking this unified vision of itself 
and ignoring the fact that other points of view and ways of seeing exist, the gaze that is 
being utilized to look at white masculinity, scmtinizing, white, patriarchal and singular, re-
tumed onto its own subjects, will only ser\'e to marginalize those in positions of power, de-
centre the phallic centre, hide the power that it has, keep privilege invisible, keep the centre 
safe, and therefore paradoxically keep it from true exposure. 
As David Levin concludes; "the power to see, the power to make visible is the power to 
control" (LevMn, 1993:7). With the new abnormalization-of-the-normal and the new close 
scmtiny of the centre we are led into the chosen and excessive visibility of the white 
For a full discussion on those who are marginalized using and subverting the techniques of the dominant 
see Chela Sandoval, 2000. 
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centre. Following on from this if, as Rajchman argues, we are caught in a system that only 
allows for certain ways of seeing, where only a limited amount of things can be seen 
(Rajchman, 1993: 391), it appears that the more visible the white middle classes become, 
the less visible it must be possible for anyone else to be. As David Theo Goldberg notes: 
"visibility carries with it connotations that tend to be appealing - access, opportunity, 
ability - in short, power; and invisibility has tended to connote absence, lack, incapacity-
in short, powerlessness" (Goldberg, 1996: 179). There is a difference between being 
visible and being 'looked at'. In this case the close scmtiny of the centre leads to the 
agency and plural individuality of the white middle classes being made visible whilst their 
power and privilege is rendered invisible or not 'looked at'. The white eye's examination 
of the white middle classes involves the examination of autonomous individuals in a way 
that the white eye's examination of black people or women does not. Thus within the 
making-visible project white middle class individuals, body and soul, are being made 
visible whilst white middle class power is being obscured. And i f we follow Levin's 
argument discussed above that the power to see and make visible is the power to control, 
what is happening is that the white centre, in making itself visible is in fact, controlling its 
own representation and (inevitably) safe-guarding its power base. 
Kirk Mann and Sasha Roseneil quote from a Sunday Times leader written in 1993 which 
claims: "over the past twenty years, an assorted collection of sociologists, feminists, left 
wing ideologues and agony aunts have made the abnormal family into the nomi" (Marui 
and Roweneil, 1999: 109-10). In the new discourse this is reversed and the normal family 
is tumed into the abnonnal family. The abnormality beneath the nonnal is sought and 
'proved'. Abnonnality itself is no longer being despised, on the contrary, it is being 
'proved' to be apparent everywhere, even as an internal standard within the white centres. 
The 'threat' of destabilization and the delegitimization of the 'old' order is being tumed to 
advantage. The technique of abnormalization is being used in order to prove that there is 
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no normality. The extremes of visibility show that underneath the appearance of nonnality 
there will inevitably be abnormality, demonstrating convincingly that no-one occupies the 
central position of the normal. As we saw earlier, i f an idea of a stable normal is invoked it 
itself becomes visible and opens itself up to question and challenge. Following on from 
this argument, for those who do occupy the white centres, it is a much safer strategy to 
deny that the normal exists at all. 
For the white, middle class centres of society to be able to show that even where there is 
an appearance of normality, inevitably there will be abnomiality undemeath, 
politically denies that colour, gender, sexuality, class, privilege or wealth matter. This is a 
discourse that is using the apparent de-legitimization and the 'cmmbling' of the 'old' 
cultural order to justify a new claim to individuality and equality in failure. The normal is 
being deliberately and systematically denied. If we are all as failing and doubting as each 
other, privilege ceases to be important. In the introduction to the screenplay of American 
Beauty, the director Sam Mendes writes that after the fourth reading of the script he 
realized that "it was about imprisonment in the cages we all make for ourselves and our 
hoped-for escape" (Ball, 1999: xi). We are, this suggests, all the same as each other, no-
one really different from anyone else - we are all imprisoned in various emotional cages, 
all hoping for release. Ball speaks about the cages "we all make for ourselves" with no 
reference to cages that are made for us, those over which we have no volition. Any social 
wounds or inequalities are individualized, personalized and equalized. The American (and 
British) Dream only involves outer trappings - a veneer - close scmtiny reveals doubt, 
failure and dissatisfaction. If, for example, the very top of British society the Royal Family 
are as messed up and dysftinctional as everyone else, why envy them?^^ If those who 
appear to be in power are just as confused and disempowered as everyone else then 
ultimately, this discourse will suggest that they might as well stay there. No-one else need 
There are issues here around aspiration and consumption that I will e.xamine in chapter four. 
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bother to try and muscle in because, in fact, there is no one stable unified place to muscle . 
in to. In this discourse the 'reality' that is implicated is the idea that the normal no longer 
exists. With the visibility of the nonnal being said to dispel it as a universal abstract, the 
normal itself as a conceptual myth is apparently dis-appearing too. With the display of the 
abnormality of the normal (as 'truth'), the normal itself (although sfill incessantly cited as a 
concept) seems to fall into the abyss. 
If we return to the discussion above around the forced visibility of white men and the 
exclusive white nuclear family and the first reaction to it which was the dogmatic (but 
unstable) backlash, the new texts whose rhetoric espouses the break up/down of the white 
centres is, in the way it is being played out, much more politically astute. Jagger and 
Wright set out their agenda for the book Changing Family Values thus: 
We seek to examine and challenge the prescriptive, nonnative status of the 
patriarchal, heterosexist, white, middle class, nuclear family, both to emphasise 
intra-family differentiation and to revalue a whole range of families that take other 
forms. This project involves highlighting and opposing the patterns of structured 
inequality - racism, classism, patriarchal power relations and gender-based 
inequalities - that are inherent in the construction of the nuclear family fonn as 
natural, nomial and ideal (Jagger and Wright, 1999: 2, my emphasis). 
In relation to my current discussion this means several things. Firstly, it involves the white 
centre 'highlighting and opposing' itself Secondly, this kind of deconstruct ion will 
inevitably show (and it does), that the nuclear family is not natural, it is not ubiquitous and 
it has serious problems of its own. This is inevitable because of the slippage between myth 
(the universalized nomial) and lived reality (whereby normality is only ever possible for an 
exclusive minority) that is endemic to so many texts on this subject. The myth is taken as 
i f it is supposed to relate to the lived reality of individuals and lived reality in general, 
rather than as a power structure that has truth effects and that therefore ensures that 
privileges and benefits can and will only relate to and be possible for certain groups in 
society. Thus what is shown by examinations such as Jagger and Wright's is that the 
nonnal does not exist - and therefore the centre of society (as it is supposed to be) does not 
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exist. The logical implication of these discussions must be finally that: the white power 
base itself as unified and effective cannot exist. Normality is only possible in a fantasy, 
therefore nonnality is a fantasy and therefore it cannot exist - QED. And if we return to 
Foucault and the idea that power needs to hide, the concept that the white, normal, unified 
power base does not exist is a perfect, and perfectly safe hegemonic discourse. The new 
discourse focuses on the Tact' that white bourgeois power is not invulnerable, it is not 
centred, it is not unified, and i f you look closely enough, it does not exist at all. 
2.6 Whose Gaze? 
The most pertinent questions to ask amongst all this must bQ\from whose point of view 
does the central normal not exist and from whose point of view was the centre ever 
invisible? As we have seen, the new visibility-for-the-centre project involves the centre 
'highlighting and opposing' itself, showing normality to be fragmented, its grand-
narrative(s) dismpted and disunified, making normality visible, because it was invisible. 
The entirety of the making-visible project rests on the idea that the white, central nonnal 
was invisible. However when we ask - invisible to whom? the problems begin to appear. 
Within contemporary masculinity studies it is recognized by some that it is the centre that 
is invisible to itself (Dyer, 1997, Collinson and Heam in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001). 
The main points made by these theorists is that white people do not see themselves as 
white, and men don't see themselves as 'men' (gendered). Richard Dyer argues that this is 
why white people do not see privilege accming to them because they are white. Stephen 
Whitehead first says: "[t]he fundamental question is [...] simply whether or not most men 
are even aware they have a gender" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 355-6), and then quotes 
Michael Kimmel on his own masculinity. Kimmel writes: "[w]hen / look in the mirror ... 
/ see a human being ~ a white middle-class male — gender is invisible to me because that is 
where / am privileged. / am the norm. I believe most men do not know they have a 
gender" (ICimmel in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 356, my emphases). By 'looking in the 
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mirror' Kimmel is providing his own self-reflecfion and as there is not an'other' to reflect 
himself back to himself, he is unable to see his own specificity and particularity. He sees 
himself not as white, or male, or middle class, but as an individual that provides him with 
the reference for the universal - 'a human being'. There is no imperative to consider what 
he may look like from the outside. In the realm of the centre's own self-reference, 
whiteness, masculinity and probably class are invisible. Therefore the centre's project of 
making itself visible will be a project that addresses the dominant, whilst claiming to be 
using the techniques of the margins because it was the work and methodologies of 
feminism and postcolonialism that are said to have first made masculinity and whiteness 
visible (Dyer, 1997, Whitehead and Barrett, 2001, Pease, 2000). 
Richard Dyer writes: 
[wjhite power [...] reproduces itself regardless of intention, power differences and 
goodwill, and overwhelmingly because it is not seen as whiteness, but as normal. 
White people need to learn to see themselves as white to see their particularity. In 
other words, whiteness needs to be made strange (Dyer, 1997: 10, my emphasis). 
Within the project of making-visible this can be read as whiteness needing to be 
objecfified, so as white people can gain a distance from it and begin to see it 'properly'. 
And theoretically, in saying this. Dyer is also saying that whiteness needs to be exoticized: 
'made strange'. Masculinity too is spoken of as (already) being 'strange'. Stephen 
Whitehead speaks about men and masculinities as being complex and strange: 
The more we delve into men and masculinities, the more is revealed of the complex 
dynamics of difference, subjectivity, power and identity, weaving their way across 
the social web. These processes are never fixed and never settled. They are under 
constant revision, negotiation and movement; in which case the idea that a core 
masculinity lies deep in men's inner biological state, to be rendered unto the social 
through men's natural propensities, is just not tenable. Men, and the masculinities 
they exhibit, are often strange, always variable and inevitably amorphous 
(Whitehead, 2002: 5, my emphasis). 
Biology as a fixed and stable determinant of masculinity is no longer a tenable argument, 
the single, unified, stable view of biological masculinity as the nomial is no longer tenable. 
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Therefore within the complex, fluid and multiple arena of masculinities, masculinity itself 
is strange but this needs pointing out to * us' as *we' may not have been able to see this. 
Within many of the representations that I am examining, this 'strangeness' is expressed 
through the idea that white men are an endangered species. This idea is expressed as 
having occurred because of different aspects of men's lives and positions. Men are 
'endangered' as a species through the lack of a need for men because of new reproductive 
technology which takes men out of the equation (Men in Crisis series B B C Radio 4, July, 
2000). Men are 'endangered' as a species because many women want female children 
(discussion on Woman's Hour B B C Radio 4, Febmary 2000). Men are "finished, extinct" 
(The Full Monty, 1997) through a lack of need of men because of unemployment and in 
Larry's Party, Larry looks at himself; "Larry Weller, a forty-five-year-old white male, an 
endangered species i f not rare" (Shields, 1997: 261). In these documents white, middle 
aged, middle class men are themselves, 'endangered' just because of who they are. This 
sense of the normal as strange and endangered extends to representations of the white 
nuclear family too. In Man and Boy Harry Silver describes his 'normal' family: 
It was a small, ordinary family - I'm the only child - and we lived in a pebble-
dashed semi in the Home Counties which could have been in almost any suburb in 
England. [...] 
My mum watched the street from behind net curtains ('it's my street,' she would 
say, when challenged by my dad and me). M y dad fell asleep in front of the 
television ('there's never anything on,' he always moaned). And I kicked a ball 
about in the back garden [.. . J . 
How many families are there like that in this country? Probably millions. Yet 
certainly a lot less than there were. Families like us, we 're practically an 
endangered species. Gina acted as though my mum and my dad and I were the last 
of the nuclear families, protected wildlife to be cherished and revered and 
wondered over (Parsons, 2000: 32-3, my emphasis). 
This sense of strangeness and being endangered gives the impression that what was the 
normal is on its way out. Although these examples could be seen as being an expression of 
the language of backlash, whereby the normal is threatened, the impression given is much 
more of rareness, mystery and exoticization. 
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As a part of the making-visible project, and as a part of the abnormalization-of-the-normal, 
making white men, white masculinity and the white nuclear family 'strange' makes some 
sort of sense. It does however, beg the question; for whom is whiteness, masculinity or the 
'normal' white family not strange? And the only possible answer must be: for those who 
were in those positions/institutions. Again, the point of view of the other, of those who are 
'outside' is being ignored. In speaking of her white students bel hooks writes that: 
[m]any of them are shocked that black people think critically about whiteness 
because racist thinking perpetuates the fantasy that the Other who is subjugated, 
who is subhuman, lacks the ability to comprehend, to understand, to see the 
working of the powerfijl. Even though the majority of those students politically 
consider themselves liberals and antiracist, they too unwittingly invest in the sense 
of whiteness as mystery (hooks, 1992: 167-8). 
In claiming to make 'whiteness strange' to the white self and the other, the fact that those 
designated as 'other' already see whiteness critically and intelligently is ignored. There is 
an assumption that there is only one point of view or, at least, only one point of view that 
matters - and that is (again) the central one. In this way the dominant is only taking its 
own view of itself into account and is employing a singular and unified field of vision, 
with the dominant addressing themselves. 
This concept of the dominant addressing (only) the dominant becomes, within certain areas 
of masculinity studies, explicit. It is most apparent in the frequently argued position that 
the project of making the dominant visible is best undertaken by the dominant themselves. 
At a recent conference on white studies,^^ the assertion throughout the day was that white 
people, in particular men, have looked at others for too long and it is now time for white 
people to look at and examine themselves: to re-tum the gaze. This, it was argued, would 
help in shifting the unequal power differentials between the centre and 'the rest'. The 
assertion that in some areas of masculinity studies following on from this is that it is, in 
The conference was entitled 'Picturing Whiteness* and was held at the Tate Britain, 24 February 2001. (As 
a point of interest, Richard Dyer was the keynote speaker). 
143 
fact, best i f white men look at and examine white men rather than anyone else doing it, 
because others have been doing it incorrectly. Anthony Easthope writes: 
Feminist and gay accounts have begun to make masculinity visible. But, written 
from a position outside and against masculinity, they too often treat masculinity as 
a source of oppression. Ironically this is just how masculinity has always wanted to 
be treated - as the origin for everything. [...] The task of analyzing masculinity and 
explaining how it works has been overlooked (Easthope, 1986/1992: 2, my 
emphasis). 
The implicit idea here is that it is best to examine masculinity from the inside and therefore 
the best people to do this are white men themselves. Examining masculinity from the 
outside is no use, it is up to white men to analyze and explain white masculinity. Indeed 
the only people who can legitimately write about white masculinity are those inside it. 
Men must tell 'us' about masculinity from the "inside". Bob Pease claims "[t]he basis of 
men's contribution to feminist knowledge (and to their struggles) will be from our specific 
situation. Men have access to some areas of male behaviour and thought that women do 
not have" (Pease, 2000: 6). This is the same point that Easthope is making; the best 
research can be done from the inside. Work done from the 'outside' is in danger of being 
'wrong'. 
Michael ICimmel defends men's position and personal experiences as white men but as 
individual men: 
Feminist women have theorized that masculinity is about the drive for domination, 
the drive for power, for conquest. 
This feminist definition of masculinity as the drive for power is theorized from 
women's point of view. It is how women experience masculinity. But it assumes a 
symmetry between the public and the private that does not conform to men's 
experiences (Kimmel, 2001: 282). 
As 'feminist women' are identified as a group and categorized, ICimmel is enabled to 
define an 'enemy' that would themselves categorize all men into 'masculinity' incorrectly. 
Kimmel differentiates between 'masculinity' and 'men', the first being the group identity 
forced on men and the second relating to individual men's fragmented experiences. 
Feminists have been theorizing masculinity incorrectly and "this is why the feminist 
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critique of masculinity often falls on deaf ears with men" (ibid). In other words, the 
dominant will only listen to the dominant and so the argument that the dominant should 
address themselves is justified. 
Men will not listen to women (so the argument goes) and, anyway, women's point of view 
of masculinity is 'skewed' (or, perhaps one could read, 'prejudiced'?), and the reflection 
that is given back to white men is 'incorrect'. In the introduction to The Sociology of the 
Family: A Reader, Graham Allan makes a similar point in relation to the area of family 
studies. He claims that whilst feminism has been crucial to putting family studies on the 
academic agenda, and has led to the opening up of "new and exciting lines of enquiry", on 
the other hand, "[f]or all intents and purposes, a focus on family sociology became 
synonymous with an analysis of women's experiences, particularly within the domestic 
sphere. [...] [IJn some regards this appeared detrimental to the field of family sociology as 
a consolidated area of research - at the very least it led to some aspects of family life being 
ignored within sociology" (Allan, 1999: 2). Feminism, or the 'view from one side' is just 
not enough - it is limited and partial (rather than unified and universal?). This is why in 
the area of masculinity studies "the sociology of masculinity, and the subsequent critical 
spotlight it can shed on the hitherto shadowy performances of masculinities and men's 
lived experiences and practices, is so central to feminist praxis'' (Whitehead, 2002: 78, my 
emphases). Masculinity can get in where feminism can't, and therefore is much more 
adept at 'bringing masculinity to light' and thus 'enlightening' feminism. White men need 
to mobilize as a group, but in order to discover men's individual, unique experiences and 
realities. 
David S Gutterman is absolutely explicit about it being up to white men to expose white 
men: 
Profeminists are often most effective when they use their culturally privileged 
status as men as a platform from which to disrupt categories of sexual and gender 
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identity. (The privileges of race, class, education etc., of course, also provide some 
profeminist men with access to other platforms.) This is often a delicate balancing 
act, but by contextualizing and critiquing the closed category of male heterosexual 
identity, profeminist men pose a unique predicament for cultural discourses of 
power. Much as heterosexual transvestites and macho gay men are especially 
disturbing to normative standards of masculinity, the slipperiness of profeminist 
men provides them with opportunities to be extraordinarily subversive. Thus, 
whereas women and gay men often are forced to seek to dismantle the categories of 
gender and sexuality from culturally ordained positions of the *other\ profeminist 
men can work to dismantle the system from positions of power by challenging the 
very standards of identity that afford them normative status in the culture 
(Gutterman in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 65, my emphasis). 
Gutterman's proposed strategy is for those in the position of normality to hide there, 
imitating the norm; using an outward appearance of normality in order to disrupt and 
subvert it. This is a strategy that has been used before by marginalized people in order to 
subvert the self-same strategy that was imposed on them by the centre. It is remarkably 
similar to Homi Bhabha's idea of mimicry, (Bhabha, 1994), where, as a strategy of 
appropriation/internal colonization, the colonial subject is encouraged to 'imitate' the 
colonizer. However, in Bhabha's model it is the colonized, subordinated subject who 
'mimics' the powerful colonial subject, rather than Gultemian's idea of the powerful 
imitating the powerftil, or as he puts it "for profeminist men to 'pass' as 'normal'" 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 66). In Bhabha's model it is a strategy employed by the 
colonizer in order to appropriate the other. However, it is a strategy that proved to be a 
double edged sword, which produced subjects who were "at once resemblance and 
menace" (Bhabha, 1994: 85). Bhabha's 'figure of mimicry' profoundly disturbs colonial 
certainties. It brings the subordinated, 'different' subject far too close to the colonizer's 
own idea of himself In bringing those who were 'different' so close and through the 
resemblance that could be perceived through proximity, the centre received back a 
reflection of itself that was 'skewed'. It produced a subject w ho was "almost the same, 
but not quite'' (Bhabha, 1994: 85), and in doing so, the dominant subject himself, his 
beliefs, values and even idiosyncrasies were brought into question through a reflection of 
themselves that originated from the outside. The subordinated subject that this technique 
produced proved to be a "threat to both 'normalized' knowledges and disciplinary powers" 
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even though this technique was conceived as a colonial "strategy of reform, regulation and 
discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other'* (Bhabha, 1994: 86). 
What Gutterman does is turn this round so that it is the privileged, white, hegemonic man 
who 'mimics' the privileged white hegemonic man. However, where Bhabha's 'figure of 
mimicry' truly disturbs those in power's image of themselves with a vision that comes 
from 'outside', all Gutterman's is able to do is to substantiate the idea that it is possible to 
have it all - to be a 'profeminist' man and retain the power and position that come with 
white hegemonic masculinity. And indeed, in the name of'extraordinary subversion' 
Gutterman claims that it is incumbent on such men to retain these positions: "by 'cross-
dressing as normal men' [...] profeminist men can 'pass' as 'nornial men' and can then 
move among other men, strategically subverting social demarcations of sexuality and 
gender" (Gutterman, 2001: 66). The suggestion is that only normal men can subvert 
normal men. Bhabha's model turns the colonial strategy on its head. He is describing a 
technique of the dominant that is used/subverted by the dominated. Gutterman purports to 
be describing a technique of the marginal (cross-dressing), which can be appropriated/used 
by the dominant. However, i f we take Bhabha's lead, what Guttemian is in fact proposing 
is that the dominant use what was a technique of the dominant anyway, one which proves 
to provide less of a subversive reflection and more of a minor tweak, which merely leaves 
everything in place and leaves the 'closed categor>' of male heterosexual identity' still 
closed. And where Bhabha at least allows the marginalized proximity to the centre 
through imitation and subversion, Gutterman keeps the marginal where they always were-
away from the centre. Gutterman's strategy is a white male strategy for white men, 
performed within white male institutions, and because of this, the 'other' need not be taken 
into account at all as lip ser\'ice is paid to change. 
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In Bhabha's model, the centre is disturbed by the proximity and point of view of the other. 
It is this very point of view that is being dismissed by Easthope, Peterson, Allan, Kimmel 
and (to a lesser extent) Whitehead above, as being 'outside' and therefore unable to see 
properly. There is a peculiar double argument being followed whereby as it is the centre 
that is unable to see itself, it is argued that it is best if the centre does see itself and then 
tells everyone else about it. There are problems here in that it is the centre's view of itself 
that is being taken as a) the most important one, b) the only 'authentic' one and c) really 
the only one. What is forgotten is, as hooks argues: 
Spaces of agency exist for black people, wherein we can both interrogate the gaze 
of the Other but also look back, and at one another, naming what we see. The 
'gaze' has been and is a site of resistance for colonized black people globally. 
Subordinates in relations of power learn experientially that there is a critical gaze, 
one that 'looks' to document, one that is oppositional (hooks, 1992: 116). 
There is always an-other point of view. In ignoring the point of view of others, a terrible 
theoretical mistake is being made, one that will ultimately lead to everything being left in 
place and the promised dissolution of the centre disappearing into thin air. If the centre 
cannot see itself, it is perfectly obvious that others can. bel hooks who, writes extensively 
on this point, has this to say: 
In white supremacist society, white people can 'safely' imagine that they are 
invisible to black people since the power they have historically asserted, and even 
now collectively assert over black people, accorded them the right to control the 
black gaze. As fantastic as it may seem, racist white people find it easy to imagine 
that black people cannot see them i f within their desire they do not want to be seen 
by the dark Other (hooks, 1992: 168). 
The question that is being ignored by so much of the 'new' theory, is: how does the centre 
look from the outside? It is only when this question is taken into account and addressed 
that a disruption of the centre will be possible. If the centre has never been invisible (to 
everyone else) what can the project of making-the-centre-visible possibly do to subvert that 
centre? For whom are whiteness and masculinity being made visible? 
Put another way; for whom is whiteness or masculinity not visible? For those who occupy 
the margins of society, the centre must always be visible. And historically the central 
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normal was always meant to be visible to those who were colonized. If we retum to our 
discussion in the introduction about the creation of the ideal of the 'manly man' and the 
ideal colonial white nuclear family, masculinity studies texts themselves discussed these 
ideals as having been meant to be visible. In Bhabha's analysis of mimicry the normalized 
white ideal has to be seen in order for its virtues to be extolled and anyone persuaded to 
copy or aspire to it. 'Imitation' of the colonizer would not be possible if the colonizer, his 
ideals and values and indeed his body were not visible. C L R James, for example was a 
man with "a remarkable visual sense" (Grimshaw, 1992: 2), aware of the nuances of 
shades of colour. He was also aware (at least later) that the business of the white masters 
at his colonial school was "instilling and maintaining their British principles as the ideal 
norm" (James, 1967: 30). If James had not seen the dominating white colonists, (the 
school masters), how could he have known who he was meant to Mook up to' and imitate? 
He had to see the colonists in order to recognize which behaviours he was meant to copy 
and be aware of which values he was meant to internalize and aspire to. And although it is 
this very colonial idealized normality that is cited by masculinity studies texts as having 
been invisible, I argue that it cannot have been, and indeed the colonial project would not 
have worked i f it was invisible. Even i f we take masculinity studies' own evidence 
(Whitehead, 2002, Beynon, 2002, Tosh, 1999, all discussed in the introduction), it shows 
that the colonial white ideal was set up to be visible. 
Not only this, but if in social, economic, racial, gendered or class terms one is not in the 
central position of the nonnal, this will only be apparent through a concrete sense of what 
the central nomial is. If one's opportunities in society are limited due to such factors such 
as race or gender, one will invariably be aware of the racial or gendered difference that 
would mean that opportunities would not be limited. It is only possible for the margins to 
be marginal in relation to a concrete centre. As Peter McLaren puts it; "[djifferences are 
always differences in relation, they are never simply free-floating" (McLaren, 1994: 58). 
149 
This is a point that is too often ignored by masculinity studies, but one that is of great 
concern to postcolonial theory in particular. Decades ago Frantz Fanon was writing on this 
subject. In 1967 he wrote: "not only must the black man be black; he must be black in 
relation to the white man" (Fanon, 1967: 110, my emphasis). Black people have to relate 
images of themselves to or against those of white people. Within prejudiced white society 
and discourse there is no possibility of self-referentiality for those othered by that society. 
Fanon continues, writing that when confronted by prejudice "[t]he black man stops 
behaving as an actional person. The goal of his behaviour will be The other (in the guise 
of the white man), for the other alone can give him worth" (Fanon, 1967: 154). The 'other' 
is the white man, symbol of the white patriarchal norm, which, in order to be recognized 
(and perhaps despised or desired) must be seen. Those in the margins cannot but be aware 
of the centre and the differentials of power and privilege between the centre and the 
margins. 
bel hooks laments the possibility of self-referentiality for black people: "[o]ften when the 
radical voice speaks about domination we are speaking to those who dominate. TTieir 
pressure changes the nature and direction of our words" (hooks, 1990: 146). The 
dominated speak in relation to the circumstances of domination — and therefore have to 
take those who dominate into account. For those who dominate however, there is no 
imperative to speak to the dominated or those who are oppressed. And the texts of the 
dominant, be they theory or fiction, tend not to speak to the other. So it is that every 
attempt by the centre to make white masculinity or the white nuclear family visible in 
order to display vulnerability and failure is a self-reflexive exercise, one that has no need to 
take anyone else into account. The point that is constantly missed is that the only people 
for whom the white centre can be invisible are those in the centre; the only people for 
whom the centre can possibly be perceived as silent are those who occupy that place. As 
Stuart Hall says of white European presence in the colonies and ex-colonies; "for many of 
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us, this is a matter not of too little but of too much. Where Africa was a case of the 
unspoken, Europe was a case of the endlessly speaking - and endlessly speaking us'' (Hall, 
1997b: 56). The idea of the invisibility and silence of the centre can only be the centre's 
view of itself it cannot be invisible. Therefore, even when the fact that the centre cannot 
see itself is discussed, the follow-on arguments about white men making white men visible 
can only be re-af^irming what is already happening from the point of view of the other. 
Thus where masculinity studies started alongside the period of attention and engaged with 
the concerns of postcolonialism, it has taken a radical and disastrous step away - ignoring 
the agency and the gaze of the other, the colonized, oppressed and othered. And in doing 
so, postcolonial theory itself has become colonized; the theoretical spaces of the 
marginalized have been taken over. As Ato Quayson reminds us: "the key dimension that 
postcolonialism forces us to consider is that of agency" (Quayson, 2000: 100). The 
theorizing of the centre as having been invisible does not allow for the agency of those 
who are not in the centre. The arguments outlined above that deliberately ignore the point 
of view of the other, begin from a theoretically incorrect position, claiming 'subversion' 
and 'newness' for a phenomenon that has been always-already there. If the centre and 
those who occupy it are to assume both they and the centre itself are invisible, not only are 
they just accepting their own view of themselves but, in order to argue for (or against) the 
invisibility of the white centre, they have to ignore the margins and those who occupy 
them, assuming (if they even think of it) that those who are marginalized cannot see the 
centre either. Masculinity studies, representations of white men and the white nuclear 
family, when recounting the invisibility of those in the central positions, or claiming to 
(now) make white masculinity and the white nuclear family visible or strange, take no 
account of the fact that they have always been visible to others and therefore exhibit a 
point of view that is almost entirely self reflexive. 
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bel hooks, who often talks about the visibility of the centre, explains this visibility in 
relation to her own childhood spent in America's south, living on the 'wrong side of the 
tracks': 
To be in the margins is to be part of the whole but outside the main body. [...] 
Across those tracks was a world we could work in as maids, as janitors, as 
prostitutes, as long as it was in a service capacity. We could enter that world but 
we could not live there. We always had to return to the margin, to cross the tracks 
to shacks and abandoned houses on the edge of town. 
There were laws to ensure our retum. Not to return was to risk being punished. 
Living as we did - on the edge - we developed a particular way o f seeing reality. 
We looked both ft-om the outside in and from the inside out. We focused our 
attention on the center as well as the margin. We understood both. This mode of 
seeing reminded us of the existence of a whole universe, a main body made up of 
both margin and center. [...] This sense of wholeness impressed upon our 
consciousness by the structure of our daily lives, provided us with an oppositional 
world view - a mode of seeing unknown to most of our oppressors (hooks, 1990: 
146). 
In hooks' discussion it is the world view of those considered other that is strange. And, 
although 'alien', the culture of the dominant is seen. The margins have to see the centre. 
The marginalized vision, of necessity, must be (at least) double, the centre does not need 
(and tends not to either employ or acknowledge) this double/plural vision - it need only 
see itself. This phenomenon of 'doubleness' is one frequently cited in postcolonial theory, 
and a theme that runs throughout Schwarz and Ray's Companion to Postcolonial Studies. 
Ato Quayson cites: "the double vision that a peripheral existence in the worid engenders" 
(Quayson, 2000: 96). Existing on the edge or at the margins means that double/plural 
vision is inevitable. David Theo Goldberg vilifies intellectual politics that has "failed to 
take seriously the doubleness of hybrid consciousness, not just its in-betweenness but its 
'caught-betweenness,' and accordingly not just the ambivalence it produces but its almost 
inevitable duplicity" (Goldberg, 2000: 83). The oppressed have no chance to be singular, 
truly unified or to see themselves as the universal subject. 
The discussion around the idea of acknow ledging and recognizing world view5, (plural 
rather than singular), and expanding horizons, also speaks about 'allowing' for 
disagreement, "dissensus" and />i/^raction (McLaren, 1994: 57). Disscnsus and interaction 
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do not necessarily induce a comfortable state, rather (sometimes intentionally) a state of 
discomfort is brought about, especially for those who occupy the dominant positions in 
society. The disruption of the stable, comfortable, single, 'given' point o f view or gaze 
and the pluralizing of the gaze involves a proper recognition of difference and points of 
view that may well dissent from the white nonn. This argument for a different way of 
seeing impinges on the feminist and postcolonial theories of'standpoint' (Harstock, 1997: 
152). This theory arises from discussions around the question: is there a specific way of 
knowing for various groups (for example women), and do they have a different way of 
seeing based on experience? It is this that is argued by some theorists of masculinity when 
they claimed that women have theorized men's experiences of masculinity incorrectly and 
that it is up to men to articulate their own disparate experiences. Standpoint theory itself 
impinges on the idea of 'strategic essentialism' and it has been criticized largely because it 
"assumes a notion of the 'real'" (Harstock, 1997: 143), and therefore a notion of the 
'authenticity of experience'. However, in my discussion of vision, I not assuming the idea 
of double/plural vision to be a 'natural' phenomenon accruing to certain groups in society 
because of their biology or, necessarily, as a specifically political point of view. 1 argue 
instead that ways of seeing that differ from the dominant have different perspectives that 
arise from different positioning within society. Sandra Harding talks about a strategic 
essentialist phenomenon when she says: "a feminist standpoint is not something anyone 
can have by claiming it, but an achievement. (A standpoint differs in this respect from a 
perspective)" (Harding, 1997: 169). Therefore in this context, I am not referring to an 
actively achieved 'standpoint', but rather a 'perspective' that (mostly inadvertently) comes 
from certain positionings within white Western society. And even as pluralized vision 
need not necessarily be political, it can be used to political effect. Mieke Bal takes this 
point: "[vjision can be pluralized so as to deprive the colonizing, patriarchal gaze of its 
authority" (Bal, 1993: 401). Pluralizing vision can de-authorize the white male gaze and 
finally lead to proper social and political pluralizing. 
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Denouncing the white male centres as having been invisible and uncritically moving onto 
the project of making-visible is not enough. This is Mieke Bal again: 
Is there an inherent connection between vision and patriarchal power? [...] the 
assumption underlying the suspicion is that vision is an essentially unified mode of 
perception and interpretation. But as has become clear in so many other areas of 
thought, unification, (eg of 'man' , 'woman' language' or 'life') tends to promote in 
and of itself a usurpation of power, i f only through rendering invisible other 
aspects, elements, or positions within the unified category. [Better therefore] to 
address the question of vision's relation to power with the explicit aim of 
differentiating various modes of vision. 1 consider attention to such differentiations 
itself a more effective contribution to the rupturing of monopolies than their 
acceptance, albeit in their critical denunciation (Levin, 1993: 379-380). 
The differentiation of modes of vision - from the singular to the double or plural is what is 
often discussed in postcolonial theory and it is this recognition of different modes of seeing 
that Bal is advocating. From Bal's point of view, to critique a monopoly is to accept it, 
and it is in this way that I am arguing that to critique the 'invisibility of the centre' and to 
advocate its visibility is to accept that the centre was/is invisible, and thus to employ a 
(dominant) singular tield of vision, even as it is denounced. Paradoxically, the project of 
making the centre visible allows that centre's disappearance. Arguing that the centre needs 
to be made visible means both denying other ways of seeing - only acknowledging one 
way of seeing - and therefore inevitably employing the dominant singular field of (white) 
vision to 'expose' the centre. And, using this gaze as the method of making the centre 
\ isible means that the centre cannot be recognized as the centre, but can only be 
recognized as the marginal. Thus the centre is de-centred but not to any effect because 
even as the centre is recognized as the marginal-by-any-other-name, the relations of power 
remain the same - nothing changes. The (unconscious) strategy of moving out of the light 
and melting into the margins is consolidated through the denial of the normal. 
Conclusion 
If the centre is de-centred into the margins, what happens to the middle of society? This 
dislodging (supposedly) re-moves the centre, 'gets rid o f 'inequality, oppression, privilege 
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and suffering', and moves what was the centre out into the margins. The decentring of 
white men and the white, heterosexual nuclear family upholds the ideal of equality-in-
diversity. Indeed inequality for diverse marginalized groups in society and diversity itself 
are said to be the reason behind the (moral) concept of de-centring the centre. Silva and 
Smart write: "[a]ccepting diverse fonns of intimacy and caring as legitimate fomis of 
family life will de-centre the nuclear family" (Silva and Smart, 1999: 10). Diversity 
legitimates the de-centring of the centre. However, this removal of the centre to the 
margins through the making-visible project paradoxically serves to obscure and hide the 
centre as it still exists in tenns of the benefits of power, privilege and wealth accruing to a 
(small) group. 
De-centring as a strategy employed before unequal wealth, power and privilege is dealt 
with will not have the explicitly stated 'desired' effect. Far from being a subversive 
strategy, i f white power is seen and perceived to be de-centred it can more easily stay in 
place. The danger to the white hegemony comes i f white power is seen and perceived to 
be still in place (power must hide its own mechanisms), and de-centring the centre -
sending it out into the morass of the margins is very adept at doing this. We are left with a 
silence at the centre, which, because of its absence, cannot even be properly identified and 
therefore it cannot be resisted. The new hegemonic project as it is stated, is to remove the 
centre, to deconstruct it through language and/or representation. This means that there will 
be no need to let anyone else into the centre because, in perfect postmodern terms, there is 
no centre anymore. 
This chapter has led us through the making-the-centre-visible project that is so apparent at 
the moment, looking at some of the consequences of the way it is discussed, theorized and 
carried out. Normality has been 'disproved', 'dispelled' and it has disappeared. However, 
for all that, nonnality as a concept is still cited albeit when it is hailed as an absence, or 
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spoken of as being in the past. Chapter three examines (the creation of) the space/place 
that, it is said, was the centre. And where this chapter traced the deconstruction of the 
centre and looked at some of the implications of this, the next chapter looks at the re-
created phenomenon of the 'old' that enables this supposed deconstruction. If the centre is 
said to be melting into the margins, there needs to be a concrete sense of where the centre 
was and it is here that we turn to next. 
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Chapter Three: Rediscovering Hidden Histories And Constructing Static 
Singularities 
Although the existence of nonnality may be being marginalized and denied at the moment, 
the marginalization and denial are predicated on a strong idea of what the normal was. 
Alongside this solid idea of what the normal was, the concept of whether this normal was a 
good thing or a bad thing has changed. This chapter will examine the current discussion of 
how the nonnal was seen in the past - from idealized Utopia to dysfrinctional dystopia. It 
will examine the changed rules and conventions of the discourse whose archive relates 
history and re-reads it. Chapter one, whilst also looking backwards looked at the 
(supposed) historic invisibility of the normal and charted the discussion about the move to 
visibility now which is coming from both the new academic studies and the media. This 
chapter will examine the re-writing and re-viewing of the history of the normal that is 
occurring from the 'moral' position of the making-the-centre-visible project detailed in 
chapter two. It will look at how the history of the nonnal is being re-viewed through both 
theory and representations that re-view 'old-style' masculinity and the nuclear family. 
This chapter will examine how this re-view is (re)discovering the oppression and 
repression of the white middle classes. In this discovery the position of the white middle 
classes, far from being privileged, becomes almost the most repressed and therefore 
oppressed and disadvantaged position of all. As no-one can live up to the myth, those who 
are expected to try to are shown to be the ones who have the most difficult time. 
This chapter re-views some of the primary texts examined before in relation to the tropes 
of crisis and in relation to the scrutiny of the normal. To begin with the archiving of the 
history of the normal will be studied by looking at the re-reading and re-viewing of the 
1950s in both theory and representation. Two very different primary texts have been 
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chosen from this archive: the British Channel 4 documentary Married Love (Channel 4, 
February 2002) and the US film Pleasant\nlle (1998). These have been chosen as they 
represent the range of texts forming the archive that looks directly at the 1950s. The re-
writing and re-presenting of this period has been chosen as it is from here that we get many 
of our current conceptions of the normal (Chambers, 2001). This chapter will also re-view 
how masculinity theory, particularly in relation to film theory, resets the 1950s ideals. 
Within all these texts there is a continuation of the victimization, crisis and marginalization 
tropes, but the fact that this time they are discussed in relation to history makes it very 
powerftal indeed as a re-writing of the past will always give legitimacy to the ideas of the 
present. Finally this chapter will move on to a considerafion o f ' o l d ' masculinity and its 
representation today in texts already discussed in other contexts: Larry's Party (1997), 
^4an and Boy, (1999), Fight Club, (1999), Magnolia, (1998), The Best a Man Can Get, 
(2000), and briefly considers a film not looked at before, Billy Eliot, (2000). Each of these 
texts are examined in relation to their portrayal and discussion o f ' o l d ' style masculinity, 
looking at how the ideals associated with this type of masculinity are demonized and at 
new attitudes to homosexuality. This chapter looks at how 'old' or 'past' ideas are being 
re-written and re-viewed in relation to contemporary ideas of 'new' pluralized, fluid and 
tolerant masculinity. 
These re-readings (and re-writings) of history are based on a re-creation of a singular 
conception of the nomial as unified, essentialized and universalized. This keeps the 
concept of the normal static and in fact re-creates it as a basic cultural concept. This 
recreation occurs during the repositioning of the nonnal as past. In consigning the idea of 
the normal to the past it is displaced from the current centres of our society and where it is 
found, in history, in fiction or in the imaginations of misguided people, normality is 
demonized, vilified and consigned back to the more morally and politically acceptable 
position of the margins. The re-creation of the history of the normal and those perceived to 
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be closest to it is presented as radical, moral and revolutionary, deliberately going 'against 
the grain' of dominant discourse. A concept of a singular normal is re-created and forms a 
springboard for multiplicity and enables the new rhetoric to claim a radical break with the 
past. This 'past', and any idea of the normal it may have carried with it, are shown to have 
never existed in the 'ideal' fonn and that a proximity and aspiration towards the nonnal led 
not to a Utopia, but to a repressed, oppressive and immoral dystopia. 
3.1 Re-reading the 1950s/ Re-viewing the Normal 
Jeffrey Weeks discusses the period after the Victorian era and up to the 1950s as being the 
time when the nuclear family, as he puts it, "began to come into its own" (Weeks, 1981: 
202). And now, certainly one of the places where we get some of our most abiding images 
of the nonnal (white, middle class, nuclear) family as well as normal white masculinity 
appears to be from the 1950s. In many masculinity studies texts the 1950s are discussed as 
being almost as important in the creation of the ideal of normal masculinity as the colonial 
period (Whitehead, 2002, Beynon, 2002). Also, for most family studies texts the 1950s 
are seen as the most important period for creating the ideal of the white nuclear family 
(Chambers, 2001, Silva and Smart, 1999). Silva and Smart cite how "the discursive 
construction of the Happy Home (Good Housekeeping institute, 1955) in the 1950s placed 
the traditional family as the ideal model of how things were" (Silva and Smart, 1999: 5). 
In this postwar culture the gendered division of the public and private (domestic) spheres 
was once again (as in colonial times) seen as a priority. It is in this period that we get the 
re-emergence of the ideal of the male breadwinner supporting his wife and family as being 
an expression of "nonnal masculinity" (Beynon, 2002: 102). Thus it is from the 1950s that 
we get many of our current stereotypes and recognizable images of and about nonnality -
often through advertising imagery and films. 
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The image and ideal of 1950s masculinity involves a re-establishment of the importance of 
the family and the man within the family, or what Christine Gledhill calls the "re-
masculinisafion of cultural value" (Gledhill, 1987: 34). In the post-war 1950s the family 
and the place of the man as father, breadwinner, husband and head of the house became 
central to definitions and ideals of normality. Arthur Brittan quotes Barbara Ehrenreich 
who, in 1983 argued that: 
In the 1950s ... there was a fimi expectation ... that required men to grow up, 
marry and support their wives. To do anything else was less than grown-up, and 
the man who willftilly deviated was judged to be somehow 'less than a man'. This 
expectation was supported by an enormous weight of expert opinion, moral 
sentiment and public bias, both within popular culture and the elite centres of 
academic wisdom (Brittan, 2001: 51-2). 
TTius in the 1950s 'real' men ('manly' men) were husbands, fathers and breadwinners. 
Concepts of'proper' masculinity were solidified around this idea of ' rea l ' men being 
family men: patriarchs. 
The myth of the 1950s as being "the golden age" (Chambers, 2001: 34) of the family in 
particular is now being challenged and discussed as 'untrue'. What the discussion of these 
stereotypes, concepts and ideals points to are a continuing interest and definition of the 
normal. Normal masculinity is recognized as constituting a concept of the normal even 
when this 'normal' is said to belong to the past and value judgements are passed on it. The 
stereotypes and ideals are also said to have conferred a space or place of privilege for white 
men that positioned everyone else as ab-normal or different. It is because of the (now) 
unacceptable inequality of others and the privileging of white men that this hardened 
concept of normal masculinity is said to belong to, and indeed to be, past; whether 
disappeared into a discussion of colonial times or into a critique of 1950s ideology. 
However, recent criticism, involving a re-reading of 1950s texts has begun to question 
even this 'stable' (if not ideal) image of both men and of the family. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s a plethora of new theoretical books began to re-view the 1950s in relation to 
gender roles and, most often, how they were represented in films at the time. Male 
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Trouble (Penley and Willis - eds, 1993), All That Hollywood Allows: Re-Reading Gender 
in 1950s Melodrama, (Byars, \99\),HomeIs Where The Heart Is (Gledhill, ed, 1987), 
Imitations of Life, (Landy, ed, 1991) and Lynne Segal's Slow Motion (1990/1997) all 
began to review masculinity in the 1950s. These books differ in their analysis of the 1950s 
to that which went before. In relation to 1950s melodrama films, Christine Gledhill argues 
that what eariier critics found was that these texts: 
Reproduce bourgeois ideology because they implicate the spectator in a single point 
of view onto a coherent, hierarchically ordered representation of the worid, in which 
social contradictions are concealed and ultimately resolved through mechanisms of 
displacement and substitution. In the process the spectator is 'interpellated' as the 
'individual subject' of bourgeois ideology (Gledhill, 1987: 8). 
Current theory however does not find this unified, ordered and universal bourgeois 
ideology. The re-reading of both the 1950s and the media texts of the 1950s find 
an earlier period of crisis for both men and the family. Citing the nineteenth century as the 
period of the creation of the melodramatic form, Gledhill argues that it was nostalgic even 
then evoking "a retum to a 'golden past': less how things ought to be than how they should 
have been" (Gledhill, 1987: 21). The 1950s melodrama however is discussed as failing 
even in that nostalgia. Although a vision of the patriarchal bourgeois normal is set up, it is 
argued now that this vision even at the time, was shown to be crumbling internally. 
Impotency, homosexuality, dysfunction, anxiety, confusion and crisis are said to be the lot 
of 1950s men as they "failed the test of manliness" (Cohan, 1993: 213). The family in the 
popular melodramas of the time is characterized as a site of conflicting (and failing) 
identifications, violence, neurosis, psychosis and hysteria (Cohan, 1993: 216, Rodowick, 
1991: 241).^ *^  
One of the most interesting films in relation to this subject is the 2003 film Far From Heaven, directed by 
Todd Haynes which is exphcitly an "homage to 1950s melodrama" (DVD - director's notes), and which 
remakes a melodrama in the style of those critiqued by new film studies. In Far From Heaven the male 
protagonist, Frank Whittaker may appear to have a "perfect life" (ibid) but the film reveals that actually he is 
homosexual and when his wife finds out she begins an inter-racial relationship. This re-reading of 1950s 
melodrama makes explicit thai "there is trouble in paradise" (ibid). 
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One of the main reasons given for this emotional and psychic mess is the existence of 
patriarchal authority (Rodowick, 1991, Segal, 1990/1997) and the gendered nuclear family 
itself (Byars, 1991). The rigidity of patriarchal authority as it is manifested within the 
family is critiqued, and the 1950s representations of this authority are re-read as being 
problematic at the time. In relation to the patriarchal figure David Rodowick argues that: 
Where the melodramatic Father formerly flinctioned to legitimate the system of 
conflict and guarantee its resolution by successftilly identifying its heroes on the 
side of the law, morality and authority, in the 1950's he tlinctioned solely to throw 
the system into turmoil by his absences through death or desertion, his weaknesses, 
his neglects, etc. In this manner, the failures of identification so characteristic of 
the domestic melodrama, and the self-conscious 'oedipaP solutions they demanded, 
can be directly linked to the figure of the Father as representing either the very sign 
of madness (the transgression of the law he represents) or as an empty center where 
the authority of the law fails (Rodowick, 1991, 245-6). 
This analysis reads as remarkably similar to the crisis of contemporary fatherhood we 
looked at in chapter one. The historical figure of the Father is being re-read in relation to 
contemporary notions of the failure of masculinity, its crisis and (that which we will 
examine later in this chapter) its pathological expression. In line with more general 
masculinity studies texts, these criticisms of 1950s tllms show that the normal is 
crumbling, but more importantly it is being shown as never having existed (even in 
mainstream Hollywood 1950s representations) at all. In constructing my argument it 
doesn't matter whether current criticism is right or wrong, what matters is that history and 
historical representations are being re-read. In the 1950s Betty Friedan's criticism of the 
deep underlying problems in suburbia was almost a lone critique. Today however the idea 
of normality be it the family or masculinity, crumbling from within is the mainstream 
discourse. In contemporary texts the history of the 'manly' man and the nuclear family is 
being 're-read' and reinterpreted. The 'normal' is shown not to be the normal again. 
In a spate of academic discussions and media representations of the nuclear family as 
dysfunctional, repressive, undesirable and 'wrong', there are certain texts that deal with the 
'manly' man and the family's 'history'. The archive of the history of the normal in texts 
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that discuss and re-present the 1950s disbands and deconstructs any idea of a Utopian 
1950s normality. We will now turn to two media texts that revisit the 1950s. The Channel 
4 documentary series Married Love (February 2002), which re-tells the history of 
heterosexual marriage in the twentieth century, and the US film Pleasant\nlle (1998) which 
fictionally recreates the utopic vision of 1950s normality. These texts have been chosen 
out of the archive as they document the re-reading of ' real ' history and provide a fictional 
re-viewing of history respectively. From these two very different forms of media 
production, discussion and representation we can begin to look at the rules and codes that 
structure the discursive enunciation of the history of the normal as it is 'allowed' to be 
spoken today. 
Both media texts examined in this section as well as the theory briefly discussed above are 
relentlessly a/7//"-nostalgic. For masculinity or the family to be positioned as 'new' in any 
sense, a documented and specific concept of the 'old' is needed. In the new discourse of 
the normal, white, middle class normality is not just being denied and re-positioned in the 
margins, it is also being conceived of as belonging in the past and further, it is being 
demonized as bigoted, intolerant, ignorant and repressive. Where once the white, 
bourgeois nonnal was seen as a position to aspire to, within the current climate and 
configuration of society the normal is being re-presented (ostensibly) as something that 
should not be aspired to in its 'old' form because it was intolerant, bigoted and exclusive. 
Where once there was nostalgia for a 'golden' past now many texts represent that past as 
immoral and wrong and the 'golden age' is proved to have never really existed anyway. 
Contemporary theory re-views the representations of nonnality at the time. The two 
contemporary representations 1 look at document the 1950s in different ways and were 
both made in the late 1990s. The US film Pleasanmlle (1998) explicitly fictionalizes the 
Utopian 1950s ideal of nonnality, showing that indeed it was a fiction. The documentary 
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series Married Love (Channel 4, February 2002) however looks at the 'reality' at the time. 
Married Love seeks to uncover the ignorance and repression that it argues, existed in 
Britain in the first half of the twentieth century. Married Love is a series of three historical 
documentary programmes taking a 'fresh' look at the history of sex in the twentieth 
century. The documentaries go to great lengths to document ignorance, fear, guilt and 
misinformation around sex in the past and juxtapose these attitudes with contemporary 
ones. The emphasis of each programme is that attitudes to sex were 'wrong' but things 
now are much better. The older men who are interviewed, when speaking about this time 
are incredulous and often sad about what it was like then and at the enforced ignorance and 
repression of the time. In all three programmes the discussion of the time before the 1960s 
emphasizes ignorance, repression, the absence of sexual education, the fact that no-one 
spoke about sex at the time, the lack of experience and the lack of a language for any 
experiences that people did have. 
In Married Love it is the women's movement and time itself that is said to have done most 
to combat repression and ignorance. Things are represented as getting progressively better 
as the voice-over to the programme tells us: "men's attitudes to sex in marriage have 
moved a long way since the first half of the twentieth century. Men's sexual behaviour 
was transformed by a new generation of assertive women" (Channel 4, 26.02.02). There 
has been progress and change and modem attitudes to sex are contrasted directly with 
those that espoused only one type of married, heterosexual love. Married Love does its 
best to shatter the idealized myth of the nuclear family in the mid-twentieth century. As 
the narrator explains: "the suburban, middle class family presented an image of domestic 
contentment in post-war Britain. But just beneath the surface lay dark feelings of sexual 
ftustration that could suddenly explode" (Charmel 4, 26.02.02). Again, even when there is 
a surface appearance of normality there will be abnormality undemeath: scratch the surface 
and something nasty is bound to ooze out. Here, and throughout most o f the discussion of 
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the three documentaries of Married Love, it is sexual finjstration, brought about by 
repression and cleaving to the conventions of the time, that provides the time bomb that 
could explode surface normality at any time. And if the normal nuclear family did not 
exist (even in the past that it is said to have occupied in an untroubled manner), this 
provides sound 'proof that the normal cannot exist today. The re-viewing of the past 
enables the current view of the normal. 
Married Love re-reads the 'image of domestic contentment' presented by the suburban 
middle class family, and re-presents us with a dark and violent image instead. Look 
beneath the idealized historical image and you find darkness, frustration, a lack of control 
and violence. Repression, it is suggested, lead to levels of sexual fi-ustration that could 
lead to both domestic violence and to marital breakdown. Thus repressive sexual attitudes 
could themselves endanger the nuclear family. And at least some of the discussion in all 
three of the documentaries is around how more liberated attitudes to sex and an emphasis 
on equal pleasure for men and women can lead to happier, more stable marriages. 
In the other text, the film Pleasant\nlle (1998), stable marriage is not even presented as 
necessarily desireable. Pleasantville is the story of two modem teenagers David and Jen, 
who fall into a 1950's sitcom world and how they set about 'modemizing' this world. The 
1950's worid of the sitcom 'Pleasantville'^' is black and white and the two teenagers bring 
colour to this grey and repressive world. In Pleasantville it is the young people and the 
women who mobilize change to this static, rigid, gendered society. And where the grey 
sitcom world of'Pleasantville' may be, as the voice-over to the sitcom tells us: 'chock-full 
of family values', these 'values' are demonstrated to be repressive, restricting and 
immoral. There are two worlds in the film, the contemporary world where HIV is rife, 
global warming threatens our world and David and Jen's parents are divorced, and the 
^'TO provide clarity, the film itself will be wrillen in italics; Pteasantvilie, the sitcom in inverted commas; 
'Pleasantville' and the lowTi without either: Pleasantville. 
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world of the sitcom 'Pleasantville' that is David's favourite programme. 'Pleasantville' 
world portrays an idealized version of suburban, gendered normality and in the film is 
presented at first as a nostalgia-fest. However as the film progresses this juxtaposition that 
places nostalgia for a mythical 'perfect' past against a jarring, fi-actured present, is slowly 
and inexorably subverted. 
In the film David and Jen are magically transported fi-om the modem world into the black 
and white 'utopia' that is 'Pleasantville', taking over the roles of Bud and Mary-Sue, the 
teenage children of a 'perfect' white, middle class nuclear family where the father goes out 
to work and the mother seems to just cook endlessly. The suburban world of Pleasantville 
is cultureless, or at least, there is neither high, nor popular culture. The books in the library 
are blank, the music is middle of the road ' l i f t ' music and the geography is confined to the 
few streets of Pleasantville. The suggestion seems to be that the white, gendered, suburban 
'ideal' itself is cultureless, bland and lacking in 'colour'. This is by no means a new idea. 
In the introduction to Visions of Suburbia, Roger Silverstone cites "the presumed 
Philistinism of suburban life" (Silverstone, 1997: 14). Seen fi^om above in the class 
hierarchy the suburban ideal, as well as the suburbs themselves, are viewed as 'middle 
brow' and bland, without the 'colour' or folk culture of the working class and without high 
culture's art, literature or music. As Roger Siverstone says; "Suburban culture is middle-
brow, and suburban music [...] is, i f nothing else, pop" (Silverstone, 1997: 23). In 
Pleasantville the music isn't even truly pop and it is up to Jen and David to introduce rock 
and roll, literature, art and the possibility of physical mobility to the town. Modem values, 
despite the picture of current Westem and global society given at the beginning of the film, 
are imagined as being infinitely preferable to the stifled and repressive values and world of 
Pleasantville. 
John Hartley writes that: 
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Politically, suburbia has been blamed for creating an apathetic, reactionary, 
conservative, conformist, status conscious, petit-bourgeois class whose members 
are incapable of organizing anything for themselves, but who are prey to 
demagogues, propaganda and media influence, forming the bedrock of passive 
support for authoritarian, un-democratic, even fascist politics (Silverstone, 1997: 
184). 
This facism, as the result of extreme convention, repression and restriction is explored in 
the film. As the changes continue to gain momentum in Pleasantville, reactionary, 
conservative, authoritarian, anti-democratic and even fascist political views begin to rear 
their head in the form of colour prejudice. In the film this is quite literal as the 
'unreconstructed' people in Pleasantville remain filmed in black and white whilst those 
letting go and exploring new emotions and sex are 'coloured in'.^^ Free and unconstrained 
modem attitudes to sex are introduced to Pleasantville and begin to combat the sexless and 
repressive, grey regime that, it is suggested, existed in the 1950s under a facade of 
convention, morality and normality. 
In both Married Love and Pleasantrille the sexist attitudes of the 'time' are condemned 
and gendered inequalities are denounced and seen as damaging for both the men and 
women. In Visions of Suburbia Roger Silverstone argues that: 
suburban culture is a gendered culture. Indeed the suburbanization of culture has 
often been equated by its many critics with a feminization of culture. The suburban 
home has been built around an ideology and a reality of women's domestication, 
oppressed by the insistent demands of the household, denied access to the varied 
spaces and times, the iteration of public and private that marks the male suburban 
experience and which creates, for them the crucial distinctions between work and 
leisure, weekday and weekend. In particular, postwar suburbanization was 
buttressed by a concerted effort by public policy and media images to resocialize 
women into the home, and into the bosom of the nuclear bourgeois family 
(Silverstone, 1997: 7). 
Here as in many discussions of white, middle class suburbia and the nuclear families that 
lived there, it is women's oppression that is viewed as being most acute and as being most 
at odds with the idealized image. Silverstone both genders and politicizes the ideal. In 
Pleasannille the sitcom world that presents the supposedly idealized view of 1950's 
" There are however no black characters in the film to complicate the film's depiction of 'colour prejudice'. 
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suburban normality is divided into strict gender roles and the film takes the contemporary 
view on this. The nuclear bourgeois family itself is seen as a place of repression and 
perhaps particulariy oppression for women. The very concept of the 1950s, post-war 
resocialization of women back into the nuclear family and the home is viewed as 'wrong'. 
In Pleasantville the family's mother Peggy commits adultery and her 'liberation' is dwelt 
on. The young people and women instigate and maintain the changes that happen in 
Pleasantville, and once these changes have begun, the women in Pleasantville are not 
going to be re-tied to domestic slavery. Once Peggy has a taste of liberation, nothing will 
be the same for her again. Indeed, the film entirely condones her affair and subsequent 
marriage break up. 
This is in sharp contrast to the way that most of the men of the town of Pleasantville are 
portrayed as rigid, repressive, patriarchal and frightened; unable to believe that their wives 
might not make dinner or might bum their shirts when ironing. As one o f the men's 
leaders tells the others; "it's a question of values, it's a quesfion of whether we want to 
hold on to those values". The grey town draws up a new 'code of conduct' that states that 
all citizens must treat each other in a 'courteous' and pleasant manner, that the library is to 
be closed, music censored, there are to be no double beds (no sex), and it decrees that all 
schools will teach '^the non-changeist view of history, emphasizing continuity over 
alteration''. History itself is to be re-written and change is not to be allowed in 
Pleasantville, and within the parameters of current discourse this is entirely unacceptable. 
The contemporary ideals of change, multiplicity and fluidity are to be replaced with 
continuity and stagnation. 
Overall it is the men who have most to lose with change, but also who are the most 
frightened of change. In Pleasantville it is the men who find it hardest to change but who 
suffer perhaps more because of this - they have been more fully socialized into repressive 
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convention and are therefore more repressed. This is quite a subtle argument and it is 
suggested rather than given directly. However, in a similar manner to the idea expressed in 
chapter one, that men can be damaged by being associated with all 'bad' men,^^ it is 
suggested that the socialization and expectations put upon all men/boys are damaging and 
repressive. It is also suggested that because masculinity is represented as being so rigid 
and the expectations of behaviour put on men by masculinity are so rigid, it is harder for 
men to reconstruct themselves and their masculinities than it might be for women to 
reconstmct themselves or femininity. 
This idea is reflected in the documentary series Married Love. In most o f the interviews 
and examples given by the programme the excessive repression of society was, it is 
suggested, worse for men than for women and worse for the middle classes than the 
working classes. Where a working class interviewee fondly recalls his gang of working 
class boys masturbating each other and in front of each other during lazy afternoons by the 
river, a middle class man who went to public school recalls institutionalized ignorance, 
repression and misinfomiation. The white, middle class male interviewees discuss the 
social movement at the time that discouraged boys from masturbating, and one man recalls 
being told that "semen came from the brain and masturbation would turn you into an 
imbecile" (Channel 4, 26.02.02). In the re-reading of the history of the nomial it is the 
white middle classes who are said to have suffered and i f women have suffered then so too 
have men. 
If we retum to Pleasantville, the film explores the idea of suffering within the 'ideal' white 
nuclear family. The film shows that the nuclear family can be an unhealthy place to be for 
both women and men. The film shows that this type of family can be immoral, 
conservative, restrictive and exclusive; set up for the benefit of white men, although they 
" Chapter one, section 1.5, 'Representations of Victimization and Feminization'. 
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too suffer within it. This is no celebraUon, although as with family studies texts, the 
possibility of this celebration is acknowledged. As Tony Parsons put it on the Late 
Review, PleasanWille "subverts its own nostalgia" (BBC 2, 11.03.99). The idea of 
nostalgia although resurrected is displaced to 'elsewhere' as neither the film nor the review 
indulges in it. 
Married Love does not indulge in nostalgia either. Here the past is also represented as a 
dystopia compared to the liberated and tolerant present. As the narrator tells us; "since the 
sixties the old restrictions of married love have been eroded" (Channel 4, 19.02.02). We 
are told that we have broken with this past in what is presented as a radical 'rewriting' of 
history. History is 're-read' ft-om our own contemporary times and contemporary morality 
overiaid on to it. Thus Tony Parsons is able to say of the world of Pleasantville that, " T V -
land past is presented not as a paradise, but as a hell surrounded by a white picket fence" 
and that the film shows that "these weren't the good old days, that the past was repressive 
and restricfive" (BBC2, 03.99). The singular ideal normal is taken in historical context and 
shown not to be an aspirational ideal at all but rather a 'mse' of right-wing, hegemonic, 
patriarchal society that encourages people to blindly conform even as the values one is 
meant to conform to engender sexism and racism. 
3.2 The Singularity of Old Masculinity 
Nonnality is looked at as being conceived within history as a singularity; one dominant 
ideal, it is assumed that in the past people were supposed to confomi to this ideal and this 
led to repression, oppression, inequality and bigotry. Stephen WHiitehead looks backwards: 
There is a sense that a century or so ago manliness was perceived as less fluid, less 
amenable to individual interpretation and, importantly, something to be openly 
strived for (Whitehead, 2002: 15, my emphasis). 
What Whitehead is describing is 'our' idea of manliness and this type of masculinity. By 
saying that 'there is a sense', Whitehead opens this idea of'manliness' up to interpretation/ 
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definition in the present. It is less a question of whether it really was so, and more a 
quesfion of how we perceive it to have been now. And 'now', manliness of this sort is not 
something to be strived for. This historical idea of masculinity and manliness is rarely 
questioned, rather it is used as a springboard from which to base the newer concepts of 
multiple, fluid masculinities."*'' Whitehead condnues: 
It remains the case that any notion of fixed or final gender roles or definitions is 
implausible. Similariy it is no longer tenable, given recognifion of the multiplicity, 
historicity and dynamism of gender representations, to talk of masculinity in the 
singidar (Whitehead, 2002: 33, my emphases). 
This implies that it was tenable to talk of masculinity in the singular and when speaking 
historically of masculinity it often sfill is. The current idea of the 'historical' ideal of 'old ' 
masculinity is itself fixed, unchanging, rigid, stereotyped and singular. 
The idea of masculinity-as-it-was, or 'normal' masculinity in the historical re-write for the 
white middle classes is one of the areas that is most often overhauled, questioned and 
discussed especially in relation to an idea of 'old style' masculinity. Thus in this section 
we revisit some of the texts examined earlier; Man and Boy (Parsons, 1999), Larry's Party 
(Shields, 1997), and the films Fight Club {\999), American Beauty (1999) and Magnolia 
(1998). These texts, as we saw earlier, all examine a conception of fatherhood and often 
their own experience as 'new style' fathers is pitted against the way that their own fathers 
parented them. In a recreation of both new and old types of masculinity, these texts 
enunciate some of the ways that these opposing types of masculinity are documented and 
represented today. Although they offer a range of discussions and representadons of 'old 
style' masculinity, that type of masculinity itself is positioned as static, unchanging and 
rigid. Throughout these texts as they are taken together, a unified conception of 'old style' 
masculinity is recreated. Offered as 'old-style' masculinity this type of masculinity is 
Thus alihough sometimes masculinity is discussed as not having been (really) nomial ever, as in the new 
re-views of the 1950s, there still remains a static idea of what that normal is/was meant to be, or what it 
'should' have been. 
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presented as the trap that is opened up by society for (white) men to fall into^^ and it is the 
trap that this generation's fathers are portrayed as already having fallen into and are 
beckoning their sons into. Whether portrayed as sinister or naive, the fathers of (young) 
middle-aged, white men are discussed and represented as having swallowed the myth of 
normality hook, line and sinker. Repressed, homophobic, sexist and conventional, these 
men represent a type of masculinity that is said to belong in the past, which is profoundly 
mistaken and which should be and is being confined to history. Although men of this type 
are still around they are represented as belonging to a dying breed and with them, 
'masculinity' as a concept and a repressive myth is said to be dying. This allows 'new' 
men and 'new' expressions of masculinity to be presented as completely breaking with the 
'old', allowing new, fluid and multiple masculinides to be expressed in opposidon to the 
fixed conception of this 'old'. 
This discussion of the 'old' being diametrically opposed to the 'new' is apparent in 
masculinity studies texts, factual media discussions and is constantly represented in 
fictional form. 'Bad old dads' as an expression of 'old' nonnality are being used as a 
springboard that allows 'new' men to express themselves in creative and more expansive 
ways. Indeed John Beynon uses this binarism to define what he calls 'nebulous new man-
ism' entirely saying that: "[t]he only defining feature we can point to with any degree of 
certainty is that he is certainly not 'old man', his father" (Beynon, 2002: 120). 'New' men 
fi-om this point of view are nothing in themselves (and therefore one might think may not 
exist at all) and can only be defined in relation to what is opposite and opposed. As there 
is a pull away from 'old bad fatherhood' and models of masculinity, those fathers who 
have moulded themselves to conventional, repressive patterns are represented as wanting 
their sons to do the same, to conform to the same nomis, and therefore battles between the 
old and the new - internal and external, are waaed. 
Black men are often portrayed as having fallen into it already through hypermasculinity (see Whitehead 
2002 and Hall, 1997 for discussions). 
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In Man and Boy Harry Silver describes his father's ambitions for him: "he wanted me to 
have everything that life has to offer - the career and the kids, the family and the salary, 
the happy hearth and the fat paycheque. He wanted me to have it all. But nobody gets 
away with having it all" (Parsons, 1999: 185). Harry's father only wants the 'best' for his 
son, the idealized normal. Harry knows however that this is impossible and the aspiration 
for it is itself a trap. Harry has 'seen through' the myth and convention. Expectation, a 
certain type of masculinity and fatherhood, and a certain way of being a husband are the 
traps that men are meant to fall into from the example and advice of their fathers, who do 
not have the vision of their sons and are speaking from their 'incorrect' position of old-
style masculinity which says (incorrectly) that there is and always has been only one type 
of (biological) masculinity. 
In Fight Club Tyler's father advises him to go to college, get a job, get married. Michael 
Jordan says of this advice that "[c]ontaminated by an ethos of aimless ambition and adrift 
from custom's logic of example, the father's advice seems empty and merely 
conventional" (Jordan, 2002: 373). Tyler's father's words are particularly empty as he 
himself was absent and thus the words themselves and the actions they prescribe don't 
even have 'custom's logic of example'. Yet even if Tyler was expected to follow by 
example the implication is that he would still be following an 'aimless ambition'. This 
concept of'aimless ambition' is a useftil one, in this context it is an ambition for nonnality 
that is not thought about; it is prescribed, expected - supposedly the path of least 
resistance. This is why Larry, in Larry's Party. Michael in The Best a Man Can Get and 
Harry in Man and Boy feel that they have acted without volition and come to a place they 
did not intend to, a place that itself is 'empty and merely conventional'. These men as well 
as Lester in American Beauty and Jack in Fight Club try to fit but it does not work. For 
these men the masculine ideal is portrayed as not being natural to them, easy to fall into but 
173 
not easy to sustain or achieve properly and any attempt to achieve it will lead to 
unhappiness and repression. 
In these texts as with many others there is a terrible anxiety around the idea of 'turning' 
into one's father. Married, and a new father, this is Harry Silver on his new conventional 
Hfe: 
And when I came back from work at night 1 would shout, ' H i honey, I'm home,' as 
though we were characters in some American sitcom fi-om the fifties, with Dick 
Van Dyke bringing home the bacon and Mary Tyler Moore making bacon 
sandwiches. 
I don't know why I tried to make a joke of it. Maybe because in my heart 1 
believed that Gina was only pretending to be a housewife, while I pretended to be 
my father (Parsons, 1999: 20-1). 
1 will examine the idea of performativity in chapter four, here I want to look at the concept 
of masculinity that Harry has. The 'ideal' often seems to relate to a mythic idea of the 
1950's, a 'golden', clear ideal of suburbia, family life, a singular ideal fatherhood and 
breadwinning masculinity that fitted in with an industrialized capitalist economy. This 
idea of an older-style, old-fashioned masculinity in many of the texts is viewed with rueful 
nostalgia, but this is consequently subverted. The men in these texts don't really want to 
become their fathers and, indeed, the thought fiightens them; the burden is too heavy and 
the expectations too great. 
I his is Larry, newly married, with his wife Dorrie pregnant already, on an aeroplane at the 
start of their honeymoon. As Dorrie sleeps, Larry feels he ought to stay awake: 
He was a husband now, and his chattering, ft-etfiil Dorrie, no longer a girlfinend but 
a wife. [...] For her sake he would stay alert. He would keep guard over her, 
drawing himself as straight as possible in his seat without disturbing her sleeping 
body. He'd clamp his jaw firmly shut in a husband like way, patient, forbearing, 
and keep his eyes steady in the dark. He would do this in order to keep panic at a 
distance. A l l that was required of him was to outstare the image in the floating 
black glass of the window, that shorn, bewildered, ft-esh-faced stranger whose 
profile, for all its raw boyishness, reminded him alarmingly, o f - of who? 
His father that's who (Shields, 1997: 20-1). 
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Larry has taken on traditional masculine roles before he is sure of himself, what he wants, 
and who he is. Larry, like Harry, feels/fears that he is becoming like his father. These 
anxieties arise as the male characters begin to follow convention and try to attain the 
normality of suburban, nuclear family life. Harry feels that he is in a 1950's American 
sitcom whilst Larry newly married has impossibly stereotyped ideas about what 'husband' 
is - firm-jawed, patient and erect. Larry already feels panic as 'husband-ness' and a 
certain type of masculinity seem to be taking him over. This is a traditional role of 
masculinity that is personified to Larry (as to Harry), by his father and one which fills him 
with panic. However, in these contemporary texts it is suggested that in fact it is 
incumbent on men to reject this type of masculinity, that it is 'correct' to do so. Rejecting 
old style masculinity is seen as the 'moral' thing to do in nearly all current discourse 
around masculinity. 
3.3 Old Masculinity Versus New Masculinity 
In contemporary representations this type of old masculinity is dealt with in different ways 
and sometimes there is a suggestion of nostalgia for the 'certainties' of the past. Man and 
Boy is one text about new masculinity that indulges in this nostalgia but it is still with the 
sense that any type of old-style masculinity belongs in the past and is consigned to history. 
Here is Harry after his father tells him he can cope with looking after his son on his own: 
It was easy for him to say. His youth might have been marred by the efforts of the 
German army to murder him, but at least in his day a father's role was set in stone. 
He knew exactly what was expected of him. M y dad was a brilliant father and -
here's the killer - he didn't even have to be a brilliant father. Wait until your father 
gets home was enough to get me to behave. [...] 
You don't hear that threat so often these days [...]. Because these days some 
fathers never come home. And some fathers are home all the time (Parsons. 1999: 
95). 
Although spoken with irony there is still the sense that being a man, being a father, was 
easier 'in those days', your role was prescribed, expected and therefore easy to follow. 
Men were just expected to be 'men', and therefore you just got on with it and because it 
was 'natural' (biological) one did not have to do very much anyway. Breadwinning and 
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authoritarianism was almost all that was expected along with, of course, compulsory 
heterosexuality and certain types of 'manly' behaviour. At least a man knew what was 
expected of him. 
For men now it is suggested that things are much more difficult. In Intimacy Jay projects 
what he supposes his wife will think once he has left her, the family home and his two 
young sons: 
I am sure she will ask herself, i f she hasn't already, what are men for. Do they 
serve any useftil ftinction these days? They impregnate women. Later, they might 
occasionally send money over. What else could fathers be? It wasn't a question 
Dad had to ask himself Being a father wasn't a question then. He was there to 
impose himself, to guide, exert discipline and enjoy his children (Kureishi, 1998: 
115). 
We have already discussed the idea that men are redundant and here Jay suggests a reason 
why they might be. Men are no longer the sole breadwinners. They are no longer the 
source of discipline, no longer the unquestioned patriarchal head of the family. Therefore 
as Jay acknowledges this he laments what he sees as a loss of power, purpose and 
certainty. Neither Harry nor Jay want a return to the 'old' but neither is beyond regretting 
the power and benefit that they as 'new' men have supposedly given up. 
However this old type of masculinity is not a viable option for men anymore in a 
multicultural, (supposedly) non-sexist society with the service and technological industries 
of late capitalism and the globalized economy that comes with this. Thus with the rhetoric 
that places the new against the old, despite the nostalgia and a certain amount of respect, 
the consensus is that it shouldn V be a viable option for men anymore. At one point in 
Larry's Party Larry seems to be regretting divided and unequal gender roles when he 
remembers how Dorrie his first wife "had done all the laundry. They never discussed this 
arrangement; she just did it. [...] Those were simpler times, the late seventies. People fell 
more easily and with less rancour into traditional roles" (Shields, 1997: 234). However 
despite Larry's tone, the suggestion is that these roles belong firmly in the past when times 
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were 'simpler' and people more naive, accepting convention without question. The 
fragmented, postmodern worid is more complicated than this and in part it is this 
complication that is regretted. Whitehead and Barrett argue that: 
Many men sfill yearn to perform and validate their masculinity through 'conquering 
the universe', but the aggressive, dominant emotionally repressed behaviour that 
such yearnings engender are increasingly seen as (self) destructive, i f not derisible 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 6). 
There are still yearnings for the old certainties of the past and the power that both 
inequality and certainty brought. But not only is this morally wrong now it is entirely 
unacceptable and seen as damaging for men and those men who even attempt to practice 
this type of masculinity now are open to ridicule: 
New and ftiture generations of men, certainly those in post-modem, post-industrial 
societies, may well find that any adoption of traditional (dated) masculine postures 
is dismissed by women as sad and ridiculous (Whitehead, 2002: 57). 
There is a lick of fear in this statement. Old-style masculinity is dated and old fashioned 
and, i f a man attempts to express it, 'women' (as well as 'new' men) may well laugh at 
him. There is a 'rediscovery' of old-style masculinity as ridiculous even as this type of 
masculinity is denied and dismissed - who would want it now? 
In American Beauty, this type of 'sad' old-style-masculinity-as-ridiculous is pushed on to 
the character of Buddy Kane Real Estate King, the man that Lester's wife Carolyn has an 
affair with. Buddy exemplifies a certain expression of old-style masculinity with an ego as 
big as his salary, a 'trophy wife', and a need to assert himself 'as a man'. Buddy wants to 
be treated as God, Master, King and Father - all fonns of masculinity that are no longer 
viable or tenable within the new discourses on masculinity. Because of this Buddy is 
represented as flashy and shallow and the type of masculinity he exemplifies is shown to 
be as empty and superficial as he himself is. Buddy's expressions of masculinity and 
Carolyn's reactions to it are made into comedy, which exposes them both as ridiculous. 
Buddy's needs and desires 'as a man' are contrasted with Lester's far more secure 
masculinity which has no need to assert itself in this manner. Buddy's clothes and 
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behaviour are coded as old-fashioned (probably 1970's), sad, superficial and absurd. The 
representation of Buddy Kane Real Estate ICing caricatures this specific type of 
masculinity and takes it to the extreme, falling into what John Beynon names as "an 
ancestry of denigrating 'traditional' masculinity" whereby "the message rammed home is 
that men are generally lazy, slovenly and cannot be trusted. Fun was [1980's] poked at 
'manly' acts of physical endurance and men were shown to be not only emotionally 
inadequate and domestically cack-handed, but downright dim and useless at most things" 
(Beynon, 2002: 135). Expressions of old masculinity are denigrated and shown to be 
incompetent. Interestingly the first three characteristics Beynon cites; 'lazy, slovenly' and 
'untrustworthy' are three that are more usually cited in relation to black men than white 
(Hall, 1997a). And again, the marginalized other is substituted (displaced?) by the white 
man as he claims marginalization. 
Old masculinity is seen as being too exclusionary for our current social climate. As 
Michael Kimmel writes: "manhood is only possible for a distinct minority, and the 
definition has been constructed to prevent others [here Irish, African, Asian and Gay men] 
from achieving it" (Kimmel in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 281). Exclusion for anybody 
and exclusivity for white men are two things that are not espoused in the new rhetoric of 
marginalization (and therefore equalization) for all. Therefore, whatever the cost to respect 
for men who have chosen certain types of masculinity, whatever the cost to easily 
exercised power, old-style masculinity must be rejected. 
This is one reason why the character of Frank in Magnolia (1998) is so shocking. Frank 
has rebelled back into old-style masculinity. His run-for-men seminar entitled 'Seduce and 
Destroy' has the slogan 'Respect the Cock and Tame the Cunt' and, in the current climate 
this is black comedy because of its very unexpectedness. We are invited to laugh as Frank 
pumps his hips chanting, "we...are...Men!", whilst at the same time nausea is generated in 
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the viewer as a reaction to this extreme expression of old style masculinity. And because it 
is so extreme we are distanced from it: 'we* are not like this. Frank is portrayed as 
'rediscovering' the past of masculinity in the wrong way. Although conceptions and 
stereotypes of what old-style masculinity is do not vary very much, seeing that masculinity 
as something to be recovered in order to be used and lived, rather than ridiculed and 
rejected is not acceptable at the moment. Thus it is that Frank is represented as rebelling 
by espousing this form of mascuHnity. John Maclnnes in The Masculinities Reader takes 
the more 'conventionaP view: 
What were once proclaimed to be manly virtues (heroism, independence, courage, 
strength, rationality, will, backbone, virility) have become masculine vices (abuse, 
destructive aggression, coldness, emotional inarticulacy, detachment, isolation, an 
inability to be flexible) (Maclnnes in Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 313-4). 
Thus even as the stereotypes of old-style masculinity remain the same, 'strength, 
rationality, wi i r etc, men's attitudes to it are supposed to have changed. And so Frank is 
represented as an aberration and also as neurotic, pathological and, we discover finally, as 
damaged by his father who absented himself, leaving the young Frank to look after his 
dying mother. So in fact Frank's 'aberration' stems from a rejection by his father who re-
plays the old-style absence and thereby forces a young Frank into the feminized position of 
responsible carer, hence the over-compensation. 
In Fight Club too the rebellion is back to an older style of masculinity although with 
controlled violence and indeed elements of non-violence. However in each text. Fight 
Club and Magnolia, there is a sense of bucking the trend and the main trend is away from 
old-style, authoritarian, violent, sexist and homophobic masculinity. Homi Bhabha says 
that his critical interrogation of old-style masculinity 
Tunis its address from an innate invisibility, a nonnal condition, to a compulsive 
interrogation. 'Are you a man or a mouse?' I can still hear my attorney father 
repeatedly confronting me in Bombay, his barristerish bravura seeking a kind of 
exclusive, excluding, bonding. 'Do 1 have to choose?' I remember thinking, in 
anxious awkwardness, caught impossibly, ambivalently, in between 'two different 
creeds and two different outlooks on life' (Bhabha in Berger et al, 1995: 58). 
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As the normal becomes visible, for contemporary, pro-feminist men, it is no longer a 
question of being either 'a man or a mouse' - of being a 'real' man or an emasculated (and 
possibly homosexual) man. Bhabha refiases the question itself; refuses the 'exclusive and 
excluding' male bonding, which brings its own ties and ensures visible inequalities and 
exclusions. 
3.4 Homophobia 
As we saw above, the question of being 'a man or a mouse' involves conceptions of what a 
'real' man is and what he is not. This section examines one of the most prevalent ideas 
around at the moment: the 'inevitable' homophobia associated with older types of 
masculinity. Within masculinity studies texts in particular there is a direct equation made 
between traditional types of masculinity and homophobia. Indeed it is argued that this old-
style masculinity could not exist i f it were not homophobic, the 'threat' of homosexuality 
being more than it could bear. Whitehead and Barrett agree that, "hegemonic masculinity 
depends upon notions of compulsive heterosexuality and homophobia reinforced through 
idealized images of heroic men" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2000: 19). Anthony Easthope 
writes even more forcefully that "towards overt homosexuality the male myth has one 
response and one only: homophobia" (Easthope, 1986/1992: 108). In the rhetoric of what 
Easthope calls the 'male myth' and Whitehead and Barrett term 'hegemonic masculinity', 
straight, white masculinity can see a threat to its hegemonic, patriarchal power. In this 
discourse gender is neither relative nor fluid, it is and should be, natural: men should be 
men, and women should be women and homosexuals should not really exist at all. In this 
essentialist rhetoric (with which we are all familiar and which equates to the theories of 
'masculinism' discussed in the introduction), homosexuality is unnatural, and what are 
appealed to are the binaries of normal/abnomial, natural/ unnatural, 'real' men and 
effeminate men. These were the binaries that were used to 'prove' the heterosexuality that 
is said to have been imperative for this type of masculinity. 
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Homophobia has no place in the new discourse on masculinity because homophobia is so 
strongly associated with 'old' hegemonic forms of masculinity. As I am arguing, current 
forms of white masculinity are doing their damnedest not to be perceived as hegemonic, 
privileged or excluding. From this apparent rejection of homophobia we get the current 
representations of men who are homophobic, the most extreme being that of Colonel Fitts 
in American Beauty. Within the film old-style masculinity that is violent, macho and 
homophobic is embodied in the character of the Colonel who epitomizes some of the most 
extreme expressions of this type of masculinity: violent, macho and militaristic. From his 
ramrod posture to his crew-cut hair, the Colonel's entire appearance signifies the 
masculine, and every time the character is on screen there are signifiers of the type of 
controlling, violent and unstable masculinity that he represents. From making his son 
Ricky give him a urine sample every six months to check for drug use, to obsessively 
shining his already shiny car, to the state of Ricky's mother (which is indirectly attributed 
to the Colonel), to our view of his study with its dark wood, two US flags, and his 
extensive weapons collection which includes his Nazi plate, everything gives us clues to 
the type of man he is and the type of masculinity he ascribes to. 
Within the film it is the Colonel's violent homophobia that is concentrated on. When we 
first meet the Colonel the first words that he says, whilst reading the paper at the breakfast 
table are: "this countr>''s going straight to hell". The Colonel believes that the 'old order' 
is under threat and falling apart. For the Colonel one of the most significant factors in this 
'disintegration of the old order' is the fact that his gay neighbours, Jim and Jim, make no 
effort to hide their homosexuality. To the Colonel, homosexuality is something to be 
hidden, kept invisible and something to be ashamed o f Indeed any question of 
homosexuality is something to be so ashamed of that the Colonel kills Lester in negation of 
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his own (rejected) homosexual advance - he cannot cope with having had those feelings 
for Lester. 
In the film, the Colonel's masculinity, although more extreme in some ways than Buddy's, 
is not ridiculous because it is too dangerous. Ricky receives regular beatings from his 
father and af^er a particularly vicious attack the Colonel tells Ricky that the beating was for 
his own good: "you have no respect for other people's things, for authority ... You can't 
just go around doing whatever you feel like; you can't - there are rules in life ... You need 
structure, you need discipline". There are rigid 'rules' that the Colonel himself lives by, 
they are an expression of his extreme form of masculinity and he wants Ricky to follow in 
his footsteps. The Colonel is hemmed in by rules and expectations, stmcture and 
discipline, his entire view of himself and who he is being predicated on the forni of 
masculinity that these ideas construct. And he believes that Ricky, as a male, needs these 
structures too. The Colonel really is doing what he believes is best but he is unable to 
express any emotion other than anger, violence, and a well-hidden fear. Throughout the 
film, in accordance with this form of masculinity the Colonel is unable to express love and 
remains inarticulate. 
The Colonel's downfall begins when he believes that he has seen Ricky give Lester a 
blow-job. As the Colonel beats Ricky shouting: "1 would rather you were dead than be a 
flicking faggot!" Ricky realizes what he has to do and tells the Colonel that he "sucks dick 
for money". Ricky gets up off the floor and advances on the Colonel, (who backs away), 
saying "you should see me fuck". As Ricky tells him he's a sad old man, the Colonel's 
fists grow soft and he starts shaking. As Ricky leaves, the Colonel is broken, holding out 
his arms now as if to embrace his son. The Colonel has been defeated by his own violence, 
homophobia and fear of non-normal masculinity. The Colonel's type of masculinity is 
shown to have too many fears, disgusts and barriers to be sustainable. In fact the Colonel 
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is easily beaten and rendered impotent by Ricky not being afraid of alternative sexualities 
and by being able to assume the language of homosexuality. Ricky wins by not reacting 
with violence but with words and by confronting the Colonel with his own worst fears 
head on. If old-style masculinity is placed in opposition to new-style and is represented as 
brittle and easily broken, then new-style is flexible, and not afraid of its own sexuality or 
the possibility of homosexuality. Whitehead and Barrett write that i f masculinity is to have 
a crisis "there would have to be a single masculinity; something solid, fixed, immovable, 
brittle even" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 8). It is this 'solid, fixed' and immovable 
masculinity that the Colonel believes in and lives by and this makes his masculinity 
'brittle' and therefore easily broken. 
Inevitably within this discourse the Colonel's violent homophobia masks a deeply 
repressed homosexuality which manifests itself in the next scene when the Colonel tries to 
kiss Lester. In this scene, Lester is working out half naked as the broken Colonel comes 
across the road in the pouring rain to stand at the garage window. When Lester lets in the 
Colonel, in concem and with compassion, he tells the Colonel that Carolyn is probably off 
somewhere sleeping with someone else. When the Colonel asks i f Lester minds, Lester 
laughs and says: "our marriage is just for show. A commercial for how nonnal we are 
when we're anything but". Lester, like Ricky, is able to and not afraid to express 
abnonnality. The Colonel cannot accept his own inadvertent and uncontrolled homosexual 
action (trying to kiss Lester) and is so disgusted and overwhelmed by it that he has to 
murder what he desires. The Colonel is rigid and therefore weak. Lester is flexible within 
his masculinity and able to express vulnerability, which paradoxically, within the new 
discourse of masculinity signifies strength. 
It is the Colonel's fonn of masculinity that is represented as being the most unstable, and 
also the most visible. As John Beynon writes: "traditional masculinity is seen to be based 
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on a very fragile foundation" (Beynon, 2002: 15, my emphases). Men now are able to see 
old-style masculinity, and it does not look safe, it looks brittle and fragile. The discourse 
of new-style masculinity has a vastly different attitude to diversity, difference and 
particulariy homosexuality to the discourse of 'traditional' masculinity. What are now 
portrayed as the more stable fonns of masculinity do not (need to) claim certainty, unity, 
universality or normality. And they certainly do not need to claim or proclaim 
heterosexuality. What is being played on is the contemporary 'commonsense' 'truth' that 
homophobia inevitably indicates repressed homosexuality. Therefore, within the new 
rhetoric of heterosexual masculinity, the homosexual (for other people) has to be embraced 
or at least accepted so as not to cast doubt on one's own sexuality. Thus Ricky is able to 
tell his father that he sucks dick for money and Lester is able to completely accept the 
gayness of Jim and Jim without censure and to accept the Colonel's 'mistake' without 
disgust. 
In Larry's Parly, the same point is made (characteristically in a more gentle manner) in a 
short passage that sees Larry sitting on his porch drinking beer with his friend Larry Fine. 
The entire passage only covers two paragraphs but it says something important about Larry 
Weller and his new-style, non-homophobic masculinity. Larry Fine is the only 
homosexual in Larry's Party and is the only other man called Larry that Larry Weller 
likes, and who 'saves' the unlovely name of Larry for him: 
Thank God for Larry Fine [...]. Larry Fine is a psychologist, or a behaviourist as 
he's quick to tell you, who teaches at the University of Chicago. This Larry has 
thick, thick wrists covered in mats of hair, but he's a good mile and a half from 
being a traditional hetero type. He bakes, he wears aprons, he sews his own 
curtains. Last Christmas he made Larry Weller a shirt out of green linen. He 
names everything he owns. His kitchen stove is called Eleanor. His car is 
Jacqueline. His computer is called Gertrude, daughter of a previous Gertrude. 
Larry Fine is probably a little in love with Larry Weller. They both know this, but 
it doesn't stop them enjoying a beer together on Larry Weller's screened porch 
(Shields, 1997: 256). 
Interestingly in these 'new' representations (just as in the 'old'), gay men must be seen to 
be gay (otherwise how would one know?). Thus Larry Fine's thick, hairy wrists are, here, 
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said not to be a signifier of heterosexuality (whoever thought they were?) because, luckily 
there are other visible indicadons of his sexuality, like his apron. Thus whether it's Jim 
and Jim in American Beauty, with a small yappy dog they fiiss over, who garden, grow 
flowers and bake, or Larry Fine in Larry's Party, who wears aprons, sews and names all 
his belongings with female names, or Billy's best friend in the film Billy Elliot (2000) who 
is shown to be gay through actual cross-dressing, the stereotypes of gay men still stand and 
the usual signifiers of gayness are used but not questioned. The men who exemplify new-
style heterosexual masculinity are able to read, or recognize who is gay and who is not, in 
a way that old-style masculinity finds more difficult (for example the Colonel). Thus, far 
from homosexuality being an invisible threat it becomes an easily read, almost 'natural' 
state of being for some men. This easily read, recognizable (and perhaps natural) 
homosexuality poses no threat to those secure in their heterosexuality. And so it is that 
new-style straight men are not intimidated by gay men, they are tolerant and accepting. 
in The Best A Man Can Get our protagonist Michael misses the fact that his housemate in 
his bachelor house, Paul, is gay until Paul 'comes out' and declares his love for Michael 
saying that he believes that Michael is gay too. Michael thinks: 
Paul's confident assertion about my apparent homosexuality had rather eclipsed the 
bigger picture, which was that he had just told me the biggest secret of his life, 
namely, not only was he gay, but that he had a crush on me. It suddenly all made 
sense - all the times he had hoped I would be there for meals he'd cooked, all the 
bizarre sulks he had got himself into. He had behaved like a jilted giriftnend 
(O'Fan-ell, 2000: 217). 
Although Michael may have missed Paul's homosexuality the 'clues' were there to be 
picked up on. Earlier in the book Michael took a look at himself and his housemates and 
found that 'we had inadvertently tumed ourselves into mum, dad and two kids" (O'Farrell, 
2000: 99), where "Paul was the martyred, long-suffering mum, fussing and worrying for 
everyone else" (ibid). Thus even before Michael realized Paul was gay he had been 
feminized, and therefore it was not too much of a shock. Michael, married with two 
children, is secure enough in his heterosexuality that when 'outed' at a party thinks: "1 
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probably wouldn't see any of these people again, so if they were determined to believe I 
was homosexual, then so what?" (O'Farrell, 2000: 219). And Larry too is secure enough 
in his heterosexuality and masculinity to be able to accept the friendship of Larry Fine and 
of course, as with Michael and Bil ly in Billy Elliot, he is the object of his gay friend's 
desire just as Lester too is the object of the Colonel's more troubled desire. Homosexuality 
in the new representations is easily accepted (for others), but in American Beauty, Larry's 
Party, Billy Elliot and The Best a Man Can Get in their different ways, it is used to prove 
and confirm the complete, untroubled heterosexuality of Lester, Larry, the ballet-dancing 
Billy and Michael respectively; their maleness and masculinity helped by their tolerance 
and acceptance. 
3.5 The Demise of Old-St>'le Masculinity 
In many of the new representations, including the ones discussed above, old-style 
masculinity is portrayed as becoming the minority form of masculinity. As Stephen 
Whitehead argues, "[wjhat is for sure is that notions of masculinity are increasingly 
multiple, rendering traditional forms of being male, i f not redundant, certainly marginal" 
(Whitehead, 2002: 6). It is this older type of masculinity that is being broken down and 
represented as being disempowered. It is interesting to note though that the descriptions of 
old-style masculinity often conform to the stereotypes of working class masculinity and 
black masculinity, fonns of the masculine that are often associated with machismo, sexism 
and homophobia. John Beynon discusses working class models of the hyper or extra 
masculine as compensating for powerlessness at work and within the economy in general 
(Beynon, 2002: 20). He argues (as do many others) that, "[t]he shift from manufacturing to 
servicing, and from industrialization to electronic technology, was immensely damaging 
for working class men" (Beynon, 2002: 107). And perhaps as the economy changes a new, 
flexible style of masculinity is more suited to the new order and a rejection of poweriess, 
rigid, old masculinity is needed. If so this could lead to the assertion of the "end of 
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masculinity" (Maclnnes in Whitehead, 2002). And i f masculinity has ended (and therefore 
one would assume, by implication that so has patriarchy), then what more does one need to 
do? The view given is that this older style of masculinity is vanishing and belongs to the 
past and to a class structure that itself is said be redundant now we have our 'classless 
society'. 
The fact that old-style masculinity belongs to the past is the same view that is held by those 
who are visible and vociferous in their wish for the (re)establishment of traditional 
masculinity and the patriarchal order. Beynon discusses this phenomenon in relation to the 
right-wing print press who, he says "lament [...] the demise of the 'old man'" (Beynon, 
2002: 127). He says that "[a]t its most extreme (certainly in the hands o f those who wish 
to re-establish patriarchal hegemony) this takes the form of asserting that 'real masculinity' 
belongs in the past" (Beynon, 2002; 127). Beynon argues that those who are for the 
patriarchal hegemony believe that 'real masculinity' has been consigned to history. 
However Beynon himself and all pro-feminist masculinity studies also assert that 'real 
masculinity' belongs in the past and in doing so both (opposed) views by implication, 
assert that a singular 'old' masculinity did exist. In Beynon's own account by saying that 
some men "wish to re-establish patriarchal hegemony'' he implies that the patriarchal 
hegemony is no more: that it is something to be re-established, (or not). Thus the 
implication must be that patriarchal hegemony has been consigned to history having been 
t//>established already. 
John Beynon writes that: 
Men have no clearly defined enemy who they can point to with certainty as 
oppressing them. Thus the male model of confrontation, appropriated so 
successfully by women, is, ironically, now unsuitable for men (Beynon, 2002: 142). 
Beynon however has missed the 'new' enemies: old-style masculinity and the nuclear 
family as its co-conspirator. These ideals are indeed being 'confronted' by those 
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expressing masculinity's 'newer' forms and those wishing for a more 'tolerant' society. In 
relation to masculinity we have another binary, that of 'good' new masculinity, tolerant, 
pluralizing, flexible and relative, versus 'bad' old-style masculinity, which exudes 
instability, intolerance and fear. Men who adhere to old-style masculinity are also 
represented and discussed as oppressing men who do not conform (Whitehead and Barrett, 
2001). Old-style masculinity is being demonized, and straight white 'new' masculinity, 
whilst still holding onto both heterosexuality and masculinity, is in the process of 
distancing itself from the extremities of the old male myth. And this type of masculinity is 
much more adept at 'justifying' white, middle class male's continuing hold on power, by 
denying normality, certainty, centrality and universality, and by asserting that the 
patriarchal hegemony has already disintegrated. 
By constructing a singular history that enables the exposure and demonizing old-style 
masculinity, men, reinvented in the new-style, are able to (claim to) pluralize and fragment 
masculinity/ies and place themselves on the moral high ground, distanced from 'immoral' 
old masculinity. This is an individualizing strategy which is enabled by homogenizing 
'old' masculinity and presenting it as singular and rigid. This aids the claims of the 
discourse of the ab/normal that suggests that there are only individuals with power, and not 
a coherent, identifiable group in society with an unfair and unequal hold on power, 
privilege and benefit because of race, sexuality, age, class or gender. This is enabled at 
least in part by the re-creation of a (bad) collective identity for those exhibiting old-style 
masculinity. Any questioning of new, plural masculinities can thus be read as an 
(immoral) attempt to redefine all men within the old male myth of the patriarchal order that 
these masculinities are supposedly in the process of breaking down, and that it is said, is 
being systematically undone by men themselves. New-style (pluralized, relative and 
individualized) masculinity cannot exist without a conception of the old-style (unified and 
'natural') masculinity, just as the 'new' pluralized forms of the family cannot exist without 
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a conception of the old-style singular nuclear version. Thus we are trapped in re-created 
hierarchical binaries that place the new above the old, the mulfiple above the singular and 
that seem to preclude ftirther discussion whilst leaving everything in place. 
However, even as so many fictional, masculinity and family studies texts deny the Utopian 
ideal of the normal there is a feeling that this re-reading the 'normal' as not normal and not 
desirable is 'going against the grain'; that normality as an ideal is still the dominant belief 
in society and that current views are 'revolutionary' and 'new'. In continuing to accept 
that a singular, white, middle class nonnal is still predominantly seen as an ideal in our 
society, the new representations, masculinity and family studies deny that they are 
anything other than oppositional to the hegemonic order. It is not conceived that the 
condemnation, demonization and purposefiji fragmentation of white masculinity and the 
nuclear family might in fact form the dominant discourse at this time. Because this 
possibility is not acknowledged any representation or discussion that questions the normal-
as-ideal is seen as a threat to the exclusive and exclusionary normal and thus seen as 
radical. Mark Lawson says that Pleasantville "suggests the past was actually worse". 
Lavvson seemed surprised (and delighted) by this. Although in the same programme, {The 
Late Review, BBC2 11.03.99), Tony Parsons can, as we saw eariier, cite Pleasantville as 
'hell surrounded by a white picket fence', the implication is that this sort of TV-land and 
this vision of suburbia would usually be presented 'as a paradise'. 
Thomas Elsaesser complicates this view by suggesting that the ideal normal was not 
usually presented as a paradise even at the time, arguing that in 1950s melodrama the 
characters end up "living out the impossible contradictions that have tumed the American 
Dream into the proverbial nightmare" (Elsaesser, 1987: 68). However, within the rules of 
the current discursive fonnation Elsaesser's own re-reading of the past is part of the current 
archive and therefore a part of the project that shows that the 'utopia' was a dystopia all 
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along. In the self-representation of the archive the 'new' re-reading of white middle class 
history by the white middle classes is expressly subversive and radical, uncovering aspects 
of history that no-one has ever seen before. The 'questioning' of normality is seen as 
radical even as that normal is re-invoked and (re)discussed as the normal (even in the form 
of a non-existent Utopia) in order to be rejected. This in turn upholds the argument that 
'disproving' the normal is in and of itself a subversive act that shatters the myth of 
nonnality. As we have seen this 'disproving' of the nonnal on its own is said to be already 
leading to radical social change and equality for all. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined, as one of the most powerful moves of 'disproving' the normal, 
the 're-discovery' of the history of the normal. This 're-discovery' is another technique of 
marginal theorists has been appropriated, the technique that David Theo Goldberg, (in 
relation to Fanon's work), terms archeology: "[a]rcheology turns on not only uncovering 
the hidden and (purposely) buried, and so not only on making the unseen seen, cognized, 
and re-cognized; it requires also the extending logic of form to the uncovered, a different 
way of thinking about - quite literally, of seeing" (Gordon et al, 1996: 186). In this way 
the manner in which the history of the 'normal' is seen is being systematically and 
deliberately changed. In the academy, white male scholars such as Peter Filene are 
explicitly looking towards marginal theory. Filene examines the 're-discovery' of 
women's histories by feminist scholars as particular (ie non-universal) histories and he 
then appropriates these techniques: 
Men's history - masculine history, i f you will - begins when we redefine our usual 
notion of historical significance and when we shift our usual frame of reference. 
Once we have made these two conceptual adjustments, we uncover some secrets 
hidden in the familiar landscape of the past. More often - and ultimately more 
important - as we shift our angle of vision, we recognize new meanings in the 
evidence that lay in front of our eyes all along (Filene in Brod, 1987: 104). 
Hidden secrets are to be uncovered in the new project, and we will see new things. White 
men will uncover the hidden, secret histories of white men and of the family. 
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Over the past few decades with the rise of feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism 
the concept of 'history' itself has been thoroughly questioned and the Western notion of 
history (singular) has been critiqued and shown to be only one, partial (albeit dominant) 
history and one that is itself reliant on other histories, is fluid, contingent and relative 
(Featherstone, 1995). History itself is a grand narrafive of the West whereby, as 
Featherstone puts it, "Western history was universal history" (Featherstone, 1995: 15). 
This idea that Western history is the only history has been deconstructed and shown to be 
'history' from only one point of view, bigoted, racist and sexist. Featherstone argues that it 
is postmodemism in particular that has led "to a greater awareness of the plurality of 
history, the suppressed narratives within history suggest that there is no unitary privileged 
history, only different histor/e^" (Featherstone, 1995: 16). Thus, where in Britain we may 
have been taught 'history' at school or read 'history' at university, what we have been 
taught is biased, partial and therefore 'untrue' in its self-representafion as 'true'. 
However, in many discussions from feminism and postcolonialism it is not only the 
'untruth' of Western history that is seen as important (although it is), what is often seen as 
more insidious is the effect that the Western view of history has had on indigenous peoples 
around the worid. The universalization of Western history and the suppression of the 
histories of other peoples 'jusfified' colonialism, slavery and the oppression of women and 
people of colour. It encouraged social Darwinism, eugenics and the view of biology-as-
destiny. In the new discussions of Westem history the very creation of the idea of the 
nonnal suppressed, repressed and damaged people not classified within this singular 
concept of the nonnal. 
For the re-positioning of the nonnal within discourse a re-view of the history of the nonnal 
is vital. The narrative of history is so important that as Ashcroft et al put it: "historical 
narrativity is that which structures the forms of reality itself In other words, the myth of 
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historical objectivity is embedded in a particular view of the sequential nature of narrative, 
and its capacity to reflect, isomorphically, the pattern of events it records" (Ashcroft et al, 
1995: 356). The way the stories of history are sequenced, constructed and told underpin 
everything, even Ashcroft et al argue, our notion of reality. Universalized, eurocentric, 
Westem history(ies) has been so widely critiqued as hiding partial, interested histories and 
negating the histories of others that any project that claims to be examining the white 
centre with the aim of dispelling and displacing it cannot afford to leave these critiques 
unanswered. For any group of people a new concept of their own history is an important 
part of the re-making of identity and a re-reading of their own history forms a large part of 
the re-making and re-positioning of white middle class identities as being away from the 
normal. 
The 'new' forms of masculinity and the family are posited on and conceived within a 
certain conception of history. In this conception the normal, in the form of white 
hegemonic masculinity and the patriarchal family-fonn-of-choice, the white nuclear 
family, are seen as having been singular and unitary in form, universal, silent and largely 
invisible, fixed, rigid and repressive (and therefore, in the 1950s at least, in crisis). The 
process of de-centring this centre and reconfiguring it as an absence and a myth itself relies 
on a conception of the normal as singular or there would be nothing to de-centre and an 
apparent break from the past would not be possible. The current project which explicitly 
seeks to fragment, pluralize, multiply and marginalize white masculinity and the nuclear 
family also involves a 'rediscovery' of the ideological concepts associated with an idea of 
normality as 'bad', restrictive, repressive and dainaging. Discussing the 'rediscovery' of 
history for the black diaspora, Stuart Hall says: 
We should not, for one moment, under-estimate or neglect the importance of the act 
of imaginative re-discovery [...]. 'Hidden histories' have played a critical role in 
the emergence of many of the most important social movements of our time -
feminist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist (Hall, 1997b: 52). 
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Hall's discussion of the imaginative act of recovering 'hidden histories' is taken from a 
marginal perspecfive, one that differs from masculinity and family studies. However it is a 
model that is extremely usefijl in exploring how these studies are recreating the 'new' 
conception of their own history that is apparently being 'rediscovered' by the white middle 
classes at the moment. The discursive movement that the new studies and new 
representations are a part of, involves the imaginative re-discovery of normality as past, as 
belonging to history. This allows the 'uncovering of the truth' that the concept of 
nomiality was as repressive and damaging to the white middle classes as to everyone else. 
Again the techniques of the marginal - feminists or postcolonialists - are employed in this 
'rediscovery' and where these theorists found repression and oppression, so too do the 
theorists of the white middle classes. 
Control over history and historical representadon is always crucial to the maintenance of 
power by any one group. As an important part of the project engaged in re-moving the 
normal from the centre of society, the white, middle classes are engaged in re-writing their 
own history and the history of the normal itself. In this re-creation, re-wTite or re-view, the 
white middle classes are themselves the victims of repressive normalizations. In feminist 
and postcolonial re-views of history minority groups' voices have been suppressed, as have 
their stories and different versions of history. In these accounts the white, European, male 
domination of history and its definitions of normality has been a major cause of oppression 
for marginalized peoples. In the new re-views of history by masculinity studies, family 
studies and some new representations, the emphasis is on how the white middle classes too 
have been oppressed by the repressive, restricting and impossible expectations put upon 
them by institutions such as the Church and the educational system, the very institutions 
that are more usually associated with helping to consolidate white, male, middle class 
power. 
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O f all the aspects of the new discourse that denies, subverts and erases normality, the re-
writing of the past is perhaps one o f the most powerful. It provides the justification behind 
the rejection and denial o f the normal without having to get too seriously into ideas about 
who is most oppressed and who benefits most from the conceptions and structures o f 
normality. The white, middle classes are represented as having also been repressed and 
oppressed by a singular conception of normality and therefore that singular conception can 
be presented as immoral and used as justification for moving the centre out into the 
margins in a 'new' and 'revolutionary' action. As the white middle classes seek to re-
imagine themselves and their past, new identities are being forged from a specific 
conception of the old. Stuart Hall discusses this act o f imagination: 
Cultural identity [...] is a matter o f ' becoming ' as well as o f ' b e i n g ' . It belongs to 
the ftiture as much as to the past. It is not something that already exists, 
transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from 
somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo 
constant transfonnation. Far from being fixed in some essentialized past, they are 
subject to the continuous 'play' o f history, culture and power. Far from being 
grounded in a mere 'recovery' o f the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, 
when found, w i l l secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the 
names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves 
within, the narratives of the past (Hall , 1997b: 52). 
Hall argues that one is not 'just' one's cultural identity but that one constantly becomes 
that identity. Hall believes that any 'rediscovery' o f one's past involves a desire-to-
become that is firmly implicated in the present and the fijture as well and is not 
disassociated from the matrices o f power or the hegemonic social order. Therefore from 
Hall 's point o f view the past is not sitting in pure and unsullied 'truth' waiting to be 
unearthed, rather concepts o f the 'past' fonn a vital part o f our current identity formation. 
The past that the academic white middle classes are 'rediscovering' for themselves firstly 
disassociates them from the nomial and secondly it repositions that very conception of the 
normal as 'wrong' , immoral and singular. This enables them to rediscover a static past that 
wi l l allow contemporary discontinuity and rupture from something sol id; an idea o f "being 
fixed in some essentialized past". This in turn allows a new 'becoming' in the form of 
identities that are multiple, fluid and flexible. The 'narratives o f the past' that are being 
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rediscovered in this context engender an abjection and rejection o f the normal and 
precipitate a movement into the margins and the pluralized abnormal that the new 
hegemonic rhetoric promotes for the white middle classes and that the next chapter 
examines. It looks at the present for white men and the family that the re-reading o f the 
' o ld ' and the 'past' for these groups that this chapter has documented allows. Chapter four 
examines the multiplicity, f luidity and return of aspiration that the repositioning o f the past 
as static and singular enables. 
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Chapter Four: Multiplicity, Inclusion, Choice and Meritocracy 
As stated at the end o f chapter three, having argued that the new discourse o f normality has 
as a necessary part o f its creation (recreated) singular conceptions o f history, o f 
masculinity, o f the family, and o f normality, this chapter looks at the expressions o f 
multiplicity, inclusion and choice that are enabled by these views. This concluding chapter 
looks at the prescriptions being given out for behaviour, attitude and lifestyle choices and 
the spaces left for aspiration as espoused by both the new studies texts and by the media. 
So far this thesis has examined the rhetoric o f anti-aspiration about, and coming from, the 
centre. However the hegemonic movement which moves the centre out into the margins 
leaves space within this for aspirations that are very similar to the aspirations people were 
always supposed to harbour: (heterosexual) partnership, children, affluence, consumption, 
albeit wrapped in different rhetoric. This is the rhetoric of choice not imperative, o f 
performance rather than biological determinism; a choice which is presented as entailing 
no unfair privileges and which supposedly sidesteps racism, sexism and inequality. These 
ideas are wrapped up in the rhetoric o f a multiplicity that suggests that everyone can (and 
should) jo in in. 
This chapter looks at the moral suggestions behind the idea o f multiplicity. It examines the 
new morality o f anti-essentialism that allows the concept o f multiplicity itself to be fonned 
and from this, the inevitable denial of any sort o f biological detenninism. This chapter 
argues that one o f the most important aspects o f the new marginalization o f masculinity is 
the denial o f biological determinism. It argues that one of the mainstays of both these 
interrelated movements is the removal o f any idea o f the personal male penis from the 
transcendental patriarchal signifier of the phallus. In order to examine the archive o f this 
new idea three primary texts are examined; Larry's Party by Carol Shields (1997), the 
2002 B B C television comedy Manchiid and the Brit ish f i lm The Full Monty (1997). These 
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texts have been chosen as they explicitly 'deal ' with the personal penises o f their 
protagonists, showing they are anything but the perfect phallus. In the continuing 
discussion of the denial o f biological determinism either as a ' fact ' or an ideal I w i l l 
examine the very popular book by Nick Hornby About A Boy (1998), which itself 
examines the concept o f the new (non-biological) family. From masculinity studies, 
family studies and About A Boy particularly the concept o f (complete) multiplicity free 
from biology leads to the idea of inclusion-for-all, which in turn leads to the idea o f 
choice-for-all. This chapter argues that this sets up a meritocratic ideal whereby anybody 
can do or even be anything, and that it is this conception of free choice (and therefore free 
will) that allows aspiration to come back into the picture. I look at what we are being 
invited to aspire to and what spaces/posifions we are not being invited to aspire to. In this 
model, with normality theoretically having been removed to the margins, normality 
becomes just one more marginal position among many, and therefore one position among 
many that we may (again) aspire to. N o w however, with the removal o f any biological 
limits we may all aspire to a position that (still) looks very like the normal without the fear 
of excluding anyone. With the normal being presented as just one position among many it 
is still however being represented as being a more moral position to occupy than most. If 
choice is completely free then we can all choose the normal. A n d within capitalist, 
patriarchal society what fits more comfortably into society's needs than the consuming 
nuclear family? The ' o ld ' immoral, regulating imperative o f normality has seemingly been 
turned into a more morally acceptable and open 'choice' that denies the existence o f both 
privilege and exclusion. 
4.1 Exposing the Power of the Phallus 
Whereas chapter three concentrated on the construction and representation of a (rejected) 
monolithic singular normal, this chapter examines the concept o f multiplicity that this 
conception of the singular enables. We begin with a subject that manifestly covers the 
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move from the universalized, essentialized singular to the particularized, anti-essentialized, 
personalized plural - the move from phallus as signifier to penis. The epitome of 
biologically determined singular, monolithic, transcendental masculine is the phallus. This 
first part o f the chapter examines the project to (re)embody white men which involves the 
move from the 'historic' patriarchal idea/ideal o f the singular, transcendental phallus to 
multiple, particular, embodied personal penises. At this stage I am going to make my only 
foray into what is more properly the provenance o f psychoanalysis through a discussion o f 
the phallus. This foray is necessary for a discussion about the re-embodiment of white 
men and about the removal o f white men from the traditional (phallic) place o f power 
'disguised' as the normal. I examine the movement o f contemporary white men away f rom 
the idea of the patriarchal, phallus-bearing, symbolic Father (Silverman, 1992: 102) into 
'actual', imperfect fatherhood that is (said to be) marginalized in today's society and in the 
family. As we saw above in the examination o f the idea of 'cr isis ' o f modem fatherhood, 
the rejection o f 'bad old dads' and the move from a singular concept of o ld masculinity 
allows multiple new expressions o f masculinities. 
The phallus is a concept that is no longer looked at just in relation to its psychoanalytic 
roots. It is now discussed in wider social and cultural discourse, and is related to as the 
symbol o f p a t r i a r c h y . A s Lynne Segal says: "it is within the journals and texts o f 
cultural studies, rather than those o f psychology, that the 'phallus' has been most tirelessly 
tracked down as the ubiquitous symbolic representation of the penis, and hence o f male 
power" (Segal, 1990/1997: 83). I am not going to trace the 'roots' o f the phallus through 
psychoanalysis, but rather wi l l examine the way that the 'or iginal ' concept has been taken 
up by both cultural studies and cultural production more widely in relation to the penis and 
contemporary talk about and representation o f white men's penises. This section wi l l 
Deriving its name from the 'phallus', the concept ot 'phallouoccntrism" describes 'the totalizing claims of 
a masculinist signifying economy" (Butler. 1990: 13), apparent in what 1 have described as its 
"overwhelming presence" (see chapter one). The 'phallus' is the signifying concept that is used and said to 
encompass the ideals, ideologies and techniques of patriarchy: "power, authority and control over desire" 
(Potts, 2000: 86), and is thus also related to the white, hegemonic ideal of masculinity. 
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discuss the move away from the "phallicized penis" (Potts, 2000: 87), and into the 
theorized and represented embodiment, marginalization and de-phallicization of individual 
white men in order to discuss some o f the effects and implications o f this movement. 
Within phallogocentric or patriarchal discourse the (erect) penis is directly equated with 
the (symbolic) phallus, whereby "the penis stands in for and up for the man" (Potts, 2000: 
85). The actual, embodied man is therefore said to be distanced both f rom his penis and 
the phallus, and thereby disembodied within the phallic symbolic economy: 
The penis is distanced from its purely anatomical frinctions o f urination and 
insemination and comes to stand as an object. [...] This displacement permits the 
penis to represent the phallus at a symbolic level and vice versa; thus the penis 
takes up a privileged, central position in the sexual economy (Potts, 2000: 86). 
Potts argues that the penis is symbolically equated with the phallus whilst being separated 
from the male body as an actual piece o f flesh. It has moved from the embodied and out 
into the symbolic, but it is still inextricably associated with the male. Richard Dyer speaks 
about the phallus at ' length': 
There is a danger o f causal thought here. The phallus is not just an arbitrarily 
chosen symbol o f male power; it is crucial that the penis has provided the model for 
this symbol. Because only men have penises, phallic symbols [...] are always 
symbols o f ultimately male power (Dyer, 1997: 274). 
Phallic power and the phallus itself are related to both the penis and to the man and it is 
because o f this that the phallus has become the symbol o f the patriarchal order of power. 
In order to sustain the equation between penis (flesh) and phallus (symbol), the 
corporeality o f the white male must be hidden. The corporeality o f the individual 
penis/man needs to be obscured in order to allow male power to accrue around the symbol 
of the phallus. The origin o f the phallus as a symbol needs to be hidden and in this way so 
must the penis. The phallus sustains its power as a symbol by remaining hidden. A s 
Anthony Easthope puts it: "[t]he phallus must remain unseen i f it is to keep its power" 
(Easthope, 1986/1992: 16). The 've i l ing ' o f the phallus is thus seen as a vital part o f the 
hegemonic patriarchal order's continuing power and dominance. The logic that follows on 
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from this reads that i f the embodied, individual, male penis can be seen, its association 
with the phallus can also be seen and in the true style o f the making-visible project, its 
mystique wi l l be shattered and the attendant power accruing to both penis and phallus (and 
therefore male) can be dissipated. Annie Potts quotes Segal who writes: "the equation 
between penis and phallus is in fact always sustained [...] once we accept that the desire 
for the phallus is dependent upon, at the very least an analogy with its penile referent, it 
becomes possible to 'lift the veil' from the phallus (which Lacan has told us can only serve 
its fijnction 'veiled') and thereby, perhaps, to begin to challenge its authority and privilege 
as a transcendental signifier" (Potts, 2000: 88-9, my emphasis). In other words, expose the 
penis expose the phallus; demystify it, and its power w i l l cease. 
Dispelling the silence that is said to accrue around the penis also, it is argued, has the same 
effect: 
While frank discussion of male sexuality, the male body and the penis might be 
meant to liberate men from disabling myths, such discussion also works to make 
visible male bodies and sexuality and, thus, to exacerbate the very crisis these texts 
want to soothe. The heterosexualized male body has been veiled by constructions 
of phallic masculinity that are endangered by the increased vis ibi l i ty o f that body; 
for, while sexual power has long been central to these constructions, that power has 
often approached the mythic. This has kept the specific, embodied sexual 
experiences of men invisible, and hidden the penis behind the phallus. Talk about 
the penis can work to demystify the phallus (Robinson, 2000: 158). 
Robinson is arguing that discussion about the penis can destabilize the phallic economy 
and 'liberation' for men from 'disabling myths' involves a (dangerous) visibi l i ty and 
embodiment for white men. Vis ib i l i ty endangers the 'constructions of phallic masculinity' 
as does acknowledgement o f the 'specific, embodied' experiences o f men. Therefore, the 
argument follows that i f ' w e ' can re-embody men and re-embody the personal, individual 
penises that belong to those men, we can move closer to the dispelling o f the phallus as a 
symbol o f patriarchal power and thus move closer (so the argument goes) to dispelling 
patriarchal power itself Insisting on the correlation between the disembodied and the 
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personal male body w i l l , it is argued, inevitably embody and make visible what was 
disembodied and invisible and exjx)se the entire phallic myth as a sham. 
The transformative potential o f insisting on the correlation between the disembodied and 
the embodied is a point that is reiterated by many theorists o f masculinity: 
As a number o f feminist theorists and analysts o f masculinity have pointed out, the 
assumption that the penis is (or even represents) the phallus is shattered by the 
recognition of the penis as a corporeal and thus vulnerable organ. What this means 
is that consciousness of corporeality threatens phallic power. [...] Male power is 
dependent on stalling the recognition of male embodiment, and particularly, white 
male embodiment (Robinson, 2000: 43). 
The assumption that the penis can unquestioningly be equated with the phallus is 
'shattered' when we see the penis as flesh. In a somewhat large theoretical leap, what 
Robinson argues is that embodiment (corporeality), because it 'endangers' phallic power 
can, ultimately, spell liberation from the phallus as a symbol and as power. Once the penis 
is exposed as flesh and blood, small(ish), not really so impressive, multiple, particular and 
individual, the power o f the phallus disintegrates even as the male is embodied. 
Robinson also says that this liberation can occur once the individual penis is seen as 
vulnerable. Annie Potts agrees with this analysis: 
Insisting on the correlation between the penis and the phallus offers some hope for 
transforming hegemonic constructions o f male (and female) sexuality. Once the 
phallus is unclothed and exposed to be a confederate o f the penis-body, it w i l l 
become evident 'just how inadequately it serves to signify that male organ, and 
men's personal histories o f bodily experience' (Potts, 2000: 89, my emphasis). 
Embodying the phallus within the penis w i l l 'expose' it as an inadequate representative o f 
men's personal experiences. I f ' w e ' can individualize and personalize the penis, the 
phallus as a symbol w i l l disintegrate. Richard Dyer argues that recognizing the correlation 
between the personal penis and the symbolic phallus 
leads to the greatest instability o f all for the male image. For the fact is that the 
penis isn't a patch on the phallus. The penis can never live up to the mystique 
implied by the phallus. Hence the excessive, even hysterical quality o f so much 
male imagery. The clenched fists, the bulging muscles, the hardened jaws, the 
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proliferation o f phallic symbols - they are all straining after what can hardly ever 
be achieved, the embodiment o f the phallic mystique (Dyer, 1997: 274). 
The penis cannot embody the 'phallic mystique'. A s Dyer says, the penis w i l l never live up 
to the phallus, it 'isn't a patch on the phallus'. Or as Potts puts it: "[ujltimately, the penis 
is doomed in its striving to live up to the phallus" (Potts, 2000: 89). This recognition that 
the penis is nowhere near as mighty as the phallus has lead many theorists to see a 
possibility for subversion of, and possibly ultimately liberation from the phall ic ideal 
through the embodiment o f the personal penis and the ackjiowledgment that it is 
inadequate, and 'not a patch' on the ideal. 
4.2 Imperfect Personal Penises 
The equation between penis and phallus is cited as being most strong when the said penis 
is erect. Potts says that what she calls the 'hard on ' "signifies the prominence of erections 
in notions o f ' no rmaP and 'natural' male sexuality and healthy heterosex" (Potts, 2000: 
88). Thus it is argued when the penis is flaccid there is a problem with equating it with the 
phallus. Therefore, embodying, representing and talking about the f laccid penis can help to 
de-mystify and dispel the symbolic ideal o f the phallus. Potts writes that; "the absence o f 
- or diff iculty in 'achieving' or 'maintaining' - a robust 'hard on ' in appropriate 
circumstances thus presents as a disastrous affl iction in the male, an abnonnality, a failure 
to stand up as a 'real ' man. [...] [Impotence] testifies to the downfall o f a certain phallic 
economy focused on the transactions o f one male sexual organ, the penis-as-phallus-stand-
i n " (Potts, 2000: 90). This is quite clear, an erect penis has no (or less) trouble in the 
equation with the phallus, an inappropriately flaccid penis however can endanger the entire 
phallic economy. For all the theorists quoted above, this is the ultimate goal. Re-embody 
the penis/man, make the individual male penis visible, talk about it, and watch the phallic 
economy dissolve. 
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Many current representations of men and their penises enunciate and document the 
difference o f the personal penis with the mighty phallus. The masculinity studies texts that 
examine 1950s melodramatic fi lms point to an often represented equation between the 
(implicit and suggested) impotence of the male protagonists and the breakdown o f their 
patriarchal authority (Cohan, 1993: 213). A n d it is not just in the texts o f the 1950s that a 
break between the penis and the phallus is indicated and represented. W e wi l l now turn to 
three media texts from the archive of masculinity and the normal that 'deal ' with penises; 
Larry's Party (Shields, 1997), The Full Monty, (1999) and the British comedy drama 
Manchiid (2002). A l l these texts quite explicitly discuss penises and, as we wi l l see, in 
line with the new project o f marginalization for white men, do so in a manner that in no 
way expresses the symbolism and power o f the phallus. Carol Shields spends quite a long 
time on Larry's penis. Here he is in Larry's Party musing on penises in a chapter entitled, 
not surprisingly, 'Larry 's Penis': 
A tube of flesh, purplish in hue, veined, hooded, hanging there. Shaft and glans. A 
nozzle. A rounded snout. A cylinder wrapped like a wonton in transparent skin. 
Hanging, there, always there, first thing in the morning, last thing at night. Trunk, 
stalk, drainpipe, pickle. [...] Lightening rod, rattlesnake, bum splitter. A knob, a 
swelling, pinky-blue, blood-fil led, wonny white, its tip an open hole, leaking. A 
duct, a conduit, ribbed, fibrous. Dick, dink, king-dong-bell. The family jewels 
(Shields, 1997: 123). 
And , after this attractive picture of penises in general, we hear about Larry 's individual, 
particular penis as he remembers his father and a neighbour making penis jokes: 
Were penises fiinny then? Or such a serious business that they had to be roughly 
masked in backyard humor. Was a penis an event? Was it history? Was it sacred 
or profane? A s a boy Larry didn't know. A n d at age thirty-six he still doesn't 
know. [...] 
How does a penis taste? H e ' l l never know. 
A l l he knows is that his penis is with him forever, doing more or less what a penis 
is meant to do. It's his to wash, and tug at and dust with talcum powder and look 
after and use, and his to witness as it grows old along with the rest o f his body. His 
partner in life, this extension of flesh, so creaturely and blind, and blundering, so 
ft-iendly and wi l l ing in its puppyish moods, but which, in the future - he has no 
doubt about it - w i l l be ready to betray him (Shields, 1997: 137). 
Larry's penis is far from perfect. It is blundering, foolish, ready to betray him with 
impotence (which does happen later), and spoken about within the novel. What this 
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discussion shows is that this is not the great, mystical unseen phallus of the patriarchal 
order. A s Anthony Easthope says: "the phallus may attract immense force and charisma 
while the humble penis carries on as best it can with its usual bodily fiinctions" (Easthope, 
1986/1992: 4). Larry's penis is 'humble' and carrying on 'as best it can'. In relation to the 
theoretical project outlined above, which advocated the embodying of the personal male 
penis, Larry's Party, in fictional form, follows suit. Showing and discussing Larry 's penis 
as inadequate, personalized and imperfect ( i f we fol low the theoretical arguments outlined 
above), breaks the equation of penis with phallus. The visible, imperfect penis de-
mystifies the myth of the phallus and by implication dissipates the symbolic and mythic 
power attached to the phallus. 
Currently, discussion of the imperfect personal penis and impotence is rife, as are 
representations o f it. In The Full Monty (1999) the men's bodies and indeed penises are 
under constant scrutiny throughout the film. The fact that 'ordinary' men are going to 
perform the ' f u l l monty' and expose their penises and inadequate and imperfect bodies to 
hundreds o f screaming women, provides much o f the comedy and concerns o f the 
narrative, ("'1 mean to say, my w i l l y ! ' 'Your wi l ly? My w i l l y ! " ' (The Full Monty, 1999)). 
Horse tries out a penis pump, phoning the company who made it complaining: " H o w come 
it's not working? Nothing's getting bigger". A n d Dave experiences erectile dysfijnction, 
unable to 'perform' with his wife, while Gerald experiences erections at the wrong time: 
"it 's not fijnny, it's medical!" A n d in answer to Larry's question; 'were penises funny 
then?' the answer seems to be a resounding Yes! In B B C 2's comedy drama Manchiid 
(2002), which follows four rich, middle aged men as they experience and celebrate crisis, 
there are fijnny penises all over the place; from James' poorly perfonning one, to the 
model o f a penis the doctor he goes to see has in his room, which goes fi-om erect to 
droopy at the touch o f a switch, to the penis sculptures in an art gallery one o f which 
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Patrick points at James who cries 'give it to me please!' (about something else), to the 
(real?) Mapplethorpe James eventually buys depicting a large black penis. 
Erectile dysftincfion is a major concern for James, over fifty, rich and enjoying a midl i fe 
'crisis ' , he tries to make love to a twenty year old when it all goes wrong, ("well hello M r 
floppy") From here on the exposure of James' penis, and its visibili ty within the narrative 
is paramount within the text. James goes to the doctor, who recommends surgery to repair 
his 'valves' , and for extra cash, provides liposuction to "give Pedro there an extra couple 
o f inches". Once the surgery is complete (we are given a very frightening view o f the 
medical instruments), the doctor examines his penis as i f it is a piece of meat, or, more 
appropriately here, a work of art made by the doctor. James stands in the surgery with just 
his shirt on, looking extremely uncomfortable, while the doctor puts on gloves and gets a 
close look at his handy work, telling James he loves his work as he can "touch it, celebrate 
it, marvel at it". A n d fol lowing the surgery James' friends beg to see, and get to see, his 
new penis. Throughout Manchild penises are ftjnny, discussed, imperfect and exposed. 
On the screen, whether television or film, the audience is actually still not permitted to see 
the penis. Although discussed constantly, the penis is never quite made into a voyeuristic 
spectacle. Indeed, in British broadcasting regulations we are still not 'a l lowed' to see an 
erect penis (but then the phallic economy hasn't really gone anywhere). However, this ban 
is now being openly discussed as being ridiculous and the general consensus seems to be 
that it wi l l not last long. If this ban is lifted, and i f more representations o f the penis are 
shown, then the move to 'exposing' the penis wi l l be nearer to complete. A t the moment 
however, the discourse is confined to discussion about the imperfect personal penis and 
this in itself has implications and repercussions. Sally Robinson writes that images o f the 
imperfect personal penis, (here she is speaking of a character in a John Updike book), 
show "an unmistakable gap between the penis and the phallus, and thus, undermines the 
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'naturalness' o f male domination" (Robinson, 2000: 43). However, as I have been 
discussing throughout, in our contemporary, diverse culture, the 'naturalness' o f male 
domination needs to be denied i f consent for the status quo is to be won and maintained 
and the actual phallic, patriarchal culture and economy allowed to continue unchallenged. 
Richard Dyer argues that: 
A naked body is a vulnerable body. This is so in the most fiandamental sense - the 
bare body has no protection from the elements - but also in a social sense. [...] 
Nakedness may also reveal the inadequacies o f the body by comparison with social 
ideals. It may betray the relative similarity of male and female, white and non-
white bodies, undo the remorseless insistences on difference and concomitant 
power carried by clothes and grooming. The exposed white male body is liable to 
pose the legitimacy of white male power: why should people who look like that -
so unimpressive, so like others - have so much power? (Dyer, 1997: 146). 
In the new discourses on masculinity this is the very effect that is desired. Completely 
opposed to the representations that showed the white male body as the extra-ordinary ideal 
that other bodies (female or 'ethnic') could never live up to, what is being shown now is 
that there is no reason why white men should have more power than anyone else just 
because they are white men. I repeat: white men as a group cannot be seen to hold power. 
A n d the detachment of the individual white penis from any idea o f the 'phallus ' is 
extremely usefijl in the systematic denial that white men might hold power because they 
are white men and not because of individual merit and talent that has been recognized and 
rewarded by an equal, just and meritocratic society. The (re)embodiment o f white men 
disavows any dominance they, as a group, might hold. 
A lan Peterson writes that; "[t]he privileging of the 'mind ' over the 'body' is widely seen to 
be characteristic of 'masul inis t ' rationality, and to be implicated in the domination o f men 
over women, o f culture over nature and of Europeans over non-Europeans" (Peterson, 
1998: 17). Within the new hegemonic project all o f these implications associated with the 
'mind ' need to be disavowed, in particular the idea that white men might dominate either 
women or non-Europeans or people of colour. Sally Robinson, writing about the vis ibi l i ty 
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of the white male body says that whereas the 'marking' o f other's bodies is: "a technique 
of control pracficed on behalf o f the putatively universal and abstract, this marking [of 
white men] does not depend on the existence o f an unmarked norm elsewhere" (Robinson, 
2000: 21). This to me seems to be a dangerous idea. If the white male body was the 
universal and abstract and is now the particular and the present, where is the norm(al)? 
If we attempt to argue that we have moved beyond any idea of the universal and abstract 
nonn, then no ftjrther conceptual or social change w i l l be necessary. A n d i f no fijrther 
change is necessary we wi l l be left with the inequality, privilege, unequal power and 
wealth, prejudice and oppression that still exist. Theorizing away the idea o f the collective 
nonnal and the elevation of the idea o f imperfect individualism does not inevitably dispel 
the material realities o f inequality that are often collectively experienced by those who 
have been historically marginalized by the concept o f the nonnal. 
The we're-all-the-same-under-the-skin, and even in-the-skin discourse is aided by the 
exposure o f the while male body and the exposure o f the imperfect personal penis. 
Showing white male bodies to be inadequate does express the fact that they 'look l ike 
others'. Beth, while sUll Larry's wife, tells him in his (temporary) period of impotency; 
"the point is that you're an absolutely normal and typical human being" (Shields, 1997: 
168). Here we have the equalizing force which always seems to accompany the exposure 
and scrutiny of white middle class men. There is a movement from the universal phallus to 
the particular, embodied, smallish and somewhat inadequate personal male penis that w i l l 
belong to individual men. N o individual penis can be perfect - but the doubts and fears 
felt by individual men wi l l supposedly be nonnal, and this w i l l cut across race and class. 
Thus we have it confinned that Larry is indeed "an ordinary man after a l l " (Shields, 1997: 
239). The intimacies o f Larry's body show individualism; his body is uniquely his own, 
but at the same time he is equated with everyone else, and to this extent shown to be 
"absolutely nonnal" (Shields, 1997: 268). Vis ib le similarities between male and female, 
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white and non-white are a vital part o f the new hegemonic discourse that shuns visual and 
biological references to power and no longer insists on difference in the traditional way but 
would rather claim marginalization and disempowerment for all . 
Just as the making-visible project in the discussion above made the normal into the 
abnormal and white men are shown to be as doubting and failing as 'everyone else', 
exposing the individual white male penis as embodied and imperfect demonstrates 
convincingly that there is no correlation between white men and the phallus. Thus, just as 
it is said that the penis needs to be detached from the phallus, separated in "a form of 
cultural castration" (Potts, 2000: 99), so dominance as a recognizable force needs to be 
separated from any (biological) equation with white masculinity and white men 
themselves. If, as Elizabeth Grosz suggests: "[t]he phallus binarizes the differences 
between the sexes, dividing up a sexual-corporeal continuum into two mutually exclusive 
categories which in fact belie the multiplicity o f bodies and body types" (Grosz, 1994a: 
58), then detachment fi-om the phallus and the singular body it implies (or "phall ic 
singularity" as Heath puts it in The Sexual Subject, 1992: 59), is at this point in time, 
desirable for white men. The demystification o f the phallus and the exposure of the 
personal penis is a significant part o f the new hegemonic movement that seeks to expose 
white men and to detach them from any suggestion that their biology has anything to do 
with the positions that individual white men may hold in society. A s Stephen Whitehead, 
staunch supporter o f pro-feminist masculinity studies argues: 
Men are not a predictable, homogenous group, needing to control women and 
others in order to 'be masculine'; a natural state that, i f knocked back, inevitably 
results in some sort o f profound sense o f rejection and existential crisis for males. 
Men are much more complicated than that. First, we should recognize the multiple 
ways of being a man and the multiple masculinities now available to men in this 
post-modern age (Whitehead, 2002: 3, my emphases). 
From Whitehead's point o f view i f men were a homogenous, identifiable group with a 
certain biology and certain characteristics, they certainly are not now. Wi th in masculinity 
studies the ideological concept that binarizes the sexes (masculinism) is being rejected in 
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favour o f multiplicity and the essentialized singularity of 'men as a group' is multiplied 
into individual (imperfect) white men whose position and behaviour is not fied to or 
attributable to their biology. 
The first sentence of John Beynon's book Masculinities and Culture reads: "[o]ne thing 
has to be made crystal clear at the outset: 'masculinity' is composed of many different 
masculinities, as this book wi l l illustrate repeatedly and which is reflected in the tifle" 
(Beynon, 2002: 1). Within 'pro-feminist' masculinity studies this statement is a usual and 
accepted position to take. Bob Pease writes: "We are now entering a new stage in which 
variations among men are seen as central to the understanding of men's lives. Thus we 
cannot speak o f masculinity as a singular term, but rather should explore masculinities" 
(Pease, 2000: 29). Masculinity is multiple we are told again and again. A n d this central 
project o f masculinity studies multiplies, complicates and fragments masculinity into 
multiple, diverse masculinities. The multiplying o f men-as-a-group (masculinity) into 
individually and variously expressed masculinities is a de-essentializing strategy that 
removes men from their grouped biology whilst not removing them from their bodies. 
This move 'proves' that biology (maleness) is not destiny and proves eventually that 
biology is not gender, power, position, role or behaviour either. If men and their 
masculinities can be multiplied then any danger o f essentializing men can be averted. 
Thus for all masculinity studies the multiplying of masculinity(ies) is one o f the central 
projects and one that is most useftil to the ultimate aim of de-centring the centre. 
4.3 Muitiplicit>', Performance and Anti-Essentialism 
A l l the ideas examined in this chapter in one way or another involve questions of 
essentialism and anti-essentialism. We wi l l continue to examine this extreme anti-
essentialism o f masculinity and also o f family studies and its manifestation in the 
narratives of some new representations. The separation of the penis f rom the phallus began 
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our discussion of anti-essentialism or perhaps more accurately in this case anti-biological-
determinism whereby merely owning a white penis does not necessarily pre-determine the 
holding of extra-ordinary power. Putting aside the question of whether we do accept that 
gender is not biologically given until later in this chapter, following this argument through, 
if biology doesn't matter then the roles taken up or the performance chosen to be enacted 
are a part of an autonomous choice. This sidelining of biology and the emphasis on choice 
is very apparent in family studies too. This is Silva and Smart in The New Family talking 
about a new, fluid and flexible scenario for the family whereby, "in this new scenario, the 
family appears as a context of fluid and changeable relationships, as well as a site of 
intimacy and emotional growth not only for kids but also for adults" (Silva and Smart, 
1999: 6). The *new' family is not rigid or static but fluid, flexible and multiple. 
Relationships are not bound by biological relationships but are forged and kept up through 
choice. 
In many of the fictional texts I have been examining the idea of biology-as-destiny is 
sidelined (and even denied) as concepts of choice are examined. The next text looked at is 
About A Boy, a 1998 novel by Nick Hornby that was made into an extremely popular film 
in 2002 starring Hugh Grant. The book follows the story of Wi l l , a thirty six year old play-
boy; womanizing, lazy, rich and selfish who metamorphoses into a kind of single parent, or 
parent-of-choice (not biology) of a twelve year old boy called Marcus. In About A Boy the 
separation of role and biology is an often discussed theme in relation to parenting and the 
family in general. Marcus' mum has tried to commit suicide and as a result of this Marcus 
wants more people in his life. His biological father is largely absent but in his wish to 
create a family of choice biology does not matter - having a biological mum and dad 
around is not the point: 
It wasn't that he needed someone to replace his dad. He'd talked about that with 
his mum ages ago. They'd been watching a programme on T V about the family, 
and some silly fat Tory woman said that everyone should have a mother and a 
father, and his mum got angry and later depressed. Then, before the hospital thing, 
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he'd thought the Tory woman was stupid, and he'd told his mum as much, but at 
the time he hadn't worked out that two was a dangerous number. Now he had 
worked that out, he wasn't sure it made much difference to what he thouglit about 
the fat Tory woman's idea; he didn't care whether the family he wanted were all 
men, or all women, or all children. He simply wanted people (Hornby, 1998: 84). 
Marcus actively wants a family of choice. The Conservative idea of the nuclear family 
doesn't matter to him, whether he has a mother and a father doesn't matter to him. Marcus' 
family of choice could be a straight one, a gay one, one made up of friends or any other 
type of family imaginable. He wants a network of people who choose to be there. 
Marcus' father doesn't really matter at all. When his dad's conscience finally strikes and 
he apologizes to Marcus for leaving and says that he now wants to be a 'proper' dad, 
Marcus decides: "[t]he thing was, he couldn't be that kind of dad anymore. He'd missed 
his moment. [...] It wasn't as though he thought his dad should have been around, but he 
couldn't have it both ways. [...] He'd have to find another job for himself Will could do 
the little things, and his mum, but his dad was out of it" (Hornby, 1998: 267-8). Marcus 
does not need his father to play at biological 'proper' fatherhood - that job is being shared 
around. If his father wants to stay a part of Marcus' life he will have to find a new role, 
one that is of use to Marcus, but that has nothing to do with the fact that he is Marcus' 
biological father. Fatherhood is a role, and one that can be broken down into constituent 
parts, which can then be played by anyone willing to play them. Marcus' father will have 
to fit into Marcus' family of choice, but not necessarily as a 'father'. This idea adds 
another dimension to the current discussions of fatherhood and is not confined to About A 
Boy. Presumably, partly because of the divorce rate and the amount of second marriages 
or partnerships and step-families the idea that the role of fatherhood need not be played by 
the biological father is becoming more common, even to my local greeting card shop 
having a section of cards labeled for the person who is "Like a Dad"! In About A Boy 
though, even this role of Mike a dad' can itself be broken down with anyone - male or 
female - who cares and is competent playing any of the roles or parts. 
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For Marcus, the separation of role and biological ties is liberating. He finds that; "[y]ou 
could create little patterns of people that wouldn't have been possible if his mum and dad 
hadn't split up and the three of them had stayed in Cambridge" (Hornby, 1998: 271). 
Marcus prefers the flexibility of his new type of family to the isolation of a small, 
biologically driven nuclear family. Will is the first recruit to Marcus' family of choice. He 
first meets him whilst Wil l is still pretending to be a single parent - albeit with an absent, 
and indeed non-existent child. Will is present when Marcus' mum Fiona is found after her 
suicide attempt and becomes embroiled from thereon in. Soon, Wil l becomes involved and 
although he knows that Marcus does not need a father exactly, it takes him time to realize 
what Marcus does need. Marcus is being bullied at school and is not conversant with 
popular culture. He tells Will he can help: 
It was then, for the first time, that Wil l saw the kind of help Marcus needed. Fiona 
had given him the idea that Marcus was after a father figure, someone to guide him 
gently towards male adulthood, but that wasn't it at all: Marcus needed help to be a 
kid, not an adult. And, unhappily for Wi l l , that was exactly the kind of assistance 
he was qualified to provide. He wasn't able to tell Marcus how to grow up, or how 
to cope with a suicidal mother, or anything like that, but he could certainly tell him 
that Kurt Cobain didn't play for Manchester United, and for a twelve-year-old boy 
attending a comprehensive school at the end of 1993, that was maybe the most 
important information of all (Hornby, 1998: 147). 
Will (as he realizes later still), is Marcus' friend. He is not his father and Marcus does not 
want him to be, however he is a vital part of Marcus' emerging extended family of choice. 
About A Boy exemplifies the type of family that is being both theorized and celebrated (and 
prescribed) in family studies that provides a non rigid space for the "intimacy and 
emotional growth not only for kids but also for adults" (Silva and Smart, 1999: 6). Both 
Marcus and Will learn and grow from their contact with each other, contact that leads to 
intimacy and a certain kind of commitment that is not prescribed by biological ties. About 
A Boy argues against biological determinism and for choice. Although (as with family 
studies) there is a nod to those whose choices are limited, the narrative is about choices and 
responsibility and autonomy. The family in About A Boy is an extended family, made up 
of fragments, disorder and chaos. It is what Deborah Chambers would describe as a 
'postmodern' family. She argues that "[t]he new 'postmodern family' is situated outside 
the modem paradigm of universal reason and progress, and as such is shaped by 
experiences of pluralism, disorder and fragmentation within contemporary culture" 
(Chambers, 2001: 115-6). In this sort of family, rather than just relying on biological fies 
to take the place of commitment and intimacy, each person is active in the creation of the 
family. 
This active creation of family and familial relationships is what David Morgan calls 
'family practices', which term he says allows a "sense of the active rather than the 
passive or static. Whatever the topic, the emphasis is upon doing class, doing gender, 
doing family" (Morgan, 1999: 17). What Morgan is drawmg on are the ideas of 
performance and performativity, ideas which come from Judith Butler, most notably in 
Gender Trouble (1990). In the way that this model has been taken up and discussed by 
both family studies and masculinity studies, performance is an active and sometimes 
deliberate enacting of roles or the perfomiance of the subversion of these roles. The idea 
of 'perfomiing the family' comes out of the ideas of perfomiing gender: 
Like the performativity of gender, being part of a family is something that must be 
culturally inscribed and accomplished as an ongoing perfonnance. Familialism is 
something that has to be reinvented and continuously achieved in everyday 
interactions with others - we do rather than simply have family (Chambers, 2001: 
169). 
Just as in About A Boy, Chambers is arguing that family is performed as a choice, an active 
choice. Part of the activity is the re-creation of the roles chosen to be played and both 
Chambers and Morgan emphasize the fact that these roles need to be reinvented and 
recreated continuously. And it is argued the ideas of practices and perfomiance can open 
up what were seen as closed categories and institutions such as fatherhood or the family 
entire allowing space for change and subversion. 
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The site that is most often mentioned and celebrated by both family studies and 
masculinity studies as a model enabling anti-essentialist subversion, fluidity and openness 
is not the heterosexual, conjugal, nuclear family but what is termed the homosexual family 
of choice. In fact in some texts, gay households are credited with creating the 'new family' 
entire (Silva and Smart, 1999, Smart and Neale, 1999, Morgan, 1996). Deborah Chambers 
comments on the works of Weeks et al and Giddens: 
The idea of a 'chosen' family based on negotiated modes of friendship, 
commitment and responsibility rather than biological kin relations, prioritises the 
assertion of personal values over biological ties and thereby has the potential to 
undermine claims to racial and ethnic purity (Chambers, 2001: 117, my emphasis). 
There is an hierarchical placing of 'personal values' (whatever they are) over 'biological 
ties' whereby it is the 'personal values' that are most important. If homosexuals can 
choose their families then, one would assume, so can heterosexuals. For Chambers as well 
as many others: "[t]he category of 'normal sexuality' is being subverted by lesbian and gay 
families of choice and by hybridised representations by the act of untying sexuality from 
gender" (Chambers, 2001: 169). Sexuality, (biology?) is 'untied' from gender (culture?) 
and as the heterosexual norm is undermined by 'homosexual families of choice' so more 
choices are opened up for straight white people themselves - even as far as their sexuality. 
Acknowledging and citing Butler and queer theory, this is Richard Collier in Changing 
Family Values'. 
What has emerged from within a diverse body of scholarship around the 
relationship between subjectivity, corporeality and gender(ed) identities is an, albeit 
sometimes implicit theorization of the heterosexual subject as a fluid 'performative 
practice', an understanding of being 'straight' as a dynamic 'project of the self 
[...]. [There is an] idea of there being a (hetero) sexed subjectivity, a distinctive 
process of being 'sexed' as heterosexual, as having or rather obtaining or taking up 
a heterosexual sensibility (Collier, 1999: 40). 
In this model, heterosexuality is no longer a 'compulsion' of straight, white, patriarchal, 
capitalist society, it is a choice. One can (or not) 'take up' a 'heterosexual sensibility'. 
Straightness is performed, but through choice and not compulsion. In Collier's argument, 
heterosexuality becomes a choice, as sexual identity becomes something to be picked up or 
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not. In a similar way David Morgan argues that our chosen 'family practices' and roles 
inform our sense of ourselves outside the home too. He says that these identities or what 
he calls "assertions": 
May often become part of the routine understandings of individual actors as they go 
about their family practices. This is not in the crude sense of ideological 
indoctrination. Rather, it is more in the sense of social actors using culturally 
available rhetorics about the family in order to account for their own practices 
(Morgan, 1999: 20). 
Morgan is asserting that 'social actors' come before the roles and these 'actors', in the 
everyday use 'culturally available rhetorics'. This gives the sense of various and multiple 
rhetorics (identities) floating about able to be picked up or dropped by anybody. Morgan 
is also suggesting that the self, as social actor, precedes culture and implies that this allows 
for choice, individuality and finally multiplicity for the subject. However, Judith Butler 
who is so often cited by masculinity studies and family studies in relation to choice and 
perfontiance argues that: "the epistemological paradigm that presumes the priority of the 
doer to the deed establishes a global and globalizing subject who disavows its own locality 
as well as the conditions for local intervention" (Butler, 1990: 148). Morgan asserts 
individuality and multiplicity for 'individual actors'. However, Butler's argument suggests 
that the separation of'doer' from 'deed' actually denies locality, specificity and 
particularity (so beloved of the new studies) and therefore leads to a universalization or 
globalization of the subject. 
The separation of the doer and the deed is a stance that is taken by more than one theorist 
however. This is John Beynon speaking in relation to gender: 
If gender is cultural, then it follows that women as well as men can step into and 
inhabit (whether permanently or temporarily) masculinity as a 'cultural space', one 
with its own sets of behaviours. In this view 'the masculine' and 'the feminine' 
signify a range of culturally defined characteristics assignable to both men and 
women (Beynon, 2002: 7). 
Beynon is arguing that men or women can choose to 'perfonn' either gender role. Or in 
other words, the masculine carries no benefit or privilege with it and there really is no need 
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for political liberation as 'we' can 'perform' any role we'd like and any that we choose to. 
Judith Butler realized that when gender and biological sex are separated this is the logical 
conclusion: 
If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender 
cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the 
sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and 
culturally constructed genders. [...] When the constructed status of gender is 
theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating 
artifice, with the consequence that man and masculinity might just as easily signify 
a female body as a male one and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a 
female one (Buder, 1990: 6). 
What Beynon gives as a joyful celebration of the free-floating nature of gender, Butler 
poses as a problem and one that she goes on to theorize flilly. In Unmasking the Masculine 
Alan Peterson, although giving a far more well-read, thoughtflil and subtle discussion of 
essentialism, sex and gender than many masculinity studies texts, still cites this passage 
from Butler without any discussion of the fact that she posed the concept of free-floating 
gender roles as a problem. He writes "[e]ven i f one assumes the stability of binary sex, it 
does not follow that the construction of 'men ' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of 
males or that of 'women' to only female bodies" (Peterson, 1998: 30). Despite his 
apparent understanding that sex too is constructed (31), Peterson here, still falls back into 
the division between sex and gender. 
Butler refutes the theoretical basis for the split between sex and gender which can be 
summed up in Beynon's statement that "[i]f'maleness' is biological, then masculinity is 
cultural" (Beynon, 2002: 2). It was this premise, apparent in much second wave feminism 
(see Moi , 1985/2002) that Gender Trouble was written to refute. Breaking with the logic 
that gender is cultural and sex is biological, Butler writes very clearly: 
Gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural 
means by which 'sexed nature' or 'a natural sex' is produced and established as 
'prediscursive', prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts 
(Butler, 1990: 7, her emphasis). 
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Splitting culture (gender) and nature (sex), means that ideas of the 'nature' of sex are left in 
place whereas Butler believes that: "sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender 
all along" (Butler, 1990: 8). Butler does not split biology and gender, believing in fact that 
both are cultural and that maleness therefore is masculinity and therefore the actor does not 
precede the act. Because of this Butler goes fijrther and denies choice in the way that it is 
discussed by masculinity and family studies altogether. She says: 
To enter into the repetitive practices of this terrain of signification [gender] is not a 
choice, for the T that might enter is already inside: there is no possibility of agency 
or reality outside of the discursive practices that give those tenns the intelligibility 
that they have (Butler, 1990: 148, my emphasis). 
In Butler's terms there can be no separate and multiple fonns of either masculinity or the 
family that exist 'out there' waiting for people to pick them up at will or freely available 
for people to 'perform' as they wish. The main reason for this is that for Butler, 
performance-is-identity-is-self and the performance of gender for women for example, can 
lead to disempowerment and not a free choice-for-all. As she says: "there is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is perfomiatively constituted by the 
very 'expressions' that are said to be its results (Butler, 1990: 25). The performance is the 
very thing that it is said to be performed; the act is the fact. 
However, the insistence of masculinity studies and family studies on splitting biology and 
role, sex and gender has consequences for these disciplines as political tropes, meaning 
that texts and discussions that are said to be radical are wrong footed. If we take 
Whitehead and Barrett for example, they among many others believe that the perfonnance 
of gender (masculinity) itself need not be fixed: 
If we accept that masculinities and femininities are not biologically given, then we 
are forced to look at how the social world is fomied, framed and enabled in order to 
get a purchase on gender relations and ways of thinking and performing gender 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 21). 
Here, i f gender is the performance then one must assume that Whitehead and Barrett see 
biology as the 'fact'. Whitehead and Barrett see gender perfomiance and the concept of 
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biology as separate. This means however that even as gender performance is fluid and 
changeable, (the concept oO biology is fixed and static. If the idea of biology is radically 
removed from any idea of gender, then one must presume that it is seen as natural and 
static and as pre-existing the gender role. Diana Fuss argues that "it might be necessary to 
begin questioning the constuctionist assumption that nature and fixity go together 
(naturally) just as sociality and change go together (naturally)" (Fuss, 1989: 254). Tlius 
taking biology itself to be static, albeit a static construction may be an erroneous premise 
to start from. Or, as Fuss puts it, it is imperative to remember that "essence as irreducible 
has been constructed to be irreducible" (Fuss, 1989: 253). Accepting the construction as 
fact keeps that very construction in place. Fuss continues: 
To insist that essentialism is always and everywhere reactionary is, for the 
constructionist, to buy into essentialism in the very act of making the charge; // is to 
act as if essentialism has an essence (Fuss, 1989: 258). 
If we accept this argument then the staunchly anti-essentialist camp creates its own 
problems of essentialist thinking. Essentialist thinking occurs even as any questions of 
current patriarchal relations and inequalities are being sidestepped and dispersed in the 
multiplicity, fragmentation and anti-essentialism of the moment. 
Simon Watney recognizes this problem from the point of view of queer theory, looking at 
the argument often cited in relation to gay people and even within queer theory itself that, 
"human sexuality is always and everywhere polymorphously perverse", which point of 
view he argues leads to the idea that: 
if you think you are exclusively attracted to either the opposite sex or the same sex, 
then you are no more than a helpless and deluded victim. [...] In this view, 
identities are always known in advance, in order to be denied. The mutable and 
inevitably deeply contingent historical forms and dispositions of human sexuality 
are read as if 'gay identity' somehow involved denying the ultimate provisionality 
of sexual identities. 1 emphasise the word 'ultimate' because it seems to me that 
there is all the difference in the worid between the insistence on the provisionality 
and contingency of sexual identities in the longer historical duration, and a certain 
style of deconstructionist denial of the validity of the category of sexual identity 
itself on the grounds that such identities are 'merely' provisional, and of their 
nature 'essentialist' (Watney, 1997: 377). 
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If one ignores history and power relations one can see all sexual identities as provisional. 
In this case, Watney says that what is suggested is a type of 'false consciousness' whereby 
people are duped into thinking that they have sexual identities. Watney argues that in this 
view the categories are "known in advance in order to be denied" and that therefore the 
denial of gay identity itself categorizes and labels 'gay identity' keeping it static, rigid and 
stereotyped, acting as if gay identity itself has an essential identity. 
In the dominant discourse biology need not determine destiny and biology need not limit 
choices. In relation to masculinity Stephen Whitehead and Frank Barrett assert that: 
"individuals do not have biologically fixed identities" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 20). 
Here role and biology are firmly kept apart and no-one has a 'biologically fixed identity' 
which leads us back into an equal meritocracy. This is an easy idea for those in dominant 
positions to assimilate. Within family studies too, alongside some newer representations of 
the family and in concurrence with the discussion of masculinity studies, neither biology or 
social circumstances are said to pre-determine anything. Family forms themselves and the 
roles available within them are also said to multiply: 
Family fomis have moved away from a fixed or rigid nofion of the 'proper' family 
and [...] even inside traditionally structured families, new normative guidelines are 
emerging. At the turn of the twenty first century in Western societies, most people 
no longer follow rigid set paths of living. Thus, because our biographies are not 
pre-given, new types and qualities of relationships have supplanted fixed models 
(Silva and Smart, 1999: 4). 
According to Silva and Smart 'we' are moving away from the fixed, traditional family that 
is rigid or singular in its fomi into new types of 'relationships'. It is however possible to 
argue that the 'proper' or nomial family has never been available to large groups of people 
and therefore to ask; just who is 'moving away' from it? Although I would argue that it 
can only be the white middle classes, Silva and Smart assert that all 'our' biographies are 
not pre-given. And, therefore, if no-one is fixed then 'we' must all have as many choices 
available to us as we want. However, this begs the question: i f everything is as fluid and 
open as is suggested by some of the new studies texts, then can one choose to be 
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oppressed? If one were to accept the anti-essentialist idea of pure choice one would have 
to answer yes. Within the logic of this argument what for one (white) person can be 
viewed as (positive and liberating) performance can for a gay person be seen as 'false 
consciousness'. Or, i f we follow this idea of fluid, changeable identities to its logical 
conclusion, can for another (black) person be equated with an 'incorrect' notion of internal 
colonization in which biology is seen as destiny. In this case oppression is the individual's 
'own fault' as it is certainly not inevitable. 
Beck and Beck-Gemsheim give us the timely reminder that in relation to inequalities: 
"[t]he Western type of individualized society tells us to seek biographical solutions to 
systemic contradictions " (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, 2001: xxii , my emphasis). Beck and 
Beck Gemsheim argue that individualized society 'blames' the individual and ignores the 
system. In the woHd of fluidity, flexibility, uncertainty, 'performance' is a different thing 
to biology and the idea that biology-is-destiny is debunked and rejected wholesale. This 
rejection comes without acknowledging that the concepts of biological detenninism, or 
biology as destiny are themselves multiple in that they mean very different things for 
different groups of people. The rejection of the notion of biology as destiny entire may not 
be a useful one for marginalized groups of people who have historically been essentialized. 
This is because what can represent choice and freedom for white, straight people can 
represent the ideological 'imperatives' that have been put on other people in relation to 
nonnality. Thus for example, in the world of pure choice, i f heterosexuality is a choice 
then so must homosexuality be and therefore if push came to shove, gay people could turn 
straight if they chose. 
4.4 The Limits of Choice 
In The New Family? under a section heading called "Families of Choice", Weeks et al 
write that in relation to families of choice: 
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[t]he important factors [...] are not the limits [on choice], real though they are, but 
the ethos and values that many non-heterosexual women and men are expressing -
that a sense of self-worth and cultural confidence is realized in and through 
friendship networks that we describe as families of choice (Weeks et al, 1999: 89). 
To Weeks et al, as proponents of white family studies the limits on 'choice' (such as 
discrimination perhaps) are not important but ideas of ' se l f worth' and 'cultural 
confidence' are. Speaking from the position of privilege Weeks et al suggest that 
discrimination is not inevitable and therefore, by implication, neither is fixity (or those 
unimportant limits on choice). However, Gayatri Spivak writes: "It seems to me that the 
proliferation of multiplicity, which is always limited by what choices are allowed, is a very 
bad idea" (Spivak, 1994: 175). Multiplicity in terms of choice of sexual identity, role, 
gender or family form is, for most people, less enabled by choice than limited by it. 
Writing about the performance of gender from a feminist point of view Suzanna Walters 
argues that we need to employ: 
a deep understanding of the limitations and constraints within which we 'perform' 
gender. Without some elaborated social and cultural context, the theory of 
performance is deeply ahistorical and therefore ironically (because postmodernism 
fashions itself as particularism par excellence), universalistic, avoiding a discussion 
of the contexts (race, class, ethnicity and the like) that make particular 
'performances' more or less likely to be possible in the first place (Walters, 1999: 
251). 
It is imperative to look at which performances are possible for which people otherwise the 
idea of'performance' itself remains universalistic, elite, empty, and ideologically 
problematic. 
This is Stephen Whitehead examining masculinity and his own position as a man: 
Those men able/prepared to perceive themselves as gendered subjects have, at 
some point, to address both material issues vis-a-vis women, and, on a highly 
personal level, those questions pertaining to masculine identity. For in engaging in 
alternative discursive realities, certainly those articulated within a (pro)-feminist 
frame, men are required to engage reflexively with their own ontological security 
as it has come to be 'achieved' in a maleist paradigm. Clearly there are both 
opportunities and threats here. For in confronting and attempting to 'resolve' the 
existential question 'Who am I as a man?', the occupier of this particular gendered 
configuration is increasingly denied refijge in traditional ways o f being a man. The 
opportunity that ensues from such social and individual transformation should not, I 
suggest, be seen in terms of material advantage (there is unlikely to be any), but in 
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the multiplicity of ontological positions which then become available to those men 
prepared to disengage from hegemonic, oppressive patterns of masculine 
behaviour. Simply put, those men who do positively respond to the questions laid 
down by feminists/feminisms are likely to have opened to them multiple and 
positive ways of being a man, outside of traditional gender stereotypes (Whitehead 
and Barrett, 2001: 357). 
The idea of gendering men as men is almost essentialist, or at least begins to question 
where issues of essentialism might arise. However, instead of delving into the politics of 
the question Whitehead turns it into a 'highly personal' project which side-steps these 
issues. One would also think that the question of 'who am I as a man?' might, instead of 
enabling/forcing a move out of traditional masculinity, allow a fruitful engagement with 
traditional masculinity. This might be a way of meeting the 'requirement' he cites as 
coming from feminism to engage with ways of being a man. Instead we have a 
particularization (and therefore de-politicization) of the positioning of individual men. 
Any question of collectivism for (white) men is personalized and anti-essentialized. 
In contrast here is Frantz Fanon's description of discovering for himself his blackness in a 
racist white society: 
I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my 
ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, 
intellectual deficiency, fetichism [sic], racial defects, slave-ships (Fanon, 1967: 
112). 
There is no liberation for Fanon in discovering 'his' blackness in the way that Whitehead 
poses liberation for white men discovering their gender. A l l Fanon comes across are 
derogatory, restricting, binding stereotypes that are used to define him. The white world 
defines and makes (imposes) his subject position through the stereotypes that it imposes on 
him or as he puts it "// is the racist who creates his inferior " (Fanon, 1967: 93). The only 
subject positionings and spaces let^ available to Fanon are those that are created by the 
dominant: 
A l l round me the white man, above the sky tears at its navel, the earth rasps under 
my feet, and there is a song, a white song. A l l this whiteness bums me [...]. While 
I was forgetting, forgiving, and wanting only to love, my message was flung back 
in my face like a slap. The white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all 
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participation. A man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave 
like a black man - or at least a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and the 
world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to get back to where 
I belonged (Fanon, 1967: 114-5). 
Fanon is barred from participation. His role is prescribed for him, he is restricted and 
defined by the white world. ' A man was expected to behave like a man', which points to a 
freer, less bounded set of roles and possibilities, Fanon was expected to behave 'like a 
black man', 'like a nigger'. Any role for Fanon as black man is prescribed by the white 
world and set within certain rigid constraints. Fanon is constrained within a singular, 
stereotyped identity, bounded to his body and his skin colour. Fanon is esscntialized and 
because he is essentialized by the white world, his behaviour is prescribed and interpreted 
only in certain ways. The white world will only see Fanon in a certain way and it will only 
allow him to act in a certain manner; as a black man, as a nigger. And in a similar manner 
Rosi Braidotti also sees that the only spaces/places/definitions left to women and of 
women come from the dominant: "Woman is other - excluded, alienated, denied, a blank 
screen onto which man projects his anguished terror of death, his contempt for, and fear of, 
all that is pre-rational and corporeal" (BraidoUi, 1991: 157). In Braidotti's analysis women 
too are essentialized - they have an essence imposed onto them by white men. 
In his own analysis Whitehead was lef^ with what I would think would be the extreme 
material advantage of the availability of a 'multiplicity of ontological positions' and not 
just as he views it, the singular, rigid and fixed position of old or traditional masculinity. 
However, historically it has been the biologically fixed and essentialized position of others 
that has allowed white men their multiplicity. Richard Dyer examines the phenomenon of 
multiple positions for the dominant in relation to white people and explains it as part of 
their dominance: 
In Western representation whites are overwhelmingly and disproportionately 
predominant, have the central and elaborated roles, and above all are placed as the 
norm, the ordinary the standard. Whites are everywhere in representation. Yet 
precisely because of this and their placing as norm they seem not to be represented 
to themselves as whites, but as people who are variously gendered, classed, 
223 
sexualized and abled. At the level of racial representation, in other words, whites 
are not of a certain race, they're just the human race (Dyer, 1997: 3). 
For dominant groups such as white people or men, it is neither their colour or their gender 
that matters or constrains them or their representations. For the dominant a multiplicity of 
roles, 'the central and elaborated roles' and representations have always been available and 
it is in part this that has meant that white men for example have not been systematically 
essentialized. And if we return for a moment to the idea of white people being invisible, 
David Theo Goldberg, although most often discussing black people as being invisible 
(unseeable) says that whites can be "[u]nseen racially, that is unseen as racially marked -
or seen precisely as racially unmarked - whites could be everywhere" (Goldberg, 1996: 
182). For white people, their whiteness enables movement and freedom even as others, in 
this white economy, are restricted by their biological skin colour. Whilst (still) placed as 
the nonn and the standard, white men are not being portrayed as men-as-a-group, but as 
individual men who are variously 'classed, sexualized and abled'. There is no suggestion 
of essentialism or fixity. 
Fanon's skin colour in white society severely limits the choices available to him. His 
bodily 'difference' (biology) affects his position and reception in society. Fanon's identity, 
behaviour and reception are determined (from the dominant outside) by his biology; Fanon 
is essentialized. However, for white men such as Whitehead, Peterson or Beynon, freedom 
of choice comes with the split between biology and destiny or position — they are not 
essentialized - and by insisting on the split between biology and destiny entire, they 
suggest that neither is anyone else and therefore deny discrimination. Thus in this model 
Fanon will be seen to have no (biological) limits on his choices. Unfortunately, what is so 
often missed by masculinity studies is the fact, documented by Rowena Chapman within 
masculinity studies in 1988 but ignored since, that that hegemonic, white, patriarchal 
culture itself is based on essentialism - not on essentializing white middle class men but on 
essentializing others: women and people of colour (Chapman and Rutherford, 1988). 
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White men have never had to be essentialized and merely denying that others are does not 
impinge on discrimination or essentialism itself at all. 
For marginalized people the idea of strategic essentialism has always been an important 
one. If one is to be essentialized by the dominant then using that categorization as a way 
of gaining a political voice can be very useful indeed. Stephen Whitehead discusses the 
question of standpoint for women coming to the conclusion that although it can be useful 
in allowing women a place from which to speak, ultimately deciding that any idea of a 
singular standpoint is 'untrue' (Whitehead,2001: 353-4). He writes of the development of 
masculinity studies: 
As this critical enquiry has developed more subtle and sophisticated perspectives, 
so has a tension emerged between balancing [the] recognition of differences 
between men with the 'fact' of patriarchy, 'gender order', and other such blanket 
polifical categorisations of male oppression. [...] 
The question of'men's sameness' is, then, directly linked to the debates 
surrounding a core feminist/womanist epistemology and ontology (Whitehead and 
Barrett, 2001: 355). 
This however is not quite correct. Within patriarchal culture women have been imagined 
as having a feminine core and much of women's oppression has come with this 
essentializing that equates femininity with 'biological' femaleness in an oppressive and 
static manner. However, it is the essentializing of women and other oppressed groups that 
has allowed white men the multiple positions they have always enjoyed along with the 
ability to move. The fixed stereotyping of others need not have any kind of detrimental 
effect on those who perpetrate and perpetuate these stereotypes from a position of power. 
Therefore the essentializing of 'women' does not logically lead to the essentializing of 
'men' any more than the essentializing of black people will lead to the essentializing of 
white people. Within the unequal relations of power, implications for different groups 
quite obviously differ and it is these power differentials that mean that white men have 
always had a multiplicity of ontological positions available to them. 
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Whitehead is suggesting the deconstruction of 'blanket categorizations' o f men. However 
deconstructing the dominant, be it whiteness, heterosexuahty or masculinity is a very 
different thing to the deconstruction of (truly) marginalized identities and subjectivities. 
And where it is suggested that the deconstruction of these dominant identities will lead to 
the deconstruction of unequal, marginalized identities, Rosi Braidotti argues: 
One cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted. [...] In 
order to denounce the death [or fragmentation] of the subject one must first have 
gained the right to speak as one; in order to demystify meta-discourse one must first 
gain access to a place of enunciation. Fragmentation of the self being women's 
basic historical condition, [...] we are left with the option of theorizing a general 
'becoming woman' for both sexes, or else flatly stating that women have been post-
structuralist since the beginning of time (Braidotti, 1991: 122). 
Marginalized people have always experienced fi-agmented subject positions that it is 
difficult to speak from because these identities have been essentialized and created by 
white patriarchal society. Deconstruction of the dominant can, in this way, be seen as 
merely re-stating the subject position that comes with being white, male and middle class. 
Taking this argument the only way that white middle class men can (supposedly) 
deconstruct their own position as dominant, make it particular and multiple, is by having 
that position in the first place. De-mystifying, 'confessing' masculinity, 'making' it 
multiple and insisting on fragmentation in this way, is just re-affirming what already was, 
(re)occupying the position of the dominant and speaking of a self that has always been 
individualized, multiple and particular. 
4.5 Learning to be Middle Class 
If biology becomes entirely separated from role, i f one can (theoretically) choose whiteness 
or blackness, choose gayness or straightness, choose middle class-ness or not and choose 
the nuclear family or not, it follows that there can be no reason why we should not all 
choose to live in the middle class, heterosexual, conjugal nuclear family and accept white, 
dominant ideas about the way to live 'properly'. The fi-ee choice argument so often 
expressed in masculinity and family studies seems to presuppose that we all live in an 
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ideologically free manner. In order for choice to be truly free there must be no 
institutionalized ideals, values, compulsions or morals. As this is patently not the case in 
contemporary British society the idea of *free choice' must come with some (moral) 
prescriptions and predetermined ideas about which choices are *best'. This returns us to 
the old Marxian argument that we do not consciously make our society, rather our society 
makes our consciousness. And as Simon During writes in relation to Althusser's theories 
of dominant ideology: 
its primary role is to construct an imaginary picture of civil life, especially the 
nuclear family, as natural, and, most of all, each individual as 'unique' and 'free'. 
Ideology fragments real connections and interdependencies, producing a picture of 
social relations which overemphasizes individual freedom and autonomy (During, 
1993:6). 
Within this supposed plethora of choice the nuclear family is being given out as just one 
choice among many, and heterosexuality as one choice of at least two. However, within 
white, hegemonic, patriarchal culture the choice to live in the heterosexual nuclear family 
must be the (ideo)logical choice. We still live in a white dominated, patriarchal, capitalist 
society and it has to be acknowledged that the family-of-choice for this society is the 
straight, nuclear version and that certain ideologies and moralities are still dominant: 
witness family studies' preoccupation with 'personal growth', 'autonomy' and 
'responsibility' (not everyone's first choice of values). 
The supposed de-centring of the nomial has turned it into a choice. If we are all able to 
exercise autonomous choice we are left with a meritocracy whereby there is no reason why 
we shouldn't 'choose' to live in the middle class nuclear family as we are told, one may as 
well choose this fonn as any other. Formed as a concept from Anthony Giddens' naming 
of what he calls 'pure relationships' (Giddens, 1992), the family of choice is described as 
non-biological or not necessarily biological, networks of friends, lovers and possibly kin. 
Weeks et al describe Giddens' vision, saying that he implies: "a radical democratization of 
the interpersonal domain, because [intimacy] assumes not only that the individual is the 
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ultimate maker of his or her own life, but also equality between partners, and their freedom 
to choose lifestyles and forms of partnership" (Weeks et al, 1999: 85). Re-moved from 
biology we are left with the ultimate meritocracy in which it doesn't matter i f you're white, 
black, poor or rich, straight or gay, you can choose what you want to be. 
In masculinity studies and family studies even when diversity and difference are discussed 
as positive and with possibilities of creativity and energy, it tends to be the white middle 
classes who are being addressed and the positive changes made possible by diversity are 
discussed only in relation to how it will benefit this group. When endorsing or 
'legitimating' new forms of the family, there are certain criteria that, it seems, 'ought' to be 
met. In the introduction to The new Family? Silva and Smart write: 
The possibility of satisfying the desire for personal growth and autonomy varies 
according to the available cultural and economic capital possessed by each 
individual, in terms of age, gender, professional qualifications, position in the 
labour market, sexual preferences, parental obligations and so on. Personal scripts 
are written in the context of the different social and economic locations of families, 
as well as individuals, within wider social structures. But there is now more than 
one normative guideline to provide the context for these choices. Moreover, social 
class, gender, sexuality, age and ethnicity no longer operate as inevitable or one-
dimensional pre-determining aspects of these normative guidelines (Silva and 
Smart, 1999: 6-7, my emphases). 
Silva and Smart are arguing (after a small nod at personal circumstances) that there are 
choices that are available to (almost) everyone and which provide plural 'normative 
guidelines'. Their recognition of 'more than one normative guideline' must be directed at 
the white middle classes as for everyone else who is not white and middle class there have 
always been different, alternative and plural 'nonnative guidelines' as the normative 
guideline was not available to these people. However, throughout current family studies it 
is the idea of choice that appears to be the important one and it appears the only 'proper' 
choice to be made is that of 'personal growth and autonomy'. Other values that may play a 
part in different types of family are ignored. Thus other (less sexy) values/morals such as 
duty, responsibility, obedience for example and many, many others are just not mentioned 
in the new studies. What this shows at least is that 'personal growth and autonomy' are 
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specific (white, middle class) values, (ones that one has to be able to afford), and therefore 
they are not necessarily universal values. 
Even as family studies texts such as Silva and Smart's seem to celebrate plural forms of the 
family the actual roles of that those families are supposed to play remain relatively static; 
What seems to be occurring is that the notion of family is being stretched to cover 
everything. [...] [T]his stretching of the concept of the family [...] means that the 
sharp boundaries which are presumed to exist between 'proper' families and less 
desirable families can no longer operate, either conceptually or politically. Using 
the concept of the family in this new sense may ultimately carry wide political 
connotations by dissolving the idea that only one kind of family (namely the 
heterosexual, conjugal family) can produce moral, autonomous, but caring citizens. 
Accepting diverse families of intimacy and caring as legitimate forms of family 
will de-centre the nuclear family through a process of gradual cultural change 
(Silva and Smart, 1999: 10, my emphases). 
Although (again) using the singular concept of the family (heterosexual and conjugal) to 
rest their arguments of diversity and change on, Silva and Smart do in fact argue that there 
is a new family or, more accurately, new families. These 'new' forms o f the family can, 
they argue, (and therefore should) produce 'moral', 'autonomous' and 'caring' individuals, 
or as they call them, 'citizens'. The implicit idea here is that the family (of whatever form) 
has a 'moral' obligation to society to perform a certain role and produce only a certain 
type of person. Just who decides what 'moral' is and who 'legitimates' which forms of 
family is not discussed. Silva and Smart appear to be accepting without question the 
ideological/social role that the white nuclear family plays in patriarchal society and arguing 
that other forms of the family can do it too. 
In the context of fictional discussion this is one of the lessons to be learnt in About A Boy. 
Wil l , who has shunned intimacy for his entire thirty six years, through his contact with 
Marcus and Fiona, through the mess and the fog, begins himself to grow emotionally, 
become more responsible, moral and caring as he begins to accept that this messy 'family' 
too is his family of choice or at least one part of it. Near the end of the book Marcus and 
his friend Ellie - another part of Marcus' family of choice (she says she's adopted him), 
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get arrested. Marcus' dad, his girlfriend. Wi l l , Fiona and Ellie's mother all turn up at the 
police station: 
Wil l looked at this strange little group, his gang for the day, and tried to make some 
sense of it. A l l those ripples and connections! He was not a man given to mystical 
moments, even under the influence of narcotics, but he was very worried that he 
was having one now, for some reason: maybe it was something to do with Marcus 
walking away from his mother and over to him. [...] Some of these people he 
hadn't known until today; some of them he had only known for a little while, and 
even then he couldn't say that he knew them well. But here they were anyway [...] 
all of them bound to each other in ways that it would be almost impossible to 
explain to anyone who had just wandered in. Will couldn't recall ever having been 
caught up in this sort of messy, sprawling, chaotic web before, it was almost as i f 
he had been given a glimpse of what it was like to be human. It wasn't too bad, 
really, he wouldn't even mind being human on a full-time basis (Hornby, 1998: 
264). 
It is the ripples and connections, the chaos and the mess that matter, but ultimately in the 
book and in the family studies theory, it is the choice that really matters, and the family as 
(any sort oO unit. Will has been given an insight into a type of family that, for all its 
faults, is not really dysfijnctional, or not in the way that his own, rich unhappy family was. 
And where Will 's biological family failed to make him a responsible or moral adult, this 
new family of choice has achieved the oft stated goals of the family within Western, 
capitalist, patriarchal society. The ideological/ political 'reasons' for the formation of the 
nuclear family in our society are left intact and in place whilst allowing other forms of the 
family to undertake the same role. As the fact that ideas of'morality', 'autonomy' (or not) 
and 'caring' may well differ across cultures and political positions is left unquestioned so 
the dominant ideologies are left unquestioned and the roles that the family is meant to play 
remain static. In this case it will not matter i f the white, heterosexual, nuclear family is 
*de-centred' as its ideological effects and atYects can be manifested through a multiplicity 
of family forms. 
( onclusion 
This chapter has traced the themes of this thesis to their logical conclusion: a re-
establishment o f ' o l d ' values, wrapped up in a new rhetoric of change, multiplicity, choice 
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and inclusion. This rhetoric denies an exclusive normality, but begins to reconstruct a new 
inclusive normality - one to which anyone (in true meritocratic style) may aspire to. We 
will therefore finish this chapter by looking at the new (moral) prescriptions for aspiration 
in today's society, which perhaps unsurprisingly tend to look very much like the 'old ' 
ones. 
Helen Wilkinson in The Global Third Way Debate speaks at length about the type of 
'intact' family forms that are needed for today's economy and society, and one of her main 
points is about education: 
Adults need the skills and competencies required to cope in an increasingly flexible 
and competitive economy, so too they need a more robust set of interpersonal and 
communication skills to cope with more demanding and fluid personal 
relationships. The challenge will be to create opportunities to leani - rather than 
programmes relying in vain on coercion or moral exhortation (Wilkinson, 2001: 
228). 
Here education is said to be necessary for enabling people to be able to cope with fluidity. 
Education is needed in order to be able to cope with both flexibility and fluidity — one 
needs educating into these (middle class) values and what need for 'moral exhortation' i f 
one has already learnt these morals within the family? This model of education involves 
'interpersonal' and 'communication' skills; the personal will be changed. In Wilkinson's 
model; "[t]omorrow's family should be a learning family and lifelong learning about 
relationships will be key. [... There will be] agencies which provide advice and 
information about relationships and parenting" (Giddens, 2001: 229). The working classes 
will be educated into, i f not actually being middle class, then at least accepting and 
learning middle class values, modes of relationships and morals. 
For Wilkinson in a similar manner to other areas of family studies, it does not actually 
really matter what form the family takes (although the nuclear fonn is to be preferred), but 
the family, its morals, commitments and responsibilities does matter. She speaks about 
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fostering a 'marriage culture', whereby education is the first goal, but encouraging this 
'marriage culture' is the second: 
There is a direct public policy interest here. Finance is a major factor. Weakened 
families cost the state money both directly and indirectly. In this context the state 
has a public interest in strengthening families, regardless of their structure. 
Families are the foundation of civil society, where we first learn moral values. 
Families generate social capital - the trust and relationship skills which enable 
individuals to cooperate (Wilkinson, 2001: 224). 
In these models the inclusion of (most) groups has a definite agenda. And the method of 
implementing this agenda is far more likely to work in the interest of hegemonic power 
structures than exclusion and hatred. In this way we can all learn to be 'moral', productive 
workers, family members and citizens. The 'family' of whatever structure will be 
'strengthened' and 'moral values' imbibed. In this model it must follow that it will be 
those who do not choose to be 'strengthened' and who may reject or disagree with the 
espoused 'moral values' who will be excluded. Inclusion means homogenization and is 
not so very different from Matthew Arnold's ideas about teaching the working classes the 
value of middle class culture so as they won't revolt (in any way) (Arnold, 1865, in 
Lipman, 1994). 
In relation to class what 'choice' means is that we can (and should) all learn to be middle 
class. In one of the more extreme examples of the dominant addressing the dominant, 
Silva and Smart discuss these changes in relation to 'women's' lives: 
For a woman to have a professional lifestyle she does not need to marry a 
professional but only to obtain a suitable degree or diploma. More and more 
women have understood that this is a much more secure route to a decent standard 
of living than marriage can provide. And if this woman found that her marriage did 
not provide the expected satisfactions in tenns of identity, affection, and sexuality, 
she could leave the marriage. She might lose her illusions, her home, and some of 
the time she might have wanted to spend with her children, but she would not lose 
her job, her pension or the vital currency of her professional qualifications (Silva 
and Smart, 1999: 6, my emphases). 
Silva and Smart are describing a fictional woman. But 'this woman' has the opportunity, 
finances, time and prior education that will allow her to 'only' have to obtain a degree of 
diploma in order to lose her home without losing childcare, her job or her 'pension'. The 
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fantasy is a middle class and probably a white one. The discussion of choice in family 
form therefore is also bounded within the white middle classes although this is never made 
explicit. However by not making this explicit the notion of choice is left hanging without 
the context of economic circumstance, available (or acceptable) cultural capital, race or 
truly 'different' expectations and values. If the 'fantasy' family form is still white, and 
middle class it is interesting that in all the discussion the 'alternative' family form cited is 
always that of the homosexual family of choice, which because it is never classed or raced, 
is implicitly white and middle class. Other forms of the family such as working class 
single parent families or black or Asian families, althougli mentioned in connection with 
the changes to the white middle class heterosexual family, are themselves never held up as 
models for alternative family forms. The discussion about 'different' and 'alternative' 
forms of the family to the nuclear form itself re-sets up the nuclear fomi as the nomial. 
Bart Moore-Gilbert discusses Homi Bhabha's work: 
Bhabha proposes a conception of cultural difference which does not aspire to 
'equalizing' migrant with 'host' cultures by conceiving of the specific social 
practices (such as 'parenting') or institutions [like the family] as interchangeably 
equivalent but which instead respects the heterogenous - even 'incommensurable' 
- histories, identities and customs of the fonneriy colonized (Moore-Gilbert, 2000: 
461). 
In this model difference means difference and difference that may not be comfortable. 
True difference may not 'fit ' . Silva and Smart and many advocates of family studies, by 
making other family fonns 'interchangeably equivalent' to the nuclear family fomi, from 
this model actually deny difference and keep the ideological reasons-for-being of the white 
nuclear fomi in place. Merely 'replacing' the white nuclear family with other family forms 
that carry the same values and reasons-for-being will not de-centre the nuclear family 
form. The family is a societal institution and David Theo Goldberg argues that: 
It bears pointing out [...] the inherently homogenizing logic of institutions. In their 
dominant logical fonn, institutions are predicated principally on instituting, 
operating, and (re)producing homogeneity. If the state minimally is a collection of 
institutions, manifesting and (re)ordering itself necessarily in and through the logic 
of such institutional arrangement, then one could say that the state inherently is the 
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institutionalization of homogeneity. Liberal states like Britain, the Netherlands, 
and the US that claim to furnish the structures for heterogeneity to flourish in this 
sense actually promote contradictory aims, purposes that pull in competing 
directions. Hence the anachronistic language one hears of 'managing diversity,' of 
'ordering difference,' of 'unifying in difference.' (Goldberg, 2000: 81-2). 
The nuclear family is a state institution, and according to Goldberg this wil l inevitably lead 
to a homogenizing pull. In this case this involves the homogenization of diverse family 
fonns into one 'moral', 'caring' lump that will not argue with itself The rhetoric of family 
studies always seems to endorse the idea of 'unifying in difference', but the way that that 
'unification' is to take place is always prescribed and in fact, is quite static. 
These prescriptions and the re-inclusion of aspirational ideals almost take us fijll circle. 
Normality as an aspirational ideal remains so even as it is supposedly fragmented into the 
margins. Jace Weaver points out a problem with postmodernism that can be directly 
equated with my critique of the theorizing of masculinity and family studies: "[i]ts error 
[...] is that it mistakes having deconstructed something theoretically for having displaced it 
politically" (Weaver, 2000: 226). Supposedly deconstructing the concepts of the nuclear 
family and white middle class masculinity will not dispel the position of the normal in our 
society or displace those who benefit fi-om it. Normality is too deeply embedded in 
history, in social, cultural and political practice to be banished so easily. And the 'easy' 
theorization of making the normal visible, re-moving it into the margins and multiplying it 
is just that: too easy. Masculinity studies and family studies are working from the centre 
and until this itself is theorized and worked through properiy then almost inevitably the 
centre will end up working in its own interests. Espousing multiplicity and choice for all 
may get rid of some of the guilt the white middle classes carry but i f we retum to the 
beginning of the thesis and Mamdani's idea of present beneficiaries and victims rather than 
past perpetrators and victims, notions of multiplicity and choice do not begin to address 
present benefit from the current system for the white middle classes, just as demonizing the 
supposed past perpetrators of inequalities will not change anything now. Current theories 
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of normality separate it out from the social and political membranes of society. Normality 
cannot be 'cut out' and removed into the margins, and the theoretical and representational 
attempts to do so do indeed take us full circle whereby in denying the normal it remains 
unsaid, invisible, universalized and singular. Normality still sits at the centre of our 
society. 
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Conclusion: Towards Re-Centring The Centre: Acknowledging Biologically 
Determined Privilege and the Existence of Normalit>' 
Throughout this thesis the ideas of visibility and embodiment in relation to the nonnal have 
been crucial. From the stated invisibility, silence and disembodiment of those in the centre 
discussed as being cited by the new studies in chapter one, to the impossibility of that 
invisibility argued through in chapter two. The exposure of chaos, abnormality, 
oppression, repression and crisis being re-read into the past discussed in chapter three led 
to an exploration of how a singular conception of normality and the 'old ' allows for an 
untroubled advocation of multiplicity and anti-essentialism by white academics. The 
marginalization of the nonnal enabled by these exposures and discussions in the academy 
and in the media, by the repositioning of what is visible, and by the strategic re-
embodiment of white men leads to a new position of aspiration that is (supposedly) 
inclusive, meritocratic. Throughout this thesis 1 have argued that the new discourse, its 
enunciations and archive are not followed by anything revolutionary and that the 'radical' 
discourse is becoming mainstream, its manoeuvres, rhetoric, representations and 
methodologies working in concert to maintain the current status quo of the white middle 
classes. However, the new discourse has had some material effects that can benefit people 
albeit that the ideologies and values behind these changes benefit only certain people and 
uphold a political vision and ideology that has not really changed. The conclusion to this 
thesis looks at the possibilities of a different type of visibility and embodiment for those in 
the centre, one that can lead away from the blinding light of individualism without evoking 
the spectres of victimization, feminization or crisis which usually accompany any idea of 
visible collective identity for those in the centre. This conclusion examines the 
transformative possibilities for those that benefit from the historic construction of the 
white, middle class, heterosexual nomial offered by a strategy of the margins not examined 
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by the new studies before in relation to themselves: strategic essentialism. This concluding 
discussion argues for an re-acknowledgment of the centre as the centre and of the normal 
as the normal. It argues for a re-view of the current status of the normal and a re-view 
those who have historically, and who still do benefit from the exclusions, prescriptions and 
aspirational ideals of the normal. 
That the new discourse has led to some changes is not in dispute. On the seventeenth of 
October 2002 the House of Lords threw out a bill that would have allowed unmarried and 
gay couples to adopt children. However, although there still exist those who believe in 
prejudice, exclusion, a certain type of morality, and a particular idea of 'family values', the 
main thrust of British society is away from being seen to endorse these values and beliefs. 
In this particular power play the newer views (quite rightly) prevailed and the bill was 
passed on November 6, 2002. As 1 hope has been apparent throughout the thesis it is not 
so much the stated aims of those espousing the new discourse that I am critical of, it is the 
universalizing of these aims, the moralizing that goes with the discourse, the methods that 
are being employed to attempt to gain these aims, the blindness of some of the theory to 
other points of view and the consequences (or not) that the methods used inevitably 
engender. Personally 1 am very glad that unmarried and gay couples can adopt children 
but it is interesting that single people - gay or straight - could adopt children already. This 
new law endorses 'committed' couples as able to provide 'legitimate' familial 
environments. The new law must require that the unmarried couples 'legitimate' 
themselves in some way before the law (otherwise how would the law recognize them as 
'couples'?) This legitimation, one assumes, will become a different or alternative fonn of 
'marriage', even as marriage itself is denied to gay couples. Thus we come around almost 
fijll circle again whereby the nuclear family itself is re-legitimized. 
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Almost full circle, but not quite. In true hegemonic fashion something has been given. As 
we have seen Stuart Hall argues that this is the nature of hegemonic consent; eventually, 
within a discourse, the interests of the powerful will come to be represented as being 
directly associated with the will of the majority of the population. He argues: 
One of the means by which the powerful continue to rule with consent and 
legitimacy is [...] i f the interests of a particular class or power bloc can be aligned 
with or made equivalent to the general interests of the majority. Once this system 
of equivalences has been achieved, the interests of the minority and the will of the 
majority can be 'squared' because they can both be represented as coinciding in the 
consensus, on which all sides agree. The consensus is the medium, the regulator, 
by means of which this necessary alignment (or equalization) between power and 
consent is accomplished. But if the consensus of the majority can be so shaped that 
it squares with the will of the powerful, then particular (class) interests can be 
represented as identical with the consensus will of the people (Hall, 1982: 362). 
At the moment in the discourse of the nonnal, recent rhetoric espouses the dismantling of 
the nonnal and the exclusive white, middle class male power bases and speaks of the goals 
of inclusion and equality for all regardless of sex, race or class. These are all very 
seductive goals that appear to be of benefit to the majority of the population. However the 
methods employed to aUain these goals and even the goals themselves are, as we have 
seen, suspect and even where there is no intention of representing the interests of the 
powerful. The way that the relations of power work makes it almost impossible for any 
one consolidated discourse not to favour the interests of the powerful unless one is fiilly 
aware of this possibility and guards against it all the way. 
However, as 1 argued in the introduction to this thesis, the discursive movement described 
is neither singular nor complete. And the fact that the discourse this thesis has made it its 
business to examine is not all-encompassing also demonstrates that there are always places 
and spaces outside dominant discourses and this in itself can give us hope. Another cause 
for hope must be the stated and implicit intentions of those (away from party politics) 
involved in creating the new hegemonic movement. Much of the theorizing and discussion 
takes the path of (almost) least resistance in 'making visible', 'pluralizing' and intending to 
'equalize' without too much thought. Support and consent may be gained by slightly 
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underhand means through the 'we're all the same really' equalizing rhetoric and in several 
places discussion might be just wrong and both theoretical and material consequences 
damaging but at least those engaging in the discussions appear to mean well. As we know 
the road to hell is paved with good intentions, however in this case it depends on how 
much will, energy and willingness there is coming from the white middle classes to truly 
precipitate change and it is to the possibility of change that I turn next - and finally. 
As we have seen one of the most strongly argued positions of family and masculinity 
studies is that of anti-essentialism. The polemic is understandable as historically the 
essentializing of the marginalized has been one of the most insidious, abiding and 
damaging elements of oppression. However, a vital point has been missed and that is, as 1 
argued above in chapter four, that the entire Western power base is premised on 
essentialism. WJiite male power comes from essentialism and an acknowledgement of this 
fact and a closer look at the concept of essentialism may illuminate a path out of the double 
binds we keep finding ourselves in. 'Essentialism' has been a despised concept for many 
years. However, also for many years, there have been those who have seen dangers in un-
critical and complete anti-essentialism itself and its power to stop dialogue in its tracks. 
On the first page of the 1994 book The Essential Difference Naomi Schor describes the 
"certainty' that accompanies so much anti-essentialism as 'the policing o f feminism by the 
shock troops of anti-essentialism. [...] Borrowed from the time-honored vocabulary of 
philosophy, the word essentialism has been endowed within the context of feminism with 
the power to reduce to silence, to excommunicate, to consign to oblivion" (Schor and 
Weed 1994: vii). 'Pure' anti-essentialism allows for no space outside itself that is not 
'wrong' and/or 'immoral'. Schor argues that the dogma of anti-essentialism precludes 
discussion. For those who have been marginalized however, strategic essentialism has 
been a vital step that has helped activate radical politics, resistant representations and 
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theory and to a certain extent change, at least, as we have been seeing, in acceptable 
dominant rhetoric if not always in material circumstances. 
In terms of this thesis, feminism, queer theory and postcolonialism would not exist without 
having utilized strategic essentialism at various times. Where we saw in chapter four 
Fanon's lament that the only spaces left for him to occupy were those created for him (and 
his 'kind') by the racist hegemony this gives us a clue to the political strategy of strategic 
essentialism. For many postcolonial, queer and feminist theorists (Spivak 1993, Hall 1997, 
Bordo 1993, Butler 1990, amongst many others), the oppressed, marginalized and 
essentialized positions and definitions of black people, Asian people, gay people or women 
meted out by the dominant white, heterosexual patriarchy provided the basis for collective 
resistance. Although this collectivism itself can carry problems of equalization, some 
denial of difference and silencing of various people's experience, there is no doubt that it 
served and still serves a useful purpose, even in the pointing out of these problems. It is 
largely because of strategic essentialism that the exclusive and exclusionary white, 
patriarchal, heterosexual nonnal began to be questioned from the margins in the first place. 
The vehement (and unified) anti-essentialism of masculinity studies and family studies 
however, does not allow any engagement with the concept of strategic essentialism. And 
when it is discussed, it is only in relation to marginal theorists, and only the problems of 
this strategy are concentrated on. Masculinity studies and family studies when they 
mention strategic essentialism, point to the idea that it has been almost completely 
discredited (Peterson, 1998). Stephen Whitehead (briefly) considers the notion of strategic 
essentialism (whilst not naming it as such) through the concept of standpoint theory. He 
cites Nancy Harslock's argument that there is a position from which women can see 'male 
supremacy' but comes to rest on his own reading of Sandra Harding's work which he 
argues: 
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[the] questioning any notion of a singular 'feminist standpoint' or indeed, of an 
identity 'woman', appears to be aligning more closely with the multiplicity of 
indentities [sic] highlighted in post-structuralist and postmodern perspectives [...]. 
In so doing, Harding avoids the accusation of being drawn into the gender 
dichotomising which underpins much of the enlightenment and (malestream) 
modem philosophizing. For can any group of individuals be said to have a unique 
and valid everyday knowledge? Does not this perspective repeat the essentialistic, 
Cartesian assumption of'core truths'? 
[...] The question remains then, can there be a privileging of women's knowledge 
- is 'woman' a universal category? 
Following a post-structuralist position, I would argue that neither 'man' nor 
'woman' are reducible to a priori, essential or grounded ontologies (Whitehead and 
Barrett, 2001:353). 
Whitehead is of course right, his questions are important and pertinent and the conclusion 
he draws is correct. However, Whitehead's poststructuralist conclusion is discussed as 
being the only one 'truth'. Whitehead's assumption here is that 'women' have created 
their own category and are fiindamental in the creation of a/the gender dichotomy. Thus in 
Whitehead's own words, Sandra Harding "avoids the accusation" - but who is accusing? I 
understand the difficulties, but shifting the blame of marginalization, continuing 
marginalization and oppression onto minority 'groups' is not helpful, particulariy in a book 
that claims to be deconstructing white masculinity and the white male hegemony. At this 
point in history it hardly seems useftil for the white centre to 'accuse' the margins of 
upholding that very centre that marginalized them in the first place. Where Whitehead 
cites his 'fact' from a poststructuralist position he forgets that all theory is implicated in 
ideology and patriarchy and therefore as Elizabeth Grosz says that "the decision about 
whether to 'use' essentialism or to somehow remain beyond it (even if these extremes were 
possible) is a question of calculation, not a self-evident certainty" (Grosz, 1994b: 95). But 
at the moment all we get from masculinity and family studies is the 'self-evident certainty' 
of the absolute correctness of anti-essentialism. 
It is possible to 'accuse' the margins because in the world of masculinity studies and 
family studies these self-same disciplines are deconstructing the white centre. However, 
where feminism and postcolonial theorists have been grappling with the problem of the 
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white, bourgeois, patriarchal centre for decades both masculinity studies and family studies 
are extremely new disciplines which claim parentage from feminism and postcolonialism. 
Whitehead himself says that the sociology of masculinity has moved from a first wave, 
through a second wave to a third. He cites the 1950's as the start of the first wave, then 
cites theorists/ sociologists from the early 1980s as the second wave and then says that 
from the mid 1990s to now this is the third wave (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 15). From 
Whitehead's 'second wave' this gives us approximately twenty years to move from the 
'discredited' (by feminism) 'old myths', certainties, singularities, essentialisms, and the 
idea of power-by-right through essentialism, immediately to multiplicities, pluralities, 
fragmentations, marginalizations and anti-essentialism. He says: 
[wjhile the critical analysis of men is barely two decades old, the developments 
ensuing from such study have been rapid and profound. It is now commonplace, 
for example, to assume the multiplicity of masculinities, and the importance of 
recognizing historical shifts in dominant and subordinated ways of being a man. 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 355). 
An academic discipline can perhaps move too quickly. If so then I argue that both 
masculinity studies and family studies have done so. This is in part because both emerged 
out of postcolonialism and feminism. Because of this, both disciplines assume that they 
can take as their starting point the theory (from the margins) that has gone before and build 
their own arguments on top of this. Thus Alan Peterson in Unmasking The Masculine 
gives a sensitive reading of the concept of strategic essentialism as it was employed by 
feminism, then moves on to the problems that feminists encountered with it. Peterson 
therefore ends up (albeit sympathetically) dismissing strategic essentialism as a usefijl 
strategy because he is only looking at it in relation to marginal theory; feminism, 
postcolonialism and queer theory (Peterson, 1998: 124). Because marginal theory appears 
to have 'gone through' strategic essentialism and 'come out the other side' the theorists of 
the centre dismiss it as having any relevance to their own theoretical or material positions. 
Thus theorists from the centre don't bother to engage with it for themselves or in relation 
to their own positions. Although strategic essentialism is discussed as having been a 
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(historically) useful step for 'other' people (Peterson, 1998, Connell, 1995, Whitehead in 
Whitehead and Barrett, 2001, Pease, 2000), the debate then always moves on, usually into 
a discussion of multiplying masculinity and guarding against essentialism. 
Strategic essentialism is based on fonning a collective; a grouping upon what white 
patriarchal culture has termed and defined as 'essence'. And as we saw in chapter one, any 
essentializing of white men, any suggestion of collectivity is represented as leading 
inevitably to men being feminized. Any sort of acknowledgment of the collective identity 
of white men always points to feminization or victimization (Robinson, 2000). At the 
moment, Sally Robinson when speaking about masculinity argues that any sort of 
collectivity for white men is only employed when white men as a group feel under threat; 
then collectivity is used as a strategy: 
Identity politics is only mobilized after the perception of victimization or injury; 
[...] the appeal of collectivity appears to depend on a felt experience of 
disempowerment. This is evident in the language in which calls for groups rights 
are couched; that language draws heavily on the moral and symbolic power of pain, 
victimization, and crisis, whether articulated from economic and social centers or 
their margins. [...] [Wjhite men do not willingly fold their individual identities into 
a group identity except around perceived losses of power, articulated as 
impingements of rights (Robinson, 2000: 7). 
In Robinson's articulation of the rhetoric of crisis, collective identity for white men is 
absolutely necessary. White men cannot be in crisis or victims unless they can identify 
themselves as white men.^^ The discourse of men-in-crisis subsumes differences between 
men into the discourse of victimization. Differences such as class and even race are 
subsumed because this discourse can only exist i f there is an identified collective identity 
for men and as we know, any type of strategic essentialism subsumes differences. The 
collective identity of wen in discussions and representations of crisis and victimization is 
more important than racial or class identities, in the discourse of crisis the identified men-
In discussing the fact that the notion of crisis has historically involved a notion of collective identity (albeit 
here a ver>' different identity and crisis) it is interesting to note that the first periodical for the National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People founded by W.E.B Du Bois, was entitled 77ie Crisis 
(James, 1967: 366). 
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as-a-group position of the backlash is mobilized into a strategic essentialism for men that 
38 
shows (or makes visible) the victimization of men. 
For white, middle class, heterosexual men at the moment, their own essentialized grouping 
as white men without the claims of feminization or victimization would be particularly 
unappealing, unattractive and perhaps 'unsafe' for the hegemonic order. As we saw above 
Stephen Whitehead, discussing masculinity studies admits that "as this critical enquiry has 
developed more subtle and sophisticated perspectives, so has a tension emerged between 
balancing this recognition of differences between men with the 'fact' of patriarchy, 'gender 
order', and other such blanket political categorizations of male oppression" (Whitehead 
and Barrett, 2001: 355). Perhaps understandably white men do not like to be placed under 
'blanket categorizations' that link them (all) with oppressive practices. Thus most 
masculinity studies texts appear to find the question of collectivity for white men as a 
group extremely uncomfortable and, in these circumstances, one can also understand the 
attractiveness of the purely anti-essentialist argument. 
If concepts of a nonnal, singular, unified and privileged white masculinity and its 'partner 
in crime' the white nuclear family can be deconstructed, dismantled and de-centred 
theoretically, then it seems that the job of masculinity studies and family studies will have 
been done. M y argument throughout the thesis has been that white men in particular, and 
white middle class people in general, do not want to be seen as having power because they 
are while, heterosexual, middle class or men. Within a meritocracy, essentialism that leads 
to inequalities because of visible biological differences must be denied. White men do not 
want to stand united as a group because, in the current climate it is no longer the case for 
Bob Pease has gone perhaps furthest in moving the usual sociological case studies along into what he calls 
"Conslrucling a Profeminisi Men's Siandpoini" and "Developing a Collective Politics Among Profeniinisi 
Men" (Pease, 2000; 5 and 7), but this lead lo him setting up a small *anti-patriarchal consciousness-raising 
group' (ibid) among 'self-defining profeminist' men. And although this is of course a start (witness women's 
consciousness raising groups in the 70's), and at least a move away from the purely collectivity-for-
viciimization strategy, there are surely enough theoretical tools and strategies out there already from 
feminism and postcolonialism that there must be more effective, subtle, direct and useful ways forward. 
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them that 'united we stand' because unity will bring visibility and accusations of 
essentialism and here, essentialism which leads to benefit, exclusion and visible inequality. 
Although ostensibly inviting everyone else in by 'dispelling' the centre, currently for the 
white middle classes it is a case of 'divided we stand'. As Bob Pease says: "1 problematize 
the use of 'men' as a generic category because it implies homogeneity" (Pease, 2000: 8). 
Men do not want to be seen as an homogeneous group, even i f in a white, heterosexist 
patriarchy they have accrued benefit and privilege as a group. 
An important part of the discussion in Schor and Weed's book hinges on the idea that anti-
essentialism itself can deconstruct and negate feminism and indeed the concept of 
'Women' or 'Woman' entire - the very basis of feminism. Which of course means that 
within masculinity studies anti-essentialism must do away with the idea of 'Men' or that 
terrible universalization 'Man' (even though there is no discussion of the impossibility 
therefore of 'masculinity' studies). The trouble is that fi-om at least one point of view both 
of these consequences are eminently desirable. If we can eliminate the concepts of 
'woman' and 'man' cannot we then dispel with sexism, prejudice and inequality? This of 
course is the argument coming out of both masculinity and family studies. However, this 
is to either ignore or forget that white men have and continue to experience benefit as 
white men. Merely theoretically denying the categories of 'man' or 'woman' not only 
denies current inequalities and prejudices but this denial will ser\'e to hide them. 
The entirety of the 'new^ project' as stated by masculinity and family studies is to de-ccnirQ 
the centre. As Stephen Whitehead puts it: 
[Men] must come to some appreciation of how 'being a man' inight affect and 
influence their expectations and experiences in a multitude of settings. For men, 
this act of self-reflexivity would be particulariy profound for it would serve to 
position them away from the centre and, consequently, women and 'others' away 
from the margins" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 352, my emphasis). 
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Whitehead is arguing that self-reflexivity for men will itself 'help' to de-centre them. He 
argues that, by positioning men away from the centre, ^others' will be positioned away 
from the margins. The only way I can see how this would work would be in a denial of the 
margins as margins thus evoking an inevitable denial of the inequality inherent in non-
white and non-male people being placed in those margins. However, a de-centring of the 
centre is the new 'radical' project. Bob Pease writes: "[t]he postmodern concept of the 
decentred subject [...] has greater critical potential for provoking inner change in men than 
the humanist notion of an innate self The aim is to decentre the dominating self of 
traditional masculinity and allow the possibility of fi-agmented and contradictory multiple 
selves" (Pease, 2000: 37). Postmodernism itself is deeply implicated in the project of 
decentring the centre. Postmodernism involves the move from the singular to the plural, 
from the universal to the particular, or the multiple particularities that people experience. 
Directly involved with these moves is the shif^ from disembodiment for white men to a 
notion of the embodied white man.^ ^ And in family studies Deborah Chambers attributes 
this phenomenon to postmodernism: 
As a process through which global struggles about tradition and modernity are 
being articulated, postmodernism involves an undermining of authority by de-
centring the orthodoxies of western culture. Its critique of universal values and 
fixed identities provides the political wherewithal for resisting racism, unitary 
nationalisms and other essentialist ideologies. As such it has been a critical force 
within the project of de-centring familialism and exposing it as an essentialist 
ideology (Chambers, 2001: 165). 
In this model, taking essentialism as one manifestation of the 'universal values and fixed 
identities' that Chambers cites, anti-essentialism will help to de-centre the centre and thus 
allow resistance to racism and sexism etc as the centre melts into the margins. 
I would like to conclude this thesis with the suggestion that what is needed instead ofade-
centring of the centre is a re-centring of the centre. In line with this idea my final 
suggestion in this thesis is that, taking just one of the strategies from postcolonialism and 
•'^  Interestingly, a part of the pluralizaiion and multiplicity project is, paradoxically, a change from the 
concept of men (plural, in a group) to a concept of the individual man (on his own). 
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feminism white, middle class male academics should explore the transformative 
possibilities that I believe may be inherent in a rigorous perusal of the concept of strategic 
essentialism. Strategic essentialism for white men and family studies would acknowledge 
and look directly at the essentialized group of white men and at the essentialized, white, 
heterosexual, nuclear family. This would involve a very different making-visible project to 
the one advocated by masculinity and family studies. In relation to men, a pursued project 
of strategic essentialism for white men would allow a re-centring that acknowledges the 
grouping of 'white, middle class men' and acknowledges the benefits and privileges that 
accrue to this group. Instead of insisting that white men used to be invisible, a policy of 
overt strategic essentialism for white men would have to acknowledge that this was always 
impossible as it has been white men as a group that have taken most of the visible 
positions of power. In this case Whitehead's self-reflexivity and examination of 'being a 
man' would not lead to positioning men 'away from the centre' (Whitehead, 2002: 352), 
but to (re)positioning men in the centre. 
Throughout this thesis I have been arguing that a mere denial of the centre will not change 
anything either politically or materially for anybody. It is because of this that 1 advocate 
an acknowledgement of the centre as the centre and the nonnal as the nornial. An approach 
of strategic essentialism for white men would not mean, as with marginalized groups (and 
the current making-the-centre-visible project), a case of pursuing a collective political 
identity in order to resist and highlight oppression and marginalization, rather it would 
involve utilizing a collective identity in order to highlight, and perhaps later resist, the 
privilege, benefit and undue advantage that (already) so often comes with being a white, 
middle class male in our society or to belonging to a white, heterosexual, middle class 
nuclear family. 
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The making-the-centre-visible project heralded by masculinity and family studies, as we 
have seen, involves highlighting and exposing failure, doubt and individuality. A policy of 
strategic essentialism for white men and an acknowledgement of the privileged and 
essentialized white, heterosexual nuclear family also involves a making visible project, but 
in this case highlighting the centre as the centre and not as marginalized. In the current 
project the white gaze is not being used (as it is by the marginal) to demonstrate the power 
held by the white patriarchal centre and exercised as oppression, rather it is designed to 
display the limits in power ft-om inside the white power base. A re-centring of the centre 
would involve using a technique of the margins proper in order to continue the work of the 
marginal in a different way and to continue to expose the power of the white centre and the 
benefit accruing to those who are nearest to the ideal of the nonnal. In this case the white 
gaze can be re-turned onto the centre in order to scrutinize it as the centre, not looking 
beneath the normal, but directly at it. In turn this would abolish the idea that is/was the 
marginal who have made white men visible, rather it could be seen that white men have 
always been visible as a group, but it was the voices of the marginal that were not heard, 
and the points of view of the marginal that were not taken into account. The silencing of 
the marginal will be acknowledged as the confessional of the centre will confess not 
inadequacy and failure, but benefit and continuing privilege. 
This project would not involve a re-casting of the nonnal as the abnormal, but it would 
involve an acknowledgement of the normal as the normal, of where the category comes 
from and a discussion of the fact that the conditions and circumstances that allowed the 
categorization of what is nonnal in the first place have not really changed. One of the 
difficulties is of course the tenn 'normal' itself However, it is possible to argue that an 
historical, contextualized, institutional and societal working concept of the nonnal still 
exists without having to argue that the 'normal' is fundamentally, universally and 
transcendentally 'true'. One of the ways that the normal still exists as a concept is through 
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aspiration and value. White middle class men and the heterosexual nuclear family, 
although shown to be imperfect are still the most represented of all groupings. Despite the 
fact that the representations show imperfection, ultimately what is suggested is confidence, 
comfort, affluence and a working knowledge of 'correct' cultural capital and taste. In our 
society these are very strong pulls and should not be underestimated. In June 2002 1 
attended a conference on class and hospitality (inclusion) at the University of Leeds. One 
of the main themes of the conference, surprisingly, appeared to be how awful it was living 
in the working class and many of the papers given and one entire film celebrated 'escape'. 
And what is there to escape into but the middle class? Thus despite being told that the 
nonnal doesn't exist, we are still half being told that it does, or a place that in the end looks 
very like it as we saw in chapter four under the aegis of 'autonomy', 'caring' and 'personal 
growth'. Again the values of the centre are universalized out and assumed to be the goals 
of everyone. 
As we have seen, de-centring the centre by (saying one is) moving it into the margins will 
just not work. Acknowledging and recognizing the centre as the centre and then beginning 
a systematic, rigorous and probably slow deconstruction of material inequalities has more 
chance of working. It will not be easy and it will be painful (admitting that one may have 
achieved one's position because one is white and/or male or middle class rather than 
through merit will stretch anyone's good intentions). An engagement with the concept of 
essentialism would also enable a more open discussion about how and where society is set 
up to be essentialist and how institutions within society perpetuate and uphold this 
essentialism. This in tum might allow a sustained and rigorous critique and discussion of 
essentialism rather than a straight denial. As the collectivity of white men as a group is 
recognized, so in tum must be the biological categorizations (whether 'true' or not) that 
have either conferred benefit, or have imposed oppression and limitations upon different 
groups of people. People have been oppressed because of their biological 'colour', or 
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because their body type is coded as female, or disabled or old etc. However, these 
categorizations can only be fully acknowledged i f it is also acknowledged that the very 
facts of being white and/or male carry privileges and benefits in themselves. In this case 
and at this time, anti-essentialism will only negate these facts. Essentialism within our 
society still exists atid this in itself means that a straight denial and an uncomplicated anti-
essentialism are not adequate tools to combat this type of continuing inequality that comes 
with racism and sexism. 
Strategic essentialism is not an end-technique but a vital theoretical step and to paraphrase 
Spivak (1994), in this case the 'usefulness' of essentialism could be acknowledged rather 
than denied, and acknowledged in terms of its usefulness both as radical critique of 
patriarchy, sexism, racism etc, but also in terms of its current and historic usefulness to a 
sexist and racist patriarchal hegemony. As Spivak argues in relation to essentialism and 
the centred subject, when people reject such concepts out of hand: "[t]his shows, it seems 
to me, a real desire to take one kind of political position over against another, not to see 
that a way of thinking is about the danger of what is powerful and useful, and instead 
simply to think that that way of thinking is talking about how that dangerous thing doesn't 
exist" (Spivak, 1994: 162). Examining essentialism as it is now and as it works now might 
(eventually) enable deconstruction. Where the 'de-centring' strategy advocates equality 
and therefore sidesteps inequality, a strategy of re-centring will enable us to tackle 
inequality head on and still allow space for the acknowledgement of difference. Denial of 
essentialism as 'incorrect' and immoral will not. This is why I advocate the use of 
strategic essentialism for white, middle class men and for it to be examined in relation to 
current concepts of the ('proper') family, in turn leading to an acknowledgment that a 
category of the 'nonnal' nuclear family still exists. 
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To reiterate: my suggestion is that white, middle class men retrace several theoretical steps 
and try strategic essentialism themselves, only where oppressed groups have and are using 
it to highlight oppression and inequality, white men could employ it to identify themselves 
as a group in order to trace benefit, both historical and present. Employing strategic 
essentialism for white, middle class men would mean that benefit could be properly 
discussed and calculated and a meaningfijl dialogue between current centre and margins 
could be set up wqth both sides listening. In order for lasting change to occur a 'true' 
(historic) technique of the margins could be employed by white men in order to 
acknowledge (and thus be able to study properly) benefit. What is needed (first) is a re-
acknowledgment and a re-positioning of the centre at the centre. A re-positioning of the 
centre at the centre will allow a far more accurate examination of power structures whilst 
(crucially) acknowledging that the power structures within our society are based on and 
aligned with essentialism. This in tum will acknowledge the margins and the true 
(continuing) extent of inequality in privilege, power and benefit in our society related to a 
(continuing) concept of normality. And if 1 am correct in my analysis that in the current 
climate, for the white, middle class centre of society it is a case of divided-vve-stand and 
united-we-fall, then a re-appropriation of a collective, (temporarily) essentialized, white, 
middle class, heterosexual, (male), identity might precipitate that fall which is the stated 
aim of both masculinity and family studies. 
It may be that hoping that this suggestion will be taken up is a little too Utopian, but 
perhaps we should believe Silva and Smart, Neale, Morgan, Chambers, Allan, and Jagger 
and Wright when they propose as their goal the dismantling of the heterosexual, 
patriarchal, nuclear family as the idealized/privileged/essentialized family form in our 
society. And perhaps we should believe Peterson, Beynon, Connell, Pease, Whitehead and 
Barrett when they proclaiin for pro-feminist masculinity studies that their fight is against 
"a culture that privileges men and masculinity" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 13). There 
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is no point in denying the material reality of normality and only when the shame of it is 
faced up to will there be any real possibility for change. The shame of normality cannot be 
individualized, it must be seen as society's shame because as Mamdani asks: " i f evil is 
thought of in social terms [...] then does not the demand for justice turn mainly, i f not 
wholly, into a demand for systemic reform?" (Mamdani, 1997: 25). Theory always has 
transformative potential and through collective and collaborative work, by not 
appropriating work without acknowledging its original context, by acknowledging where 
academic work is positioned from, recognizing who it addresses and by listening to each 
other, we can work towards that systemic refonn and can begin to look for true and 
sustained change. 
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